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Abstract 
Human conduct is often guided by conformist preferences, with “conformity” being the act 
of changing one’s behaviour to match the purported beliefs of others. Informal norms 
regulating human behaviour play a crucial role in directing people’s expectations, thereby 
favouring uniformity of behaviour. This thesis develops such insights by exploring the 
conditions for different categories of norms to be in operation. The first essay [Chapter1] 
considers the motive that drives players when facing a problem of coordinating one 
another’s actions for their mutual benefit. Chapter 1 suggests that for a “convention” (i.e.: 
a solution to a coordination game with multiple equilibria) to be in operation, conformity is 
dependent on the states one is aware of, that is, the specifications of the contingencies that 
each player perceives in the context of a given game. The second essay [Chapter2] focuses 
on the motivation that makes people comply with default rules of behaviour when facing a 
social dilemma (i.e.: a “mixed-motive” game). Chapter 2 suggests that individuals may feel 
guilt at violating a norm, and this painful emotion generates conformity under precisely 
stated conditions. The essay models a “norm” as a rule that dictates a set of strategy 
profiles: it is assumed that players hold a conjecture about the active player’s norm-
complying actions; a norm-driven decision maker is then modelled as a player with 
conformist preferences whose utility function is a linear combination of material and 
psychological payoffs. The third essay [Chapter3] provides an experimental test for 
conformist motivations by investigating the extent to which the peers’ behaviour (as 
presumed by other players) serves the individual as a means to guiding her actions. 
Specifically, the experiment of Chapter 3 is designed to measure the impact of the beliefs of 
players in the same role on behaviour; the data show evidence of conformity being present. 
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Introduction  
Surveys from various disciplines (including sociology, cognitive psychology 
and neuroscience) support the view that human conduct is often guided by 
conformist preferences – which thrive on behavioural expectations within a 
society or group – with “conformity” being the act of changing one‟s 
behaviour to match the purported beliefs of others. Informal norms regulating 
human behaviour play a crucial role in directing people‟s expectations, 
thereby favouring uniformity of behaviour within a given social group. By 
serving as equilibrium selection devices, norms reduce transaction costs in 
economic interactions that present multiple equilibria or, in some cases, 
promote efficient solutions. The present thesis develops these insights, in 
order to improve our understanding of such norms by explaining the 
underpinning conditions for different categories of norms to be in operation 
among players with conformist motivations. Indeed, the literature proposes 
various mechanisms for uniform social behaviour – which in turn relate to a 
variety of conformist preferences – including a pure coordination motive, 
social disproval and the internalization of absolute norms of conduct. 
The first essay [Chapter 1] considers the first mechanism or, precisely, 
the motive that drives players when facing a problem of coordinating one 
another‟s actions for their mutual benefit. Chapter 1 suggests that for a 
“convention” (i.e.: a certain solution to a coordination game with multiple 
equilibria) to be in operation, conformity is dependent on the states one is 
aware of, that is, the specifications of the contingencies that each player 
perceives in the context of a given game (e.g.: contextual cues). The essay 
proposes a theoretical framework for the player‟s own perception of the game 
so as to show that a convention is in place whenever members of a social 
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group use, and expect others to use, similar conceptual schemes: this is 
done by implementing a system of multiple state spaces ordered by 
expressive power, and a notion of the players‟ (un)awareness, in such a way 
as to provide a precise link between the players‟ perception of the game and 
the associated strategy labels. In brief, conventions are devised as the result 
of a four-step procedure: (i) perception; (ii) labelling; (iii) salience 
comparison; (iv) expected utility maximization.  
The second essay [Chapter 2] focuses on the second mechanism or, 
precisely, the motivation that makes people comply with default rules of 
behaviour when facing a social dilemma (i.e.: a “mixed-motive” game1). 
Chapter 2 suggests that individuals may feel guilt at violating a norm, and this 
painful emotion generates conformity under precisely stated conditions. The 
essay models a “norm” as a rule that dictates a set of strategy profiles: it is 
assumed that players, conditional on each history of an extensive form game, 
hold a conjecture about the active player‟s norm-complying actions available 
at that history; a norm-driven decision maker is then modelled as a player 
                                  
1
 Following Thomas Schelling‟s ([1960], Ch. 4) classification of games, strategic interactions 
can be categorized as “pure motive” and “mixed motive” games. The former are situations in 
which the players‟ preferences are rank-correlated with respect to outcomes, as in the 
games of pure coordination (positive correlation) or in the games of pure conflict, also known 
as zero-sum games (negative correlation). On the other hand, mixed-motive games present 
a non correlated structure of preferences, due to their mix of coordination opportunities and 
conflicting motivations: as Schelling puts it, «“[m]ixed-motive” refers not, of course, to an 
individual‟s lack of clarity about his own preferences but rather to the ambivalence of his 
relation to the other player – the mixture of mutual dependence and conflict, of partnership 
and competition» (p. 89). 
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with conformist preferences, whose utility function is a linear combination of 
her material payoff and a component representing the social cost of 
deviating. A “social norm” is said to exist and to be followed by a population if 
players have conditionally conformist preferences, hold correct beliefs, and 
are sensitive enough to the social cost of deviating. (The aforementioned 
third mechanism for uniform social behaviour, that is, the case of absolute 
norms of conduct is here considered as the feature of a special family of 
norm-driven agents, i.e.: those with unconditional preferences for conformity 
to a norm, which therefore constitutes a “moral norm”.) 
The third essay [Chapter 3] provides an experimental test for 
conformist motivations (in mixed-motive games) by investigating the extent to 
which the peers‟ presumed behaviour serves the individual as a means to 
guiding her own actions. The first hypothesis is that the experimenter should 
be able to predict a conformist player‟s behaviour from the conformist‟s 
guess about the behaviour of other players in the same role. Now, it should 
be noted that a false consensus effect hypothesis will predict an analogous 
correlation between beliefs and behaviour (although with an inverse causal 
relationship); given that, in order to disentangle consensus from conformity, 
one of the experimental treatments of Chapter 3 introduces an exogenous 
variation in beliefs by showing subjects some aggregate information about 
the others‟ beliefs. Indeed, if the experimenter can predict a subject‟s choice 
from the subject‟s guess (about the behaviour of other participants in the 
same role) in conjunction with the subsequently transmitted information about 
others‟ guesses, then one has effectively disentangled consensus from 
conformity and provided evidence in support of a conformity hypothesis. In 
fact, if false consensus is present, then there will be a causal relationship 
from behaviour to beliefs, and thus there will not be an effect of providing 
exogenous information; but if, on the other hand, conformity is present (in 
which case the causality runs from beliefs to behaviour), one will find that 
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exogenously varying beliefs has an impact on behaviour. More specifically, 
the experiment measures the impact of the beliefs of players in the same 
role, on behaviour, in a Trust Game: in brief, the data show that the 
transmitted information can influence one‟s behaviour, with the strength of 
the impact depending on one‟s prior beliefs; therefore, the data show 
evidence of conformity being present. 
Before proceeding, I shall stress that the rule-based approach to 
conformity here pursued does considerably differ from the approach followed 
in notable alternative accounts of conformity, such as the models of 
informational cascades (e.g.: Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani et al. [1992]) or 
esteem-based models (e.g.: Bernheim [1994]), in a sense that – while those 
models simply assume an agent to care about the others‟ information or 
esteem – there the others‟ actions do not directly enter each agent‟s utility 
function. Conversely, the present thesis focuses on conformity in situations 
where an individual‟s payoff directly depends on what the others do; in fact, 
although the present definitions and conditions for conventions or social 
norms to apply differ from one another (i.e.: “conventions” apply to 
coordination games, while “social norms” apply to mixed-motive games), in 
both cases the essence of such unwritten rules is defined by the fact that 
both imply belief-based solutions to problems of strategic interdependence. 
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I. A Theory of Conformity to Conventions with 
Incompletely-Aware Players  
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I.1. Introduction 
The “theory of convention” found its first comprehensive formulation within 
David Hume's theory of justice, elaborated in his Treatise of Human Nature 
(Hume [1740]). Then, the first game-theoretic analysis of conventions was 
developed by David Lewis in his Convention: A Philosophical Study (Lewis 
[1969]): this defined conventions as behavioural regularities satisfying some 
special conditions and inducing a “pure coordination equilibrium” (i.e.: a 
regular pattern of behaviour that is a strict Nash equilibrium in a coordination 
game with two or more strict Nash equilibria).2 Note that Lewis acknowledged 
his debt to Thomas Schelling – from whom he had borrowed the idea of 
modelling conventions as equilibria of coordination games – according to 
Schelling [1960] in fact, in solving coordination problems, we are often driven 
by apparently insignificant factors that make one of the feasible strategies 
“salient”. Also, it should be recalled that, according to the philosophical 
literature (Bicchieri [2006]), a convention is simply a descriptive norm which 
does not imply a commitment to compliance, but is useful since it coordinates 
people‟s expectations by acting as a signal that eases interaction; as Ken 
Binmore [2007] points out, in the Driving Game nobody cares which 
convention we use,3 there is no reason why either of the equilibria should be 
preferred to the other, yet «[i]n practice, we solve many coordination games 
                                  
2
 For recent reconstructions of Lewis‟ philosophical theory of convention, see: Cubitt and 
Sugden [2003]; Sillari [2005]. 
3
 The Driving Game is as follows: two players have to choose the side of the road upon 
which to drive: if they coordinate on either side, both get an equal payoff; if they do not 
coordinate, neither player receives anything. 
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by appealing to focal points that are determined by the context in which a 
game occurs. For example, people drive on the left in Japan and on the right 
in the United States. Such conventions are usually the result of historical 
accidents, but not always» (Binmore [2007], p. 268).  
The starting point of this essay is that certain features of the game as 
experienced by the player – which would not explicitly enter the formal 
description of a standard game  – can effectively make some strategy profiles 
focal. Therefore, the core of the problem is to provide a framework for the 
player‟s own perception of the strategic situation so as to show that 
coordination is possible because “normal” players use, and expect others to 
use, similar conceptual schemes. Thus, here it is suggested that, for a 
convention to be in operation, conformity is dependent on the states 
perceived by the agents, that is, the specifications of the contingencies that 
each player perceives in the context of a given decision problem (e.g.: 
contextual cues). In this respect, I shall build on Heifetz et al.‟s [2006] model 
of unawareness so as to account for multiple descriptions of the world: as in 
their model, here a system of multiple, ordered state spaces and surjective 
projections (from each state space to every space that is weakly “less 
expressive”) is adopted: the result is a powerful framework allowing for the 
players to be unaware of some features of the game as captured by 
alternative state spaces. 
Then, building on Sugden‟s [1995] and Casajus‟ [2000] approaches, 
the present theory defines the players‟ own framing system in such a way as 
to allow for the possibility that both stochastic and non-stochastic procedures 
may determine the labelling of strategies. Yet, departing from Sugden‟s and 
Casajus‟ models, here each player‟s labelling of strategies depends directly 
on her perception of the game, that is, on the states she is aware of: 
therefore, this study provides a precise link between a player‟s information 
function and her labelled strategies. Also, this study departs from the existing 
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literature in that it introduces a binary relation (i.e.: a complete preordering) 
on each set of strategy labels, thereby allowing the salience comparison of 
pairs of labelled strategies. Further, the introduction of two requirements 
capturing the notions of symmetry and salience has the effect of restricting 
the set of a player‟s mixed strategies. It follows that conventions arise as the 
result of a four-step procedure: (i) perception; (ii) labelling; (iii) salience 
comparison; (iv) expected utility maximization. 
Before proceeding, a quick note on methodology: this essay aims at 
explaining, in a static perspective, why conventions occur. While many 
commentators suggest alternative analyses of conventions (or, more 
generally, of coordination problems) based on evolutionary dynamics or on 
bounded rationality (i.e.: Level-k models), such approaches are not explored 
here as the present theory revolves around one-shot games played by (fully) 
rational utility-maximizers. In this respect, this model may be considered part 
of a body of literature sometimes referred to as “team-reasoning”. 
The remainder of the study is organized in this manner: I.2. introduces 
some general notation and concepts on strategic form games, coordination, 
and unawareness; I.3. proposes a game, and reviews some alternative 
analyses; I.4. formally expounds the model; I.5. discusses an equilibrium 
solution, and I.6. concludes. 
  
I.2. Preliminaries 
I.2.a. Notation on strategic form games 
A strategic form game is formalized by a structure  𝑁,  𝑆𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 ,  𝑢𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , where: 
𝑁 =  1, … , 𝑛  is the set of players, 𝑆𝑖  is the set of player 𝑖’s pure strategies, 𝑢𝑖  
is 𝑖’s payoff function. 
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Each player 𝑖 has a finite set 𝑆𝑖  of pure strategies, with generic 
element 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑎  (the first subscript indicating a certain player, the second 
subscript a certain strategy, with 𝑎 ∈  1, … , 𝑚  for a given 𝑚 ∈ ℤ+), where 
𝑠𝑖 ,𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖,1, 𝑠𝑖 ,2, … , 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑚 ; in order not to make the notation overly 
cumbersome, in what follows I shall dispense with the comma that separates 
the two subscripts and denote a generic strategy-index simply by 𝑠𝑖𝑎 . Note 
that, throughout this essay, each of a player‟s pure strategies is assigned an 
index which uniquely identifies that strategy: this means that, for example, in 
the aforementioned Driving Game each player 𝑖 has a finite set 𝑆𝑖  of pure 
strategies with generic element 𝑠𝑖𝑎 , where 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 =
 1,2 ; it should be further stressed that the English words “left” and “right” do 
not enter the formal structure of the game. Given that, a strategy profile 𝑠 is a 
tuple of strategies, with one strategy for each player of the game: let 𝑆 =
 𝑆𝑖𝑖∈𝑁  be the set of strategy profiles; similarly define 𝑆−𝑖 =  𝑆𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  for players 
𝑗 other than 𝑖. 
The material payoffs of players‟ strategies (as well as the players‟ 
preferences) are described by functions 𝑢𝑖 : S → ℝ, with 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁; the payoffs to 
player 𝑖 are therefore written as 𝑢𝑖 𝑠 ≡ 𝑢𝑖   𝑠𝑗𝑎  𝑗 ∈𝑁  for ∀ 𝑠𝑗𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑗 , where 
𝑠 =  𝑠𝑗𝑎  𝑗 ∈𝑁 denotes a strategy profile.
4 To keep the exposition simple, I shall 
often focus on 2-player games, although the analysis applies equally well to 
any n-player normal form game: in the 2-player case, it is common to put the 
strategy of Player 1 first so that the payoffs to player 𝑖, with 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (𝑁 =  1,2 ), 
are written as 𝑢𝑖 𝑠1𝑎 , 𝑠2𝑎   for ∀ 𝑠1𝑎 ∈ 𝑆1, ∀ 𝑠2𝑎 ∈ 𝑆2; with respect to the order 
                                  
4
 The lower subscript 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 indicates that 𝑠 contains one element 𝑠𝑗𝑎  for every 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁. 
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of the players‟ strategies when writing a strategy profile, the notation adopted 
here removes any ambiguity since every strategy-index belongs to exactly 
one player (e.g.:  𝑠1𝑎 , 𝑠2𝑎   indicates the same strategy profile as  𝑠2𝑎 , 𝑠1𝑎 ), 
hence the order of the players‟ actions does not matter since the strategies 
contained in each player‟s strategy set have different indices, that is, 
𝑆𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗 = ∅ for ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖.
5 
A mixed strategy for player 𝑖 gives the probabilities that action 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 
will be played: let a generic mixed strategy for player 𝑖 be denoted by 𝜍𝑖 , 
where 𝜍𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖 ≡ ∆ 𝑆𝑖 , with Σ𝑖  denoting the set of 𝑖’s mixed strategies and 
∆ 𝑆𝑖  being the set of probability measures over 𝑆𝑖 ; a generic mixed strategy 
for player 𝑖 can be represented as a vector of probabilities 
𝜍𝑖 =  𝑝 𝑠𝑖1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖2 , … , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑚   . In the 2-player case, with a slight abuse of 
notation, let 𝑢𝑖 𝜍1, 𝜍2 =   𝑝 𝑠1𝑎 𝑠2𝑎 ∈𝑆2𝑠1𝑎∈𝑆1 𝑝 𝑠2𝑎  𝑢𝑖 𝑠1𝑎 , 𝑠2𝑎   indicate the 
payoffs to player 𝑖 for the profile of mixed strategies 𝜍 =  𝜍1, 𝜍2 . 
I.2.b. Coordination games, symmetries, and labels 
Following in Lewis‟ [1969] wake – who defined a “convention” as a regular 
pattern of behaviour that is a strict Nash equilibrium in a coordination game 
with multiple strict Nash equilibria – the present theory revolves around one-
                                  
5
 Note that the strategies contained in each player‟s strategy set have different indices 
because the first subscript of a strategy-index always identifies a certain player; for example 
in the aforementioned Driving Game, with 𝑁 =  1,2 , the strategy sets are 𝑆1 =  𝑠11 , 𝑠12  and 
𝑆2 =  𝑠21 , 𝑠22 . Also notice that, given that only one-shot games in strategic form are to be 
analysed here, in this essay I refer to “strategies” and “actions” interchangeably. 
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shot games (played without communication) in which the payoff table is 
completely symmetrical between players and strategies.  
Before defining symmetries, it may be worth recalling that a 
coordination problem is a situation with a number of outcomes on which 
agents can coordinate their actions for mutual benefit; such situations can be 
categorized as “pure coordination” or “impure coordination” games if – at 
each equilibrium outcome – all players receive the same payoff or not, 
respectively. Some pure coordination games, which present the below payoff 
structure for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, are referred to as matching games: 
 
𝑢𝑖 𝑠1𝑎 , 𝑠2𝑎 , … , 𝑠𝑛𝑎  =  
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 = 𝑎 = ⋯ = 𝑎 
0 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 , 
  (1.2.1) 
 
for all 𝑎, 𝑎 , … , 𝑎 ∈  1, … , 𝑚 . Compactly, a matching game is a structure 
Γ𝑛
𝑚 =  𝑁,  𝑆𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 ,  𝑢𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , where 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 =  1, … , 𝑛  and 
𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, … , 𝑠𝑖𝑚   for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (for given 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ ℤ
+, 𝑛 = 𝑚 or 𝑛 ≠ 𝑚), 
with  𝑢𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 being defined as in formula (1.2.1):
6 the aforementioned Driving 
Game is an instance of Γ2
2. 
The concept of symmetry is developed by Harsanyi and Selten [1988], 
Ch. 3: here a slightly simpler definition that best suits the purposes of this 
study is employed. 
                                  
6
 Recall that, throughout this essay, it is assumed that material payoffs describe the 
consequences of the players‟ actions as well as their preferences. 
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Definition I.1. Given a strategic form game 𝐺, with 𝑆𝑖 ∩ 𝑆𝑗 = ∅ for ∀ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, a 
symmetry of the game is a pair of bijective functions  𝜙,  𝜎𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , where 
𝜙: 𝑁 → 𝑁 and 𝜎𝑖 : 𝑆𝑖 → 𝑆𝜙 𝑖  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, such that 𝑢𝑖 𝑠 = 𝑢𝜙 𝑖   𝜎𝑗  𝑠𝑗𝑎   
𝑗 ∈𝑁
  
for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each strategy profile 𝑠 =  𝑠𝑗𝑎  𝑗 ∈𝑁. 
 
In a nutshell, a symmetry is a way of exchanging the names (i.e.: indices) of 
players and strategies that leaves the payoffs – hence the solution/s – of the 
game unchanged: obviously, if one exchanges via  𝜙,  𝜎𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁  the players 
and the strategies of a game and this yields in all cases the same payoffs (as 
those of each strategy profile prior to the exchange of names), then such a 
pair of bijective functions has generated the same game. Similarly, one could 
define a new game 𝐺 ′ =  𝑁′ ,  𝑆𝑖
′ 𝑖∈𝑁′ ,  𝑢𝑖
′ 𝑖∈𝑁′   in such a way as to rename ex 
novo the players and the strategies but leave the payoffs as in the original 
game 𝐺: that is easily done by introducing a pair of bijective functions 
 𝜙 ,  𝜎 𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁′  , with 𝜙 : 𝑁 → 𝑁
′  and 𝜎 𝑖 : 𝑆𝑖 → 𝑆𝜙  𝑖 
′  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′ , such that 𝑢𝑖 𝑠 =
𝑢𝜙  𝑖 
′   𝜎 𝑗  𝑠𝑗𝑎   
𝑗 ∈𝑁′
  for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁′  and each strategy profile 𝑠 =
 𝑠𝑗𝑎  𝑗 ∈𝑁′ .
7 Again, the solutions of 𝐺 and 𝐺 ′  are necessarily the same, which 
implies that the solutions of any game in strategic form have to be 
                                  
7
 In Harsanyi and Selten‟s [1988] terminology, such a pair of bijective functions is referred to 
as a renaming or, equivalently, as an isomorphism with no positive linear payoff 
transformations. Two games 𝐺 and 𝐺 ′  are called isomorphic if at least one isomorphism from 
𝐺 to 𝐺 ′  exists. 
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independent of the ordering or naming of players/strategies: this result – 
known as “invariance with respect to isomorphisms” – is formalized by 
Harsanyi and Selten [1988], Ch. 3; further, since a strategy could be named 
(i.e.: indexed) differently, in equivalent games, invariance with respect to 
isomorphisms implies that strategies that are distinguishable only with 
respect to each strategy-index should be assigned the same probabilities in a 
solution.  
Given that, Casajus [2000] suggests a definition of “symmetric 
strategies” which draws on Harsanyi and Selten‟s notion of symmetry of a 
game: (adapting it to the notation and definition of symmetry of the present 
essay) two pure strategies 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑠𝑖 ′ 𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 ′  of 𝐺 are said to be 
symmetric if there exists a symmetry  𝜙,  𝜎𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁  of 𝐺 such that 𝜎𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝑠𝑖 ′ 𝑎 . 
For example, in the Driving Game Γ2
2, 𝑠11 and 𝑠12 are symmetrical with 𝑠21 
and 𝑠22, respectively; again, this implies that the only symmetry-invariant 
equilibrium in mixed strategies must assign them the same probability, i.e.: 
  
1
2
,
1
2
 ,  
1
2
,
1
2
  . 
Although neither Schelling [1960] nor Lewis [1969] defined any such 
formal concept of symmetry of strategic forms, both pioneered the study of 
coordination in games whose payoff table is symmetrical between players 
and strategies. In particular, Schelling drew attention to the importance of 
contextual cues (or “focal points”) in coordination problems: in effect, players 
can sometimes solve coordination games by resorting to apparently 
insignificant factors that make one of the feasible actions salient, thereby 
breaking any symmetry of strategies; put differently, this means that the 
context in which games appear – or the way games are framed – may affect 
the way people play them. Building on Schelling‟s intuition, Sugden [1995] 
enriches the mathematical structure of a game by introducing a rule that 
assigns to each of a player‟s strategies a private label representing the way 
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the very player describes the game to herself (e.g.: in Γ2
2 one player may have 
a rule such that 𝑠𝑖1 ↦ 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 and 𝑠𝑖2 ↦ 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑕𝑡, or vice versa); there the players‟ 
descriptions of strategies are privately observed permutations of the analyst‟s 
naming (i.e.: indexing) of strategies. As Sugden points out: 
The labels that a player uses will depend in part on psychological and cultural 
factors: for example, where one player sees “left and right”, another might see 
“east and west”. There is a sense in which the labels that players use reflect 
what is salient for them: we might say that the left-right distinction is salient for 
some players and the east-west distinction for others. (p. 537) 
While Sugden‟s [1995] theory accounts for coordination in games where a 
stochastic procedure determines the (one-dimensional) label each player 
privately assigns to each of her strategies, Casajus [2000] provides a 
complementary framework for the analysis of coordination games where a 
non-stochastic structure called “frame” describes the players‟ own 
representation (i.e.: labelling) of strategies by associating them with a set of 
attributes (e.g.: colour or shape of an object to choose). More precisely, 
Casajus builds on Bacharach [1993] and Janssen [2001] by defining a multi-
dimensional system for the labelling of strategies,8 in addition to a 
requirement on solutions based on Harsanyi and Selten‟s invariance with 
respect to isomorphisms.  
I.2.c. Knowledge and unawareness 
The present theory compromises on Sugden‟s and Casajus‟ approaches, as 
it defines the players‟ own framing system in such a way as to allow for the 
                                  
8
 This body of literature was initiated by Gauthier [1975]. 
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possibility that both stochastic and non-stochastic procedures may determine 
the labelling of strategies. Moreover, this study postulates that different 
labellings arise among players by virtue of the different sets of states each 
player may be aware of (where the multiple state spaces picture the 
specifications of the contingencies each player perceives in the context of a 
given decision problem). More precisely, here, each player’s labelling of 
strategies depends directly on her perception of the game, that is, on the 
states she is aware of: therefore, this study provides a precise link between 
the players‟ perception of the game (given by their information functions) and 
their labelled strategies. 
Before introducing the concept of (un)awareness, I shall briefly present 
the standard model of knowledge and the problems associated with it.9 For a 
given strategic form game  𝑁,  𝑆𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 ,  𝑢𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , a model of knowledge is a 
structure   Ω, 𝑞 ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , where: Ω is the set of states, 𝑞 is a probability 
measure over Ω, I𝑖  is the information partition of player 𝑖 (with I𝑖  being a 
partition of Ω). Given the state space Ω – where each 𝜔 ∈ Ω is a description 
of the contingencies that the agent considers to be relevant in the context of 
the game at hand – each player 𝑖 has an information (set-valued) function 𝐼𝑖  
that associates with every state 𝜔 ∈ Ω a non-empty subset 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⊆ Ω (with 
𝐼𝑖 𝜔  being interpreted as the set of states the agent considers possible 
when the true state is 𝜔). It is assumed that   Ω, 𝑞 ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁  satisfies the 
                                  
9
 The standard model of knowledge corresponds to the S-5 system of epistemic logic, and is 
due to Hintikka [1962]. The concept of common knowledge was suggested by Lewis [1969], 
whereas Aumann [1976] gave the mathematically-precise (set-theoretic) definition which is 
habitually used in the economics literature. 
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following properties: (i) 𝜔 ∈ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  for ∀ 𝜔 ∈ Ω; (ii) 𝜔
′ ∈ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⟹ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔
′ = 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 . 
To sum up, when representing a socio-economic application in game-
theoretic terms, given a (unique) state space Ω, uncertainty is generically 
captured by assuming that the agent 𝑖 does not know which is the true state, 
knowing instead only which cell 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  of a partition I𝑖  of Ω contains the true 
state 𝜔. 
Now, unawareness characterizes an epistemic state in which “one 
does not know an event,10 and does not know that she does not know it, and 
so on ad infinitum”.11 While a notion of unawareness as described here 
encompasses the perfectly realistic situation in which an agent is simply 
ignorant as to the existence of some contingency, it turns out that – under the 
assumptions of the standard partitional model of knowledge – it is not 
possible to account for such a situation. In fact, the information function 𝐼𝑖  
associates with every state 𝜔 ∈ Ω a non-empty subset 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  of Ω, and this 
implies that the agent cannot be unaware of anything: having an information 
partition I𝑖  entails that, if she does not know an event, then she knows she 
does not know it. To further clarify this point, I shall recall that player 𝑖 is said 
to know event 𝐸 (with 𝐸 ⊆ Ω), at state 𝜔, if 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⊆ 𝐸; writing K𝑖 𝐸  as a 
shorthand for the set of states in which 𝑖 knows 𝐸, one can define a 
knowledge function K𝑖  (mapping the power set of Ω into itself) by K𝑖 𝐸 =
                                  
10
 As is customary, an event 𝐸 is defined as a subset of the state space. 
11
 In a controversial statement to the press Donald Rumsfeld (as the United States Secretary 
of Defense) claimed: «[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We 
also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do 
not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don't know we don't know». 
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 𝜔 ∈ Ω: 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⊆ 𝐸 . It is well known that the knowledge function K which is 
derived from an information function 𝐼 satisfies the following properties: 
 
 𝑘. 𝑖: necessitation   K Ω = Ω 
 𝑘. 𝑖𝑖: monotonicity   𝐸 ⊆ 𝐹 ⟹ K 𝐸 ⊆ K 𝐹  
 𝑘. 𝑖𝑖𝑖: conjunction   K 𝐸 ∩K 𝐹 = K 𝐸 ∩ 𝐹  
 𝑘. 𝑖𝑣: axiom of knowledge   K 𝐸 ⊆ 𝐸 
 𝑘. 𝑣: axiom of transparency   K 𝐸 ⊆ K K 𝐸   
 𝑘. 𝑣𝑖: axiom of wisdom   ∼K 𝐸 ⊆ K ∼ K 𝐸 . 12 
 
A few comments are in order. Properties (k.i-iii) are bookkeeping 
assumptions satisfied by knowledge functions derived from any information 
function; besides, if the information function is partitional, then (k.iv-vi) are 
satisfied as well. Of particular interest is (k.vi), which implies that whenever 
an agent does not know an event, she knows she does not know it (which 
plainly eliminates the possibility of unawareness): for this reason, 
Geanakoplos [1989] circumvents the problem by using non-partitional 
information structures; yet, Dekel et al. [1998] propose three intuitive 
properties for unawareness and show that they are not compatible at all with 
the standard state space specification (and in particular with the above (k.i-
ii)). As a consequence of Dekel et al.‟s [1998] impossibility results, a few 
attempts at modelling multi-person unawareness have been put forward 
either by making use of the modal syntax within the semantic structures or by 
                                  
12
 ∼ denotes negation. 
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means of set-theoretic specifications involving a lattice structure:13 the latter 
approach models a system of multiple state spaces explicitly ordered by 
“expressive power”. 
In what follows I shall draw on Heifetz et al.‟s [2006] specification of 
such epistemic states, in order to allow for the players to be unaware of some 
representations of the situation (as captured by different state spaces).14 
Thus, the goal of the essay is to provide a framework for the player‟s own 
comprehension of the game so as to show that coordination is possible when 
certain players use – and expect others to use – similar conceptual schemes: 
so, for a convention to be in operation, conformity is dependent on the states 
(e.g.: contextual cues) perceived by similar players (e.g.: agents sharing a 
collection of attitudes, values, goals, and practices characterizing a certain 
group, organization or institution). 
 
I.3. A game and a comparison of alternative analyses 
I shall introduce the following game (henceforth “Choose an Object”). Players 
are presented with a tray with six cubic objects, which are then placed into a 
                                  
13
 For the former class of models see Heifetz et al. [2008], for the latter see Heifetz et al. 
[2006], among the others. 
14
 A related idea – known as “indirect realism” – has been popular in the history of 
philosophy, being developed by many authors including Bertrand Russell, Baruch Spinoza, 
René Descartes, and John Locke: indirect realism is a position broadly comparable to a 
certain view of perception in natural science, according to which individuals do not 
experience the external world as it really is, but know only interpretations of the way the 
world is (Hawking and Mlodinow [2010], Ch. 3). 
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bag all at once.15 (Such objects are cubic blocks, which the experimenter 
identifies by the numbers 1 to 6; such numbers are invisible to the players.) 
The colours of the cubes are as follows: objects no. 1-2 are grey, objects no. 
3-4 are red, objects no. 5-6 are black; the objects are otherwise identical in 
shape, size, material, etc.. Given that, the experimenter takes three blocks 
out of the bag, one by one at random in front of all players, and places them 
on a table in an orderly fashion. Players are then privately asked to choose 
one of the objects (subjects cannot communicate with one another); the 
players‟ utility is defined as in formula (1.2.1) above, that is, assuming 
 𝑁 = 2, each player‟s payoff is 1 if both choose the same object, 0 
otherwise. 
Using the notation introduced in section I.2.a. above, the analyst‟s 
description of the game is as follows: each object represents a distinct 
strategy, that is, 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, … , 𝑠𝑖6  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁; notice that no contextual 
cues enter the analyst‟s description of the game, in fact – to the analyst – 
Choose an Object simply consists of  
6
3
 =
6!
3!3!
= 20 strategic games, where 
Nature randomly (and publicly) determines the one game to be played; so, 
each of the 20 games differs from the others only in the names of the 
available strategies, with the strategies of each of the 20 strategic games 
being denoted by 𝑆𝑖
′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖3 , 𝑆𝑖
′′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖4 , 𝑆𝑖
′′′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖5 , 
𝑆𝑖
′′′′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖6 , etc. for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. For instance, 𝑠𝑖1 denotes the strategy of 
choosing object no. 1, 𝑠𝑖2 denotes the strategy of choosing object no. 2, etc. 
for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁; again, it should be stressed that  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖3  represents only the 
                                  
15
 The initial positions on the tray are not clearly identifiable. 
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analyst‟s naming of the strategies (all such strategy-indices are invisible to 
the players, as are the numbers on the objects which the analyst uses to 
identify the blocks). 
Now, assume Nature has selected the strategic game of which the set 
of strategies is 𝑆𝑖
′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖3  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: further to the discussion in 
section I.2.b. above, notice that 𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖3 are symmetric strategies; it follows 
that the only symmetry-invariant equilibrium in mixed strategies must assign 
them the same probability. Therefore, the only symmetry-invariant equilibrium 
is the profile of mixed strategies 𝜍 =  𝜍1, 𝜍2  where, using the above notation, 
a mixed strategy is given by the vector of probabilities 
𝜍𝑖 =  𝑝 𝑠𝑖1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖2 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖3  =  
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Similarly, if Nature selects 
the strategic game with set of strategies 𝑆𝑖
′′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖4  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, the only 
symmetry-invariant strategy profile is 𝜍 =  𝜍1, 𝜍2 , where a mixed strategy is 
given by the vector of probabilities 𝜍𝑖 =  𝑝 𝑠𝑖1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖2 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖4  =  
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
  for 
∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.  
From the above analysis it is evident that all such 20 strategic games 
are isomorphic (see footnote 7), that is, to the analyst their mathematical 
structures represent exactly the same decision problem, and as such should 
not be treated differently (Harsanyi and Selten [1988], Ch. 3). Instead, 
Variable Frame Theory (Bacharach [1993], Bacharach and Bernasconi 
[1997]) would analyze Choose an Object as follows: once Nature has 
selected a strategic game, the cubic blocks will present (colour-perceiving) 
players with either two or three different colours, hence two/three different 
“feasible acts” (besides a completely randomized act). Therefore, in the case 
in which the blocks are of only two colours, Variable Frame Theory (along 
with Janssen [2001]) suggests that players should choose the one block of a 
different colour: for instance, assume Nature has selected the strategic game 
with set of strategies 𝑆𝑖
′ =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖3  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁; recalling that objects no. 1-
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2 are grey and object no. 3 is red, Bacharach would predict that players 
choose the red object (i.e.: 𝑠𝑖3 for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁) with probability one. 
Furthermore, consider the case in which Nature has selected the 
strategic game with set of strategies  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖3, 𝑠𝑖5  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁; here the cubic 
blocks present players with three different colours. Thus, in this case 
Bacharach‟s theory would predict three equilibria in pure strategies, that is, 
one in which all players choose the grey object with probability one (i.e.: 
𝑠 =  𝑠𝑖1 𝑖∈𝑁), one in which all players choose the red object (i.e.: 𝑠 =  𝑠𝑖3 𝑖∈𝑁), 
and one in which all players choose the black object (i.e.: 𝑠 =  𝑠𝑖5 𝑖∈𝑁). Unlike 
Bacharach, in this case Janssen [2001] argues that to the players the 
feasible acts (i.e.: the coloured objects) are symmetric, hence – players have 
no particular reason to choose their part of any one of the three solutions, 
and so – a theory of rational play should require that players implement the 
strategy profile 𝜍 =  𝜍1, 𝜍2 , with each strategy being the vector of 
probabilities 𝜍𝑖 =  𝑝 𝑠𝑖1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖3 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖5  =  
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
 . 
As mentioned above, Casajus‟ [2000] analysis follows in Bacharach‟s 
and Janssen‟s wake by defining a (multi-dimensional) system for the labelling 
of strategies in such a way as to formalize both (Bacharach‟s and Janssen‟s) 
arguments and take care of Harsanyi and Selten‟s invariance with respect to 
isomorphisms.16 Yet, specifically in the last example (i.e.: strategic game with 
set of strategies  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖3, 𝑠𝑖5  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁), because the objects differ in colour 
but are otherwise identical in shape, size, material, etc., Casajus‟ model 
would limit itself to defining one “attribute” (i.e.: colour), thereby labelling the 
                                  
16
 A recent contribution in the same line of research is Alós-Ferrer and Kuzmics [2012].  
 - 31 - 
 
strategies as colour perceiving players see them (i.e.: 𝑠𝑖1 ↦ 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦, 𝑠𝑖3 ↦ 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 
and 𝑠𝑖5 ↦ 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁). 
On the other hand, departing from the aforementioned models, the 
theory to be introduced in the next section will argue that in the last example 
(i.e.: strategic game with set of strategies  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖3, 𝑠𝑖5  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁) – given the 
same suggested labelling as above (i.e.: 𝑠𝑖1 ↦ 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦, 𝑠𝑖3 ↦ 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑠𝑖5 ↦ 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 
for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁) – colour perceivers can coordinate on a unique pure strategy (i.e.: 
𝑟𝑒𝑑) if they feel that primary colours are most prominent (based on a binary 
relation allowing the salience comparison of pairs of alternatives), without 
needing to define any additional attribute.17 Also, the aforementioned models 
would not help us in the case in which players simply (ignore colours but) 
distinguish between the objects by the order in which the experimenter draws 
the blocks from the bag: in fact, the present theory will argue that the block-
order perceivers can end up with a payoff of 1 if they feel that the first object 
to be randomly drawn is more prominent than the others. (Again, notice that 
Casajus‟ framework is based on a non-stochastic labelling structure, like 
Bacharach‟s and Janssen‟s.)   
 
                                  
17
 In effect, it should be stressed that here Casajus [2000] would need to define one 
additional attribute (i.e.: primary-/non primary- colour) so as to label strategies as primary-
colour distinguishing players see them (i.e.: 𝑠𝑖1 ↦ 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦, 𝑠𝑖3 ↦ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦, and 𝑠𝑖5 ↦
𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁), in order to reach the same conclusion. 
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I.4. A model of conventions 
The present theory builds on Sugden‟s and Casajus‟ frameworks so as to 
allow for the possibility that both stochastic and non-stochastic procedures 
may determine the labelling of strategies: for instance, assume it is common 
knowledge (among the block-order perceivers) that each player identifies the 
strategies by the order in which the objects are drawn from the bag and 
placed on the table; then, based on the order of the blocks as drawn by the 
experimenter, one could define a renaming of the strategic game at hand, 
thereby labelling the strategies as the players perceive them, namely 
 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑 .18 Now, it should be noticed that such labelled 
strategies would remain symmetrical with one another, and therefore 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑 should each still be assigned the same probability in a 
mixed-strategy solution: hence, in order to capture the different degrees of 
                                  
18
 Sugden [1995], building on Crawford and Haller [1990], proposes a set of properties for 
labelling procedures, namely:  𝐴1  scrambling of labels for each player;  𝐴2  independent 
labelling;  𝐴3  common language;  𝐴4  symmetry of labelling between players. Sugden‟s 
analysis then focuses on what he dubs “common-pool labelling procedures”, that is, labelling 
procedures satisfying both  𝐴2  and  𝐴4  or, in plain words, procedures requiring that 
different players‟ labellings are determined by independent random draws from the same 
distribution. On the other hand, the present theory departs from Sugden‟s in that the labelling 
procedures considered here satisfy both  𝐴1  and  𝐴4 , but not  𝐴2 : in a nutshell, the 
labelling procedures I shall focus on have a stochastic element since, for example, the order 
in which the blocks are drawn from the bag and placed on the table is determined by an 
exogenous random process, yet all such random draws are publicly observed by players; 
therefore, here (unlike Sugden [1995], and Crawford and Haller [1990]) players‟ descriptions 
of strategies are publicly observed permutations of the analyst‟s naming (i.e.: indexing) of 
strategies. 
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salience that players may attach to their labelled strategies, the present 
theory introduces a binary relation on the set of players‟ labelled strategies, 
allowing the salience comparison of pairs of alternatives (i.e.: a complete 
preordering, henceforth referred to as a “salience relation”). 
A few comments are in order. First, it is assumed that such a binary 
relation is based on an exogenous criterion that is mutually recognizable, like 
the order in which the objects are drawn by a third party, the consequent 
objects‟ spatial proximity to the players, etc.. It is clear that such a binary 
relation will induce a solution which is arbitrary to a certain degree. As 
Schelling [1960] puts it: 
The solutions are, of course, arbitrary to this extent: any solution is “correct” if 
enough people think so. [...] Most situations – perhaps every situation for 
people who are practiced at this kind of game – provide some clue for 
coordinating behaviour, some focal point for each person‟s expectation of 
what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or 
rather finding a key – any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes 
the key – may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on 
analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or 
geometrical configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and 
what they know about each other. (pp. 55-57, italics in original) 
For instance, given a binary relation based on the order in which the objects 
are drawn by the experimenter, here a reason why players may end up 
attaching a greater degree of salience to the object labelled as 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 is, 
again, provided by Schelling: «If one [...] asks what number, among all 
positive numbers, is most clearly unique, or what rule of selection would lead 
to unambiguous results, one may be struck with the fact that the universe of 
all positive numbers has a “first” or “smallest” number» (Schelling [1960], p. 
94, italics in original). So, in Choose an Object, such a rule of selection would 
result in players – who perceive the strategies as 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑, 
respectively – choosing the first block to be drawn by the experimenter (i.e.: 
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the strategy labelled as 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡), whatever is the strategy-index associated with 
it. 
On a different note, it should be stressed that Sugden [1995] (like 
Crawford and Haller [1990]) accounts for uncertainty regarding the other 
players‟ comprehension of the game in that, as mentioned above, the 
players‟ descriptions of strategies are privately observed permutations of the 
analyst‟s indexing of strategies (see footnote 18). Instead, Casajus [2000] 
(like Bacharach [1993] and Janssen [2001]) models uncertainty by means of 
a sort of game of incomplete information in which the frame (i.e.: labelling) of 
a player is associated with a player‟s “type”. Now, the present theory models 
uncertainty in an original way, which only in part relates to Bacharach, 
Janssen, and Casajus, in that a certain kind of player is associated with a 
certain labelling of strategies (and, in the present theory, in turn with a certain 
binary relation on the set of the player‟s labelled strategies); however, this 
study crucially departs from the existing literature because it implements a 
notion of the players‟ (un)awareness. In effect, by introducing a notion of 
unawareness: (i) the present theory accounts for both stochastic and non-
stochastic labelling procedures, thereby providing a precise link between the 
players‟ perception of the game and their labelled strategies; (ii) it permits to 
explain coordination, in certain cases, even between differently-aware 
players (i.e.: between players that have partially-different sets of labelled 
strategies). 
Therefore, the present theory implements Heifetz et al.‟s [2006] 
system of multiple state spaces so as to account for such different players‟ 
perceptions: for instance, in Choose an Object, players who realize only the 
block orderings will be aware of state space Ω𝐵 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝜔𝑐𝑥𝑥  , 
where each state refers to one of 120 possible orderings of the objects 
(based on the order of the blocks as drawn by the experimenter); similarly, 
players who realize only the colour differences will be aware of state space 
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Ω𝐶 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖   , … , 𝜔𝑥𝑥     , where each state refers to one of 20 possible 
combinations of the coloured objects (based on the available coloured 
objects drawn by the experimenter, irrespective of the order). Then, as 
mentioned before, each player‟s labelling of strategies will depend directly on 
her perception of the game, that is, on the states she is aware of; given that, 
the present theory restricts the set of each player‟s (mixed) strategies by 
imposing two constraints that are implied by the notions of symmetry-
invariance and salience relation, respectively.   
The exposition of the model is organized in a manner such that each 
of the following sub-sections will describe one of the steps involved in the 
operation of a convention: (i) perception; (ii) labelling; (iii) salience 
comparison; (iv) expected utility maximization. 
I.4.a. A general framework for perception 
Let Ω∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾  be the full set of states, with  Ω
𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 being disjoint subsets 
of Ω∗, where 𝐾 is a space-index set and Ω𝑘  denotes a generic set of states;19 
for each 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 let  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘  be a finite probability space, with 𝑞𝑘 ∈ Δ Ω𝑘 , 
where 𝑞𝑘  is a probability measure over Ω𝑘  and Δ Ω𝑘  is the set of probability 
measures over Ω𝑘 . The interpretation is that each Ω𝑘  is a collection of 
mutually exclusive specifications of the contingencies that an agent perceives 
in the context of a given decision problem (i.e.: each 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝑘  can be regarded 
as a full description of contingencies that relate to the game, in the player‟s 
own perspective). Notice that, for a given state space Ω𝑘 , only one of the 
                                  
19
 An explicit ordered structure on  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 will be introduced below. 
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states – referred to as the “true state” – obtains, thereby depicting how the 
game is actually expressed through the (𝑘-perceiving) player‟s own 
vocabulary (whereas the other states relate to possible, alternative 
descriptions of the game). 
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). I can now discuss the game introduced 
in section I.3. in light of the above definitions. Recall: players who realize only 
the block orderings will be aware of state space Ω𝐵 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝜔𝑐𝑥𝑥  , 
where each state refers to one of 120 possible orderings of the objects; 
players who realize only the colour differences will be aware of state space 
Ω𝐶 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖   , … , 𝜔𝑥𝑥     , where each state refers to one of 20 possible 
combinations of the coloured objects. Hence,  Ω𝐵 =  
6
3
 3! =
6!
3! 6−3 !
3! = 120, 
and 𝑞𝐵 𝜔 = 1/120 for each ω ∈ Ω𝐵 (i.e.: the probability 𝑞𝐵 𝜔  of each of 
these states occurring, where occurring means “being brought about by the 
experimenter‟s random draws”, is 1/120);20 similarly,  Ω𝐶 =  
6
3
 = 20, and 
𝑞𝐶 𝜔 = 1/20 for each ω ∈ Ω𝐶. Furthermore, in Choose an Object, players 
who realize both the block orderings and the colour differences will be aware 
of the “more expressive” state space Ω𝐵𝐶 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖   , … , 𝜔𝑐𝑥𝑥      , where each 
state includes the description of one of 120 possible orderings along with a 
description of the respective colours of the objects: to sum up,  Ω𝐵𝐶 = 120, 
and 𝑞𝐵𝐶 𝜔 = 1/120 for each ω ∈ Ω𝐵𝐶 . 
 
                                  
20
 For a given set Ω,  Ω  denotes its cardinality. 
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Given the role played by the state spaces in depicting the individual‟s 
perception of the game, it is now convenient to discuss a notion of the 
players‟ (un)awareness. Indeed, as exemplified above, a player may view 
only some of the features of a (multi-person) decision problem (i.e.: some of 
the state spaces in  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾); or else, a player may be aware of all the 
potential contextual cues (i.e.: the full set of states Ω∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 ), and may 
yet assume that her co-players‟ perceptions are limited. Again, a player of 
Choose an Object (say, Player 𝑖), who is aware of both block orderings and 
colour differences (i.e.: aware of the state space Ω𝐵𝐶), may well assume that 
her counterpart is only aware of Ω𝐵 if she believes that her counterpart is 
colour-blind; she in turn (say, Player 𝑗) – if indeed colour-blind – will not be 
able to conceive of Ω𝐶 as being relevant to the game perceived by her co-
player since she (Player 𝑗) will merely ignore the existence of Ω𝐶. Therefore, I 
shall draw on Heifetz et al.‟s [2006] model of unawareness so as to account 
for such different players‟ perceptions; as in their model, I use a system of 
surjective projections from each state space to every space that is weakly 
less expressive – this sub-section will initially detail such a system of 
projections and follow up with further discussion of the above illustration – the 
application will lead the way to a novel theory of conventions. 
Consider a complete lattice of disjoint spaces 𝑺 =  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾  and let 
Ω∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾  be the union of such spaces (i.e.: the full set of states); recall 
that a state 𝜔 is an element of some space Ω𝑘 . Let ≼ denote an expressivity 
relation, that is, a partial preordering on 𝑺 such that, for any Ω, Ω′ ∈ 𝑺, Ω ≼ Ω′  
means that “Ω′  is weakly more expressive than Ω”: the interpretation is that 
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states in Ω′  give a more detailed description of contingencies.21 Further, let 
𝑟 =  𝑟Ω
Ω′  
Ω,Ω′ ∈𝑺: Ω≼Ω′
 denote a set of surjective projections from each state 
space to every space that is weakly less expressive (i.e.: 𝑟Ω
Ω′ : Ω′ ⟶ Ω is a 
surjective projection from one space, Ω′ , to a weakly less expressive one, Ω; 
if 𝜔 ∈ Ω′ , then 𝑟Ω
Ω′  𝜔  is the projection of 𝜔 into a weakly less expressive 
space); such mappings are required to commute, that is, if Ω ≼ Ω′ ≼ Ω′′  then 
𝑟Ω
Ω′′ = 𝑟Ω
Ω′ ∘ 𝑟Ω′
Ω′′ . If 𝜔 ∈ Ω′ , with a slight abuse of notation, denote by 𝜔Ω
∶= 𝑟Ω
Ω′  𝜔  the projection of 𝜔 into Ω and, similarly, by 𝜔Ω′ ∶= 𝑟Ω′
Ω′′  𝜔′ = 𝜔 the 
projection of 𝜔′  into Ω′ , with 𝜔′ ∈ Ω′′ . Given a mapping 𝑟Ω
Ω′ : Ω′ ⟶ Ω and a 
generic (sub)set of states 𝑂, if 𝑂 ⊆ Ω′  denote by 𝑂Ω =  𝜔Ω ∈ Ω: ∃𝜔 ∈
𝑂 s. t. 𝜔Ω = 𝑟Ω
Ω′  𝜔   the set of all the images of the elements of 𝑂 (i.e.: the 
range of 𝑟Ω
Ω′ |𝑂, namely the range of the restriction of 𝑟Ω
Ω′  to 𝑂). Let 𝑔 Ω =
 Ω′ : Ω′ ≽ Ω  be the set of state spaces that are at least as expressive as Ω; 
for a generic (sub)set of states 𝑂 – if now 𝑂 ⊆ Ω – denote by 𝑂→ =
   𝑟Ω
Ω′  
−1
Ω′ ∈𝑔 Ω |𝑂 𝑂  the union of the (inverse) projections from 𝑂 to spaces 
weakly more expressive than Ω (i.e.: all the pre-images of a subset 𝑂 of the 
range of 𝑟Ω
Ω′ ).22 
                                  
21
 Regarding the interpretation, the fact that “states in Ω′  give a more detailed description of 
contingencies than states in Ω do” does not mean that elements of the latter are also 
elements of the former, because 𝑺 is a lattice of disjoint spaces. Also note that it is required 
that  Ω ≤  Ω′  .  
22
 The above specification of a lattice of state spaces mostly corresponds to that of Heifetz et 
al. [2006], although I give different interpretation and notation; moreover, note that Heifetz et 
al. [2006] do not define probability measures on each Ω𝑘 . (In this respect, notice that here 
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Given the above apparatus, I can move on to characterize (multi-
space) events: as usual, an event is defined as a subset of a state space, 
although here 𝐸 ⊆ Ω∗ is an event if it is of the form 𝑂→ for some 𝑂 ⊆ Ω, with 
Ω ∈ 𝑺; notice that this implies that an event contains states lying in multiple 
spaces (besides, not every subset of Ω∗ is an event).23 Further, if 𝑂→ is an 
event (with 𝑂 ⊆ Ω𝑘), its negation is defined as ∼ 𝑂→ ∶=  Ω𝑘 ∖ 𝑂 →; if 𝑂 = Ω𝑘 , 
then ∼ 𝑂→ ≡ ∅𝑘  where, for each Ω𝑘 ∈ 𝑺, ∅𝑘  is the vacuous event. Also, the 
conjunction ∧𝜆∈Λ  of a set of events  𝑂𝜆
→ 𝜆∈Λ  is simply the intersection 
 𝑂𝜆
→
𝜆∈Λ , whereas disjunction ∨𝜆∈Λ  is defined from conjunction by the de 
Morgan‟s laws,24 i.e.:  𝑂𝜆
→ = ~  ~𝑂𝜆
→
𝜆∈Λ  𝜆∈Λ . 
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). From the above discussion it is clear 
that a complete lattice of disjoint spaces 𝑺 =  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾, with Ω
∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 , is 
given by 𝑺 =  Ω∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 . Using the above notation, the set of state 
spaces that are at least as expressive as the – uninformative – empty set 
Ω∅ ∶=  ∅  is denoted by 𝑔 Ω∅ =  Ω∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 . For space constraints the 
following figure illustrates all the aforementioned state spaces, but only part 
                                                                                              
the probability measure defined on some space Ω is obviously related to that defined on Ω′ , if 
Ω ≼ Ω′ , but for the purposes of the current study it is not necessary to explore this further.) 
23
 In Heifetz et al.‟s [2006] terminology, if 𝐸 is an event in the above sense, then 𝑂 is called 
the “basis” of 𝐸 and Ω = Ω 𝐸  is the “base-space”. On a different note, it should be stressed 
that here 𝑓|𝑂 indicates the restriction of a certain mapping 𝑓, e.g.: if 𝑓: 𝑋 → 𝑌 is a mapping 
and 𝑂 ⊆ 𝑋, I denote the restriction of 𝑓 to 𝑂 by 𝑓|𝑂, that is, the function from 𝑂 to 𝑌 such that 
𝑓|𝑂 𝑜 = 𝑓 𝑜  for ∀𝑜 ∈ 𝑂 (in Heifetz et al.‟s [2006] terminology, “restriction” refers instead to 
the projection of a state into a less expressive space). 
24
 ~  𝑂𝜆𝜆∈Λ  =   ~𝑂𝜆 𝜆∈Λ ; ~  𝑂𝜆𝜆∈Λ  =   ~𝑂𝜆 𝜆∈Λ . 
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of the states: specifically, it shows only the states associated with the case 
where Nature has selected the strategic game with set of strategies 𝑆𝑖 =
 𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, 𝑠𝑖3  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁; recalling that objects no. 1-2 are grey and object no. 3 
is red, such states are represented in the form of a sequence of blocks (in 
Ω𝐵) or a string symbolizing the coloured objects available (in Ω𝐶) or a 
sequence of blocks and colours (in Ω𝐵𝐶).25 
 
 
Figure I.1 - Some state spaces and projections in Choose an Object 
 
                                  
25
 For instance, assume that the state 𝜔 =  1,2,3 , with 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐵 , obtains: such a state 
provides information about the order in which the experimenter drew the blocks from the 
bag, where each integer corresponds to the number of each object. Similarly, in the case of 
the state 𝜔 = 𝑔𝑔𝑟, with 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐶 , such a state provides information about the colours of the 
blocks, where 𝑔 stands for “grey” and 𝑟 for “red”. 
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Notice that projections are indicated by arrows:26 it is clear that Ω𝐵 and Ω𝐶 
both describe contingencies in a less expressive way than are described in 
Ω𝐵𝐶 ; Ω∅ in turn describes contingencies in such a way as not to provide any 
information about the order in which the experimenter drew the blocks from 
the bag or about the colours of the blocks. Recalling that  Ω𝐶 =  
6
3
 = 20, let 
Ω𝐶 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖   , … , 𝜔𝑥𝑥     ≡
 
𝑔𝑟𝑟, 𝑔′𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑔𝑔, 𝑟′𝑔𝑔, 𝑔𝑏𝑏, 𝑔′𝑏𝑏, 𝑏𝑔𝑔, 𝑏′𝑔𝑔, 𝑟𝑏𝑏, 𝑟′𝑏𝑏,
𝑏𝑟𝑟, 𝑏′𝑟𝑟, 𝑔𝑟𝑏, 𝑔′𝑟𝑏, 𝑔𝑟′𝑏, 𝑔𝑟𝑏′ , 𝑔′𝑟′𝑏, 𝑔′𝑟𝑏′ , 𝑔𝑟′𝑏′ , 𝑔′𝑟′𝑏′
 ;27 also, recall that 
state space Ω𝐵 is defined as Ω𝐵 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖 , … , 𝜔𝑐𝑥𝑥   with each state 
referring to one of 120 possible orderings of the objects, whereas state space 
Ω𝐵𝐶  is defined as Ω𝐵𝐶 =  𝜔𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑖   , … , 𝜔𝑐𝑥𝑥       with each state including the 
description of one of 120 possible orderings along with a description of the 
respective colours of the objects. Given that, consider the event 𝐸 that 
“Nature selects one or more grey blocks”: let 𝑂 denote the set of states 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑟, 𝑔′𝑟𝑟, 𝑟𝑔𝑔, 𝑟′𝑔𝑔, 𝑔𝑏𝑏, 𝑔′𝑏𝑏, 𝑏𝑔𝑔, 𝑏′𝑔𝑔,
𝑔𝑟𝑏, 𝑔′𝑟𝑏, 𝑔𝑟′𝑏, 𝑔𝑟𝑏′ , 𝑔′𝑟′𝑏, 𝑔′𝑟𝑏′ , 𝑔𝑟′𝑏′ , 𝑔′𝑟′𝑏′
 , hence  𝑂 = 16, with 𝑂 ⊂ Ω𝐶; 
using the inverse projections from 𝑂 to spaces weakly more expressive than 
Ω𝐶 (i.e.: the state spaces 𝑔 Ω𝐶 =  Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 ), one can finally define the event 
                                  
26
 Identity maps and compositions of projections are not shown in the figure. 
27
 Notice that, for example, 𝑔𝑟𝑟 and 𝑔′𝑟𝑟 describe, respectively: the case in which the 
experimenter draws two red blocks and one of the grey blocks; the case in which the 
experimenter draws two red blocks and a grey block other than that of 𝑔𝑟𝑟. Note that, in 
practice, not even colour perceiving players would tell 𝑔𝑟𝑟 from 𝑔′𝑟𝑟; yet, to the analyst the 
difference matters as each state is associated with a different grey block, hence a different 
strategy-index. As regards players – if they are indeed colour perceivers – they simply 
realize that, say, 𝑔𝑟𝑟 obtains when the experimenter randomly draws the objects associated 
with it. 
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𝐸 as the set 𝑂→, with  𝑂→ = 16 + 16 ⋅ 6 = 112. Furthermore, the event that 
“Nature does not select one or more grey blocks” (i.e.: the negation of 𝐸) is 
defined by the set ∼ 𝑂→, with  ∼ 𝑂→ = 4 + 4 ⋅ 6 = 28. It follows that, unlike in 
the standard partitional models of knowledge, here it is possible that some 
states belong neither to an event nor to its negation: in fact, 𝑂→ ∪ ~𝑂→ ⊂ Ω∗ 
(i.e.: 𝑂→ ∪ ~𝑂→ ≠ Ω∗, as  𝑂→ +  ∼ 𝑂→ ≠  Ω∗ ), which implies that there are 
states one could be unaware of (e.g.: those that do not belong to 𝑂→ ∪ ~𝑂→). 
 
 This sub-section concludes by detailing a set of properties for 
information functions 𝐼𝑖  (accounting for multiple state spaces), which have 
been proposed by Heifetz et al. [2006]. Recall that, for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, I𝑖  
was referred to as the information partition of player 𝑖, and 𝐼𝑖  as the 
information (set-valued) function associating with every state 𝜔 ∈ Ω a non-
empty subset 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⊆ Ω (with 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  being interpreted as the set of states the 
agent considers possible when the true state is 𝜔).28 At this point it is 
convenient to extend such an information structure so as to account for 
multiple state spaces: henceforth, unless otherwise stated, the letter 𝐼 will 
stand for a generalized information function, that is, a set-valued function 
(with I here denoting merely a collection of mutually disjoint subsets of Ω∗) 
that associates with every state 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ (with Ω∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 ) a non-empty 
subset 𝐼 𝜔 ⊆ Ω∗; formally, for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, a generalized information 
                                  
28
 See section I.2.c. above. 
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function is defined as 𝐼𝑖 : Ω
∗ → 2Ω
∗
∖ ∅.29 It is assumed that such a function 
satisfies the following properties: 
 
 𝑔𝑖. 𝑖: confinedness   𝜔 ∈ Ω′′ ⟹ ∃ Ω′ ≼ Ω′′  𝑠. 𝑡. 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⊆ Ω
′  
 𝑔𝑖. 𝑖𝑖: reflexivity   ∀ 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗, 𝜔 ∈  𝐼𝑖 𝜔  
→
 
 𝑔𝑖. 𝑖𝑖𝑖: stationarity   𝜔′ ∈ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⟹ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔
′ = 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  
 𝑔𝑖. 𝑖𝑣: projections preserve awareness    𝜔 ∈ Ω′′  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔 ∈ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  𝑎𝑛𝑑 Ω
′ ≼ Ω′′  
⟹ 𝜔Ω′ ∈ 𝐼𝑖 𝜔Ω′   
 𝑔𝑖. 𝑣: projections preserve ignorance    𝜔 ∈ Ω′′  𝑎𝑛𝑑 Ω′ ≼ Ω′′  
⟹  𝐼𝑖 𝜔  
→
⊆  𝐼𝑖 𝜔Ω′   
→
 
 𝑔𝑖. 𝑣𝑖: projections preserve knowledge    Ω′ ≼ Ω′′ ≼ Ω′′′  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔
∈ Ω′′′  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑖 𝜔 ⊆ Ω
′′  ⟹  𝐼𝑖 𝜔  Ω′ = 𝐼𝑖
 𝜔Ω′  . 
 
A few comments are in order. Properties (gi.ii-iii) reproduce the standard 
properties of any traditional (partitional) information function: reflexivity says 
that a player never excludes the true state from the set of states she regards 
as possible; stationarity says that a player uses the consistency or 
inconsistency of states with her information to make inferences about the 
state. Properties (gi.i) and (gi.iv-vi) have been proposed by Heifetz et al. 
[2006]: confinedness says that the states a player considers as possible at a 
certain state 𝜔 ∈ Ω′′  are all described with a vocabulary no more expressive 
than Ω′′ ; properties (gi.iv-vi) compare a player‟s information set at a certain 
                                  
29
 For a given set Ω, 2Ω denotes its power set. 
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state 𝜔 with the information set at the projection of 𝜔 into a weakly less 
expressive space. The rationale is to guarantee that the states a player 
considers as possible at some 𝜔 ∈ Ω′′  can be described by that very player in 
a weakly less detailed – yet consistent – way for some Ω′ ≼ Ω′′ . Given that, 
one may introduce an unawareness operator which, now, can indeed capture 
the case in which a player does not know an event and does not know that 
she does not know it. 
The following definition of an “indirect-realism knowledge structure” 
compactly characterizes the above general framework for perception.  
 
Definition I.2. Given a strategic form game 𝐺, an indirect-realism knowledge 
structure (henceforth simply a “knowledge structure”) of 𝐺 is given by 
 𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , with each component being defined as 
above.30 
 
Before proceeding, I shall note that a knowledge structure of this form (along 
with the associated frame, to be introduced in the next sub-section) is 
comparable to the approach to scientific inquiry referred to as “model-
dependent realism”. As physicist Stephen Hawking puts it: «According to 
model-dependent realism, it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only 
whether it agrees with observation. If there are two models that both agree 
with observation [...], then one cannot say that one is more real than another. 
                                  
30
 I𝑖  is here informally defined as a collection of mutually disjoint subsets of Ω
∗; see formula 
(1.4.1) in the next sub-section for a more precise definition of I𝑖 . 
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One can use whichever model is more convenient in the situation under 
consideration. [...] Model-dependent realism applies not only to scientific 
models but also to the conscious and sub-conscious mental models we all 
create in order to interpret and understand the everyday world. There is no 
way to remove the observer – us – from our perception of the world, which is 
created through our sensory processing and through the way we think and 
reason. Our perception – and hence the observations upon which our 
theories are based – is not direct, but rather is shaped by a kind of lens, the 
interpretive structure of our human brains» (Hawking and Mlodinow [2010], 
pp. 61-62). 
I.4.b. From perception to labelling 
I can now turn to define the other ingredients of this theory of conformity in 
coordination games by introducing a perception-based model of labelling, in 
such a way as to allow for the possibility that both stochastic and non-
stochastic procedures may determine the labelling of strategies. Given a set 
of properties 𝑇, with generic element 𝑡, in what follows a “label” is defined as 
a rule that assigns to every element 𝑠𝑖𝑎  of the strategy set 𝑆𝑖  a unique 
element 𝜋 of a set Π𝑡  of instances of property 𝑡. 
 
Definition I.3. Given a strategic form game 𝐺, a label is a function 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  that 
assigns to each strategy-index 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖  one element from a set Π𝑡  of 
instances of property 𝑡; that is, a label 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 : 𝑆𝑖 → Π𝑡  is a rule that expresses 
strategies as an instance of a given property. 
 
In a nutshell, given a class of sets ℘ =  Π𝑡 : 𝜋 is an instance of property 𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇, 
a label function represents strategies as an instance 𝜋 of some property 𝑡 
(with 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇). For example, if 𝑡 is the property “colour”, then Π𝑡  is the set of 
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instances of colours, e.g.: Π𝑡 =  𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 . Hence, for some 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 
𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎   denotes a perception-based labelled strategy (henceforth simply a 
“labelled strategy”) and 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑆𝑖  denotes the set of labelled strategies. The 
interpretation is that a label conveys the descriptions by which players 
recognize strategies. 
Now, it is assumed that a 𝜏-tuple of labels, with 𝜏 =  𝑇 , is associated 
with each state 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗: let Λ denote the set of labels, with generic element 
𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ; (general) “availability” is a rule that assigns to each state a certain 
number (𝜏) of labels. 
 
Definition I.4. Given a strategic form game 𝐺 and the full set of states 
Ω∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 , availability is an injective set-valued function 𝜑 that assigns to 
each state 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝑘  (for all Ω𝑘 ∈ 𝑺, with 𝑺 =  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾) a 𝜏-tuple of labels 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ Λ 
(with 𝜏 =  𝑇 ); that is, availability 𝜑: Ω∗ → Λ is a rule associating with each 
state 𝜔 a certain number of labels 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  by which to express strategies with the 
vocabulary of Ω𝑘 . 
 
To sum up, given the set Λ of labels, for each state there exists a distinct 𝜏-
tuple of labels 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ Λ, where 𝜏 equals the cardinality of the set 𝑇 of 
properties. In what follows, for each state 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ I shall use bold letters to 
denote such a 𝜏-tuple of labels, i.e.: 𝝀𝜔 ∶=  𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ′ , 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ′′ , … , 𝜆𝜔
𝑡𝜏 . Note that it is 
assumed that, if a certain state 𝜔 belongs to some space Ω𝑘  which is not rich 
enough to express a particular property 𝑡′ , then 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ′  is not defined at 𝑆𝑖 .   
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). Recall that a complete lattice of disjoint 
spaces 𝑺 =  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , with Ω
∗ =  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 , is given by 𝑺 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 . 
Now, the set of properties can be defined as 𝑇 ∶=  ∅, 𝐵, 𝐶 , where 𝑡 = 𝐵 is the 
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“order” property while 𝑡 = 𝐶 is the “colour” property; 𝑡 = ∅ is the “null” 
property, which does not explain anything. The set of labels can be defined 
as Λ ∶=  𝝀𝜔  𝜔∈Ω∗ where, for each 𝜔 ∈ Ω
∗, 𝝀𝜔 ∶=  𝜆𝜔
∅ , 𝜆𝜔
𝐵 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐶  . Again, it should 
be stressed that if 𝜔 belongs to some Ω𝑘  not rich enough to characterize a 
particular property 𝑡′ , then 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ′  is not defined at 𝑆𝑖 , e.g.: if some state 𝜔 
belongs to Ω𝐵, then 𝜆𝜔
𝐶  is not defined at 𝑆𝑖  (similarly, if 𝜔 ∈ Ω
𝐶, 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  is not 
defined at 𝑆𝑖). Given that, consider the case where the experimenter 
randomly draws the objects from the bag in a way as captured by state 
𝜔 =  4𝑟, 5𝑏, 6𝑏 , with 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐵𝐶 : clearly, 𝜔 =  4𝑟, 5𝑏, 6𝑏  is the state associated 
with the case where Nature has selected the strategic game with set of 
strategies 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖4, 𝑠𝑖5, 𝑠𝑖6  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Hence, using the above notation, the 
value of the availability function at 𝜔 =  4𝑟, 5𝑏, 6𝑏  is 𝜑 𝜔 =  𝜆𝜔
∅ , 𝜆𝜔
𝐵 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐶   and 
the label functions 𝜆𝜔
𝐵 : 𝑆𝑖 → Π𝐵 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐶 : 𝑆𝑖 → Π𝐶 , and 𝜆𝜔
∅ : 𝑆𝑖 → Π∅ are given as 
follows.31 
 
 
 
 
                                  
31
 Recall that the analyst identifies the strategies with the numbers of the objects (object no. 
4 is red and objects no. 5-6 are black). In this connection, it should be stressed once again 
that – although such numbers are invisible to the players – the experimenter‟s random draws 
are publicly observed by the players: therefore, here players‟ descriptions of strategies are 
publicly observed permutations of the analyst‟s indexing of strategies (see footnote 18). 
 - 48 - 
 
𝑆𝑖  𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑠𝑖𝑎   𝜆𝜔
𝐶  𝑠𝑖𝑎   𝜆𝜔
∅  𝑠𝑖𝑎   
𝑠𝑖4 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 
𝑠𝑖5 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 
𝑠𝑖6 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 
 
Furthermore, let 𝑟 =  𝑟Ω
Ω𝐵𝐶  
Ω,Ω𝐵𝐶 ∈𝑺: Ω≼Ω𝐵𝐶
 denote a set of surjective projections 
from Ω𝐵𝐶  to every space Ω that is weakly less expressive: for example, if 
Ω = Ω𝐵, then 𝜔Ω ≡ 𝑟Ω𝐵
Ω𝐵𝐶  𝜔  represents the projection of 𝜔 into the weakly 
less expressive space Ω𝐵, that is, 𝜔Ω =  4,5,6 ; from the above discussion it 
follows that, in this case, 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  𝑆𝑖  is not defined. 
 
Given that each player‟s labelling of strategies should depend on her 
possibly limited perception of the game, it is convenient to define each 
“individual availability” as the restriction of (general) availability 𝜑 to a 
particular subset of Ω∗, namely to the “set of player 𝑖‟s perceivable states” 
(henceforth denoted by Ω𝑖
∗ for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁). In order to do so, I shall first recall 
that (given a complete lattice of disjoint spaces 𝑺 =  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾) ≼ is a partial 
preordering on 𝑺 such that, for any Ω, Ω′ ∈ 𝑺, Ω ≼ Ω′  means that Ω′  is weakly 
more expressive than Ω. Then, for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 let 𝐾 𝑖 ⊆ 𝐾 denote player 
𝑖‟s space-index set and, given that, let Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  denote the maximum (or 
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greatest) state space player 𝑖 is aware of, that is, Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max
𝑘∈𝐾 𝑖
  Ω𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 : the 
interpretation is that Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  depicts “the most expressive state space 
perceivable to player 𝑖”.32 Hence, for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 let I𝑖  be defined as: 
 
I𝑖 =  Ω
𝑘 Ω𝑘∈𝑺: Ω𝑘≼Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 . 
(1.4.1) 
 
Given that, one can derive the set of player 𝑖’s perceivable states, for each 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, as Ω𝑖
∗ ∶=  Ω𝑘 ≡Ω𝑘∈𝑺: Ω𝑘≼Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  Ω𝑘𝑘∈𝐾 𝑖 . I can now proceed to define 
each player‟s individual availability – henceforth denoted by 𝜑𝑖  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 – 
as the restriction of (general) availability 𝜑 to the set Ω𝑖
∗ of 𝑖‟s perceivable 
states: 
 
𝜑𝑖 = 𝜑|Ω𝑖
∗ . 
(1.4.2) 
 
                                  
32
 Note that – given a partial preordering on 𝑺, and an information function 𝐼𝑖  – the maximum 
(or greatest) state space player 𝑖 is aware of can be derived for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 by taking the 
maximum across the sets of the images of the states in Ω𝑘  (for ∀ Ω𝑘 ∈ 𝑺), i.e.: Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
max
Ω𝑘∈𝑺
   𝐼𝑖 𝜔 𝜔∈Ω𝑘  Ω𝑘∈𝑺. In plain words, Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is obtained by taking the maximum across all the 
state spaces player 𝑖 considers possible (with  𝐼𝑖 𝜔 𝜔∈Ω𝑘 = 𝐼𝑖 Ω
𝑘 ), therefore Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  simply 
represents to player 𝑖 the most expressive possible state space. 
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To sum up, given a strategic form game 𝐺 and the associated knowledge 
structure  Ω∗,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , 𝑖‟s individual availability is an injective set-
valued function 𝜑𝑖  that assigns to each state 𝜔 ∈ Ω
𝑘  – for all Ω𝑘 ∈ I𝑖  – a 𝜏-
tuple of labels 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ Λ. Again, the intuition is that each player‟s labelling of 
strategies depends on her own (i.e.: possibly limited) perception of the game. 
The following definition compactly characterizes a “frame” as a 
structure that, in conjunction with a knowledge structure, fully determines the 
player‟s own comprehension and description of a certain strategic form 
game. 
 
Definition I.5. Given a strategic form game 𝐺 and the associated knowledge 
structure  𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , a frame is a description of 𝐺 and is 
given by  Ω∗, φ, Λ, 𝑇,  Π𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 , with each component being defined as above. 
 
It should be noticed that the current formalization of the players‟ 
comprehension and description of a game, although somehow related to that 
of Casajus [2000], crucially differs from it by accounting for both stochastic 
and non-stochastic procedures in the specification of the labelling of 
strategies (see footnote18). Moreover, while Casajus directly allows for 
different label functions across players, here the frame does not vary directly 
with players (in fact, it varies with properties 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇), however different 
labellings may be employed among players by virtue of the different players‟ 
information functions: once again, here each player‟s labelling of strategies 
depends on her perception of the game.  
Further, going back to the game of Choose an Object – and 
considering again the case where state 𝜔 =  4𝑟, 5𝑏, 6𝑏  occurs – it is clear 
that 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  generates an isomorphic game (see footnote 7), that is, to the analyst 
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the mathematical structures of the original game with strategies 𝑆𝑖 =
 𝑠𝑖4, 𝑠𝑖5, 𝑠𝑖6  and of the game with labelled strategies 
𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑆𝑖 =  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑  represent exactly the same decision problem, 
and as such should not be treated differently (Harsanyi and Selten [1988], 
Ch. 3).33 Thus, since 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑠𝑖4 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑠𝑖5 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑠𝑖6  are symmetric strategies, 
players ought to assign them the same probability in a symmetry-invariant 
equilibrium: what follows formalizes this argument by making use of the 
notion of a frame. 
 
Remark I.1. Given a strategic form game 𝐺, and the associated knowledge 
structure  𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁  and frame  Ω
∗, φ, Λ, 𝑇,  Π𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 : 
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑠𝑖𝑎 , 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 : 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎 ;  𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎   s.t. 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗   
⟹ 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  . 
 
A few observations are in order. First, notice that remark I.1 simply says that 
if two strategies with different indices (i.e.: 𝑠𝑖𝑎 , 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 : 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎 ) are labelled in 
the same way for a given property 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (i.e.: 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  ), then the 
probability with which they are chosen by player 𝑖 must be the same (i.e.: 
𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  ) for some 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 , provided that 𝑖 can actually conceive of those 
labelled strategies (i.e.: 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗ , with 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗  denoting the range of 
individual availability 𝜑𝑖). Also, note that remark I.1 (which, following Casajus 
[2000], is derived from Harsanyi and Selten‟s requirement of invariance with 
                                  
33
 Conversely, it is also clear that 𝜆𝜔
𝐶  does not generate an isomorphic game.  
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respect to isomorphisms) uses some version of Bernoulli‟s “principle of 
insufficient reason” (i.e.: if the strategies are indistinguishable except for their 
names, then each should be assigned the same prior belief); similarly the 
frameworks of Bacharach [1993] and Janssen [2001] too, more or less 
implicitly, use some version of Bernoulli‟s principle of insufficient reason.  
I.4.c. From labelling to salience comparison 
From the above discussion it is now clear that the solution concepts of all the 
aforementioned models – as a consequence of their use of the principle of 
insufficient reason – depend on the number of strategies which are labelled 
in the same way: in other words, coordination heavily depends on the rarity of 
some labelled strategies relative to all other labelled strategies. Indeed, what 
those models lack is an appreciation of the degree of salience of each 
labelled strategy (for a given property). 
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). Consider the case where the 
experimenter randomly draws the objects from the bag in a way as captured 
by state 𝜔 =  4𝑟, 5𝑏, 6𝑏 , with 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐵𝐶 : again, 𝜔 =  4𝑟, 5𝑏, 6𝑏  is the state 
associated with the case where Nature has selected the strategic game with 
set of strategies 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖4, 𝑠𝑖5, 𝑠𝑖6  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Now, I shall temporarily make 
the assumption that no player is aware of the block orderings, hence no 
player conceives of any labelling more expressive than the colour identifier: 
therefore, given I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐶  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 – and denoting Ω ≡ Ω𝐶 – let 
𝜔Ω ≡ 𝑟Ω𝐶
Ω𝐵𝐶  𝜔  be the projection of 𝜔 into the weakly less expressive space 
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Ω𝐶; it follows that 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 𝜔Ω , with 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶 : 𝑆𝑖 → Π𝐶 being given as before for 
∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.34 Recall that remark I.1 states that if two different strategies are 
labelled in the same way (for a given property 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇), then the probability with 
which they are chosen by player 𝑖 must be the same for some 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗ . 
So, in this case remark I.1 implies that 𝑝 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 ≡ 𝑝  𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  𝑠𝑖5  = 𝑝  𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  𝑠𝑖6   
for 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 𝜔Ω ,
35 however it does not say anything about 𝑝 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘  being 
greater or less than 𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑑 . In effect, many may probably feel that red is 
more salient than black. 
 
In order to capture the different degrees of salience that players may 
attach to their labelled strategies, this sub-section introduces a binary relation 
on the set of instances of property 𝑡 (or, equivalently, on the set of labelled 
strategies via 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ). 
 
Definition I.6. Given a set Π𝑡  of instances of property 𝑡, with 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, salience 
is a binary relation ≽𝑡  defined on Π𝑡  which allows the comparison of pairs of 
instances 𝜋, 𝜋′  of 𝑡 (hence, the comparison of pairs of alternative labelled 
strategies via 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 , when 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  = π,  𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  = π
′  for some 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ Λ); that is, 
                                  
34
 The above assumption implies that, in this example, 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  is not defined for any 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝑖
∗. 
35
 Similarly, if one lets 𝜔Ω∅ ≡ 𝑟Ω∅
Ω𝐵𝐶  𝜔  be the projection of 𝜔 into the least expressive space 
Ω∅, obviously given that 𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅ ∈ 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, in this example remark I.1 also implies 
that 𝑝 𝑜𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 ≡ 𝑝  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  𝑠𝑖4  = 𝑝  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  𝑠𝑖5  = 𝑝  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  𝑠𝑖6   for 𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅ ∈ 𝜑𝑖 𝜔Ω∅ . 
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salience is a complete preordering on Π𝑡  such that, for any π, π
′ ∈ Π𝑡 , π ≽
𝑡 π′  
means that “𝜋 is weakly more salient than 𝜋′ ”. 
 
In brief, given a class of sets ℘ =  Π𝑡 : 𝜋 is an instance of property 𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇, recall 
that a label function represents strategies as an instance 𝜋 of some property 
𝑡 (with 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇). For example, denoting by 𝑡 = 𝐶 the colour property, Π𝐶  is the 
set of instances of colours, e.g.: Π𝐶 =  𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 ; hence, in this case, 
salience ≽𝐶  allows the comparison of pairs of alternative colour-labelled 
strategies, e.g.: 𝑟𝑒𝑑 ≽𝐶 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦 ≽𝐶 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘. Similarly, in the case where players 
identify the strategies by the order in which the objects are randomly drawn 
from the bag, denote by 𝑡 = 𝐵 the order property and let Π𝐵  be the set 
 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑, 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑 ; hence, in this case, salience ≽𝐵 allows the comparison 
of pairs of alternative order-labelled strategies, e.g.: 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ≽𝐵 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ≽𝐵 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑.36 
Note that, for the sake of simplicity, the present theory assumes that 
salience is based on an exogenous criterion: in effect, one may think of 
salience as a (biology- or culture-dependent) binary relation based on a 
mutually recognizable criterion; as a consequence, for a given game and 
associated knowledge and frame structures, it is assumed that there exists a 
unique salience relation ≽𝑡  for each property 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. 
 
                                  
36
 The symbol used to denote salience, for some 𝑡 (i.e.: a binary relation ≽𝑡  defined on the 
set Π𝑡  of instances of property 𝑡) must not be confused with the symbol used to denote 
expressivity (i.e.: a binary relation ≼ defined on a complete lattice 𝑺 of disjoint state spaces). 
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Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). In the case of the colour property, one 
may argue that primary colours are most salient: this could be captured 
adopting the “RGB” colour model. RGB is an additive colour model, used in 
computer graphics, in which red, green and blue light are added together in 
various ways to reproduce a broad range of colours (the name of the model 
comes from the initials of the three additive primary colours, i.e.: 𝑅 =red, 
𝐺 =green, and 𝐵 =blue). In computing, the three component values are 
usually inputted as integers in the range 0 to 255; here – given the set of 
integers 𝑋 =  0,1,2, … ,255 , with generic element 𝑥 – one can easily define 
the set Π𝐶  of instances of colours as the set of 3-dimensional vectors 
Π𝐶 ≡ 𝑋
3 =  𝜋 =  𝑥𝑅 , 𝑥𝐺 , 𝑥𝐵 : 𝑥𝑣 ∈ 𝑋 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑣 = 𝑅, 𝐺, 𝐵 . Next, one needs to 
define a notion of length of a vector in 𝑋3, that is, a norm on 𝑋3 (i.e.: 
 ⋅ : 𝑋3 → ℝ+): for example, consider the sup norm, defined as the absolute 
value of the largest component of a vector, that is,  𝜋 ∶= max
𝑣
   𝑥𝑣 : 𝑣 =
𝑅, 𝐺, 𝐵 . Now, consider the case where Nature has selected the strategic 
game with set of strategies  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖3, 𝑠𝑖5  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and let the set of colour-
labelled strategies be given by  𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 , with 𝑠𝑖1 ↦ 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦, 𝑠𝑖3 ↦ 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 
and 𝑠𝑖5 ↦ 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Then, from computer graphics we know that a 
common shade of grey is given by the vector 𝜋 =  127,127,127 , red is given 
by the vector 𝜋 =  255,0,0 , and black by the vector 𝜋 =  0,0,0 : it is clear 
that the sup norm implies that  𝑟𝑒𝑑 >  𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦 >  𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 . Finally, salience 
relation ≽𝐶  can be defined accordingly, thereby indicating that primary 
colours are most salient, that is, 𝑟𝑒𝑑 ≽𝐶 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦 ≽𝐶 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘.37 
                                  
37
 The assumption that I have arbitrarily made here (that primary colours are more salient 
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The next assumption follows from the introduction of a salience 
relation. 
 
Assumption I.1. Given a strategic form game 𝐺 and the associated 
knowledge structure  𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , frame 
 Ω∗, φ, Λ, 𝑇,  Π𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 , and salience relations  ≽
𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 : 
 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑠𝑖𝑎 , 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 : 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎 ;  𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  , 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  ∈ Π𝑡  s.t. 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎 = 𝜋, 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝜋
′
𝑎𝑛𝑑  π ≽𝑡 π′   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗ 
  
⟹ 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  ≥ 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  . 
 
Assumption I.1 simply says that if two strategies with different indices (i.e.: 
𝑠𝑖𝑎 , 𝑠𝑖𝑎 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 : 𝑎 ≠ 𝑎 ) are labelled differently for a given property 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (i.e.: 
𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝜋, 𝜆𝜔
𝑡  𝑠𝑖𝑎  = 𝜋
′ ) and if the instances of property 𝑡 with which 𝑠𝑖𝑎  and 
𝑠𝑖𝑎 , respectively, are associated are the first more salient than the second 
(i.e.: π ≽𝑡 π′ ), then the probability with which they are chosen by player 𝑖 
should be such that the former is weakly more likely than the latter (i.e.: 
                                                                                              
than others), in fact, has some sort of scientific foundation. The modern RGB colour model is 
derived from the Young-Helmholtz tri-chromatic colour vision theory, which was developed in 
the 19th century (by polymaths Thomas Young and Hermann von Helmholtz) in order to 
explain the way the photoreceptor cells of human eyes enable colour vision. According to 
such a theory, in fact, there exist three types of photoreceptors (now referred to as “cone 
cells”) in the eye, each of which is sensitive to a particular range of visible light. Evidence 
that the eye does contain three types of cone has effectively been provided relatively 
recently by examining the light emerging from the eye after reflection off the retina. 
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𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  ≥ 𝑝 𝑠𝑖𝑎  ) for some 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 , provided that 𝑖 can actually conceive of those 
labelled strategies (i.e.: 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 Ω𝑖
∗ ). 
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). Going back to the case where 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶 ∈
𝜑𝑖 𝜔Ω , with label function 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶 : 𝑆𝑖 → Π𝐶 and salience relation ≽
𝐶 being 
defined as above, remark I.1 and assumption I.1 imply that 𝑝  𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  𝑠𝑖5  =
𝑝  𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  𝑠𝑖6  ≡ 𝑝 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 ≤ 𝑝 𝑟𝑒𝑑 ≡ 𝑝  𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  𝑠𝑖4   for 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶 ∈ 𝜑𝑖 𝜔Ω . Therefore, 
player 𝑖‟s (mixed) strategies – respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for 
𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  – can be represented as the vector of probabilities 
𝜍𝑖 =  𝑝 𝑠𝑖4 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖5 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑖6  =  𝑝𝑖 ,
1
2
𝑝 𝑖 ,
1
2
𝑝 𝑖  with 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑝 𝑖  (𝑝 + 𝑝 𝑖 = 1).  
 
To sum up, remark I.1 and assumption I.1 have the effect of restricting the 
set of (mixed) strategies by imposing constraints that capture the notions of 
symmetry and salience, respectively. Before proceeding to the next sub-
section, I shall abuse notation denoting by 𝜌𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡  a generic (mixed) strategy 
of player 𝑖 respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for some 𝜆.
𝑡 . (In the 
above example, 𝜌𝑖 𝜆𝜔Ω
𝐶  ≡  𝑝𝑖 ,
1
2
𝑝 𝑖 ,
1
2
𝑝 𝑖  with 𝑝𝑖 ≥ 𝑝 𝑖  (𝑝 + 𝑝 𝑖 = 1).)   
I.4.d. Expected utility maximization 
The last step involved in the operation of a convention is an expected utility 
maximization. As mentioned above, the present theory models uncertainty in 
an original way, which is only in part similar to Bacharach [1993] in that a 
certain kind of player – or rather, here, a player perceiving certain states – is 
associated with a certain labelling of strategies (and, in the present theory, in 
turn with a certain binary relation on the set of the player‟s labelled 
strategies). In fact, given the set of a player‟s actually realized attributes, 
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Bacharach assumes that the distribution of such sets of realized attributes in 
the population of players is exogenously given:38 Bacharach uses this 
distribution to derive the “subjective probability that a player having a 
repertoire assigns to the other player having some other repertoire”; in doing 
so, Bacharach [1993] (as well as Janssen [2001] and Casajus [2000]) 
assumes that each player believes that her co-player‟s repertoire is some 
subset of, or equal to, her own repertoire. Now, while Bacharach [1993] does 
not provide a solid foundation for those assumptions (in terms of a 
knowledge structure),39 the present theory justifies its own construction by 
employing an indirect-realism knowledge structure as defined in section I.4.a. 
above. Besides, this study departs from the existing literature also because, 
as it will soon be clear, by implementing a notion of the players‟ 
(un)awareness it effectively permits to explain coordination, in certain cases, 
even between differently-aware players (i.e.: between players that have 
partially-different sets of labelled strategies). 
Thus, I shall introduce a few more definitions. Given a complete lattice 
of disjoint spaces 𝑺 and an expressivity relation ≼ (i.e.: a partial preordering 
on 𝑺 as defined in section I.4.a. above), let 𝑺 denote the set of minimal 
                                  
38
 The sets of attributes are referred to as “families” in Bacharach‟s [1993] terminology (each 
family roughly corresponds to the set of instances of property 𝑡 of the present theory); 
Bacharach refers to a set of such families as a “repertoire”. 
39
 Bacharach and Stahl [2000] justify those assumptions by implementing a Level-k model of 
bounded rationality. 
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elements of 𝑺\Ω∅.40 Similarly, given I𝑖 =  Ω
𝑘 Ω𝑘∈𝑺: Ω𝑘≼Ω𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 (as 
defined in formula (1.4.1) above), let I
𝑖
 denote the set of minimal elements of 
I𝑖\Ω
∅. Before proceeding, it should be noted that the reason why I have 
defined such sets is that each space Ω ∈ 𝑺 may (or may not) describe the 
states 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ according to one property (or basic vocabulary), whereas all 
the spaces more expressive than those in 𝑺 just employ various 
combinations of those basic vocabularies. (For example, in the game of 
Choose an Object, 𝑺 ∶=  Ω∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 , therefore 𝑺 =  Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 ; if player 𝑖 is 
not aware of the block orderings, then I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐶  and I
𝑖
=  Ω𝐶 , that is, Ω𝐶 
is his only basic vocabulary.) Given that, let 𝜐 Ω  denote the objective 
probability of a player being aware of some space Ω ∈ 𝑺. So, for each Ω ∈ 𝑺, 
𝜐 Ω  represents the probability of success in a Bernoulli trial, where the 
outcomes of the experiment are success (being interpreted as the “outcome 
that a player is aware of Ω”) and failure (being interpreted as the “outcome 
that a player is not aware of Ω”). It is assumed that the probabilities of a 
player being aware of different spaces in 𝑺 are mutually independent (and 
exogenously given). 
Now, the present theory assumes that players are naïve in the 
following way: if player 𝑖 is aware of some state spaces (i.e.: aware of those 
contained in I𝑖  and unaware of those in 𝑺\I𝑖), then she presumes that her 
co-player may be aware of one space in I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅ only; that is, player 𝑖 
                                  
40
 Given a relation ≼ on 𝑺, Ω ∈ 𝑺 is a minimal element if there is no element Ω ∈ 𝑺 (with 
Ω ≁ Ω, where ≁ means “not equivalent” or rather, here, “not iso-expressive”) such that Ω ≼
Ω. 
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believes that I𝑗 ⊆ I𝑖 ∪ Ω
∅ and  I𝑗  = 1. Hence, the assumption of 
independence across state spaces Ω ∈ 𝑺 makes it possible that player 𝑖’s 
prior belief 𝜏𝑖 Ω   about 𝑗 being aware of Ω  is derived from 𝜐 as follows: 
 
𝜏𝑖 Ω  
∶=
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜐 Ω    1 − 𝜐 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
\Ω 
  𝜐 Ω    1 − 𝜐 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
\Ω  +   1 − 𝜐 Ω  Ω∈I𝑖Ω ∈I𝑖
: Ω ∈ I
𝑖
,
𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 : Ω ∉ I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅,
  1 − 𝜐 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
  𝜐 Ω    1 − 𝜐 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
\Ω  +   1 − 𝜐 Ω  Ω∈I𝑖Ω ∈I𝑖
: Ω = Ω∅, I
𝑖
≠ ∅,
1 : Ω = Ω∅, I
𝑖
= ∅.
  
(1.4.3) 
 
A few comments are in order. First, it should be noticed that formula (1.4.3) 
implies that player 𝑖 presumes the other player not to be aware of state 
spaces weakly more expressive than those in I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅; besides, the first line 
of the formula shows that, for all the spaces in I
𝑖
, 𝜏𝑖 Ω   is given by the ratio 
of the “objective probability of being aware of Ω  only” to the “sum of the 
objective probabilities of being aware of (only) each of the spaces in I
𝑖
 and 
the probability of being aware of Ω∅ only”.41 (This ensures that the 𝜏𝑖 Ω   sum 
                                  
41
 The “probability of being aware of Ω∅ only” is given by the product of the objective 
probabilities of being unaware of all the spaces in I
𝑖
. 
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to unity for ∀ Ω ∈ I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅.) Further, the third line of the formula gives the value 
of 𝜏𝑖 Ω = Ω
∅  when player 𝑖 is aware of at least one space weakly more 
expressive than Ω∅ (i.e.: when I
𝑖
 is non-empty), while the fourth line gives the 
value of 𝜏𝑖 Ω = Ω
∅  when player 𝑖 is unaware of any space weakly more 
expressive than Ω∅ (i.e.: when I
𝑖
 is empty). 
The interpretation is the following. Suppose that 𝐺 is played many 
times between players 𝑖 and 𝑗, with players drawn at random from large 
populations: then, 𝜏𝑖 ⋅  may be interpreted as the statistical distribution of the 
“mixed strategies 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
.  respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for the 
available 𝜆.
𝑡”, in a population of agents playing 𝐺 in the role of player 𝑗 (in 
other words, 𝜏𝑖 ⋅  may be thought of as the distribution of the basic 
vocabularies, hence the distribution of the strategies labelled according to the 
available 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, hence the distribution of 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
. ).42 In fact, if these statistical 
distributions are observed, each 𝜏𝑖 Ω   may also represent 𝑖‟s probabilistic 
belief about player 𝑗 respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for the 
available 𝜆.
𝑡 , in a play of 𝐺. It should be highlighted that if the agent who is 
drawn to play in the role of player 𝑗 happened to be aware indeed of state 
spaces in I𝑗 ⊆ I𝑖  – yet of spaces weakly more expressive than those in 
I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅ (e.g.: in other words, if 𝑗 herself were aware of Ω𝐵𝐶) – then by 
                                  
42
 Obviously, for each set 𝜆.
𝑡 𝑆𝑗   there is an infinite number of mixed strategies 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
𝑡  
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 (for some given 𝑡). Yet, for simplicity, one can think 
of the belief about 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
𝑡  as a degenerate point belief, for each 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇: as it will soon be clear, 
expected utility maximization will imply that it is so (i.e.: for each 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, individuals play one 
and only one profile of mixed strategies). 
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disregarding 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵𝐶  little would be lost: in effect, although 𝑗 will actually be 
able to describe the current situation according to each of the basic 
vocabularies (properties) available in I
𝑖
, she will still have to play a mixed 
strategy respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for one of the available λ.
𝑡  
only; as a consequence, from 𝑖‟s perspective, 𝑗 will be expected to play a 
mixed strategy respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for one of the λ.
𝑡  
which the vocabularies available in I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅ permit to define, as captured by 
formula (1.4.3) above.43 Therefore, 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝑡  is interpreted as “player 𝑖‟s prior 
belief  about player 𝑗 respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for 𝜆.
𝑡 , in a 
play of 𝐺”. 
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). Recall that 𝑺 ∶=  Ω∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 , which 
implies that 𝑺 =  Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 ; further, if player 𝑖 is aware of both block orderings 
and colour differences, then I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶  and I
𝑖
=  Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 . Now, 
the above assumption about the players‟ naïveté implies that player 𝑖 will 
presume that player 𝑗 must be aware of either Ω∅ or Ω𝐵 or Ω𝐶 (but not of a 
union of Ω𝐵 and Ω𝐶). In the case in which the agent who is drawn to play in 
the role of player 𝑗 happened to be aware of state spaces in I𝑗 ⊆ I𝑖  – yet of 
spaces weakly more expressive than those in I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅ (i.e.: Ω𝐵𝐶) – then she 
will still have to play a mixed strategy respecting remark I.1 and assumption 
I.1 for one of the available λ.
𝑡  only: for instance, if player 𝑗 happens to be 
                                  
43
 On a different note it should be stressed that, obviously, in the case in which it is possible 
for some 𝑗 in the population to be aware of state spaces not in I𝑖  (i.e.: if I𝑗 ⊈ I𝑖), then the 
notion of unawareness implies that (for some player 𝑖) 𝜏𝑖  will not be defined at those spaces. 
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aware of both Ω𝐵 and Ω𝐶 (i.e.: I𝑗 =I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 ), then from 𝑖‟s 
perspective 𝑗 will be expected to play a mixed strategy respecting remark I.1 
and assumption I.1 for one of the λ.
𝑡  which the vocabularies available in 
I
𝑖
∪ Ω∅ permit to define, that is, either 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
𝐶  or 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
𝐵  or 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
∅ .  
 
Before proceeding it should be noted that (while the reason for the above 
simplifying assumption is that the introduction of salience  ≽𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 allows the 
comparison of pairs of strategies, each expressed as an instance of an 
exclusive property 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇) such an assumption is likely to make no difference 
to expected utility maximizing behaviour, besides sparing us some 
complications. 
Given that, I can now turn to define the expected payoff to player 𝑖, as 
follows. 
 
Definition I.7. Given a strategic form game 𝐺 and the associated knowledge 
structure  𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , frame  Ω
∗, φ, Λ, 𝑇,  Π𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 , salience 
relations  ≽𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇, and distribution 𝜐, the expected payoff to player 𝑖 is defined 
as: 
 
E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|I𝑖 =   𝜏𝑖 Ω 𝑢𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡  + 𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
∅  
𝑡∈𝑇: 𝑡≠∅Ω∈I
𝑖
, 
 
where 𝜍𝑖  is a generic mixed strategy of player 𝑖, and 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡  is a profile of 
strategies of all players other than 𝑖 respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 
for some 𝜆.
𝑡  (with 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡 =  𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
𝑡  
𝑗 ∈𝑁: 𝑗≠𝑖
 and 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
∅ =  𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
∅  
𝑗 ∈𝑁: 𝑗≠𝑖
). 
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It is clear that the expected payoff to player 𝑖 depends on her perception 
(hence labelling) and salience comparison, which implies that players with 
different knowledge functions face different games. In a nutshell, the second 
term of the above expected utility function represents the share of the payoff 
due to 𝑖‟s belief about her co-player(s) being unaware of any state space 
more expressive than the uninformative Ω∅: as a result, (before playing 𝑖 
presumes that) every other player completely randomizes as imposed by 
remark I.1 on the case where Ω = Ω∅ (i.e.: 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
∅ ). Then, the first term 
represents the share of the payoff due to 𝑖‟s belief about her co-player(s) 
being aware of (only) each of the spaces in I
𝑖
 (which is the reason for the 
summation across Ω ∈ I
𝑖
); notice that, for each Ω ∈ I
𝑖
, players are required 
to take a mixed strategy respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for 𝜆.
𝑡 ≠ 𝜆.
∅ 
(i.e.: 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡 , which is the reason for the summation across ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇: 𝑡 ≠ ∅). In 
this regard, it should be highlighted that – for each space Ω ∈ 𝑺 – there exists 
only one property 𝑡 ≠ ∅ (with 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇) according to which 𝜆.
𝑡  may express 
strategies: this implies that only one 𝜆.
𝑡 ≠ 𝜆.
∅ is actually defined for each state 
𝜔 ∈ Ω, with Ω ∈ 𝑺. It follows that in the first term of definition I.7, for each 
space Ω ∈ I
𝑖
, 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡  denotes a profile of strategies of all players 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for the only one label function 
𝜆.
𝑡 ≠ 𝜆.
∅ which is actually defined. 
 
Example: Choose an Object (cont’d). Given 𝑺 =  Ω∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 , recall that 
the set of properties is defined as 𝑇 ∶=  ∅, 𝐵, 𝐶 , where 𝑡 = 𝐵 is the “order” 
property while 𝑡 = 𝐶 is the “colour” property; 𝑡 = ∅ is the “null” property, 
which does not explain anything. The set of labels is defined as Λ ∶=  𝝀𝜔  𝜔∈Ω∗ 
where, for each 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗, 𝝀𝜔 ∶=  𝜆𝜔
∅ , 𝜆𝜔
𝐵 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐶  . Again, it should be stressed that if 
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𝜔 belongs to some Ω not rich enough to characterize a particular property 𝑡′ , 
then 𝜆𝜔
𝑡 ′  is not defined at 𝑆𝑖 , e.g.: if some state 𝜔 belongs to Ω
𝐵, then 𝜆𝜔
𝐶  is not 
defined at 𝑆𝑖  (similarly, if 𝜔 ∈ Ω
𝐶, 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  is not defined at 𝑆𝑖). 
To make the analysis more interesting, I shall now return to one of the 
cases considered in section I.3. above, namely the case where the 
experimenter randomly draws the objects from the bag in a way as captured 
by the following state: 𝜔 =  1𝑔, 3𝑟, 5𝑏 , with 𝜔 ∈ Ω𝐵𝐶 ; more specifically, 
𝜔 =  1𝑔, 3𝑟, 5𝑏  is the state associated with the case where Nature has 
selected the strategic game with set of strategies 𝑆𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖3, 𝑠𝑖5  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. 
Besides, let  ≽𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 be defined as before, i.e.: 𝑟𝑒𝑑 ≽
𝐶 𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑦 ≽𝐶 𝑏𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 and 
𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 ≽𝐵 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑 ≽𝐵 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑟𝑑. 
Recall that 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
𝑡  denotes a generic mixed strategy of player 𝑗 
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for some 𝜆.
𝑡 . Now, considering the 
projection of 𝜔 into Ω𝐶, in this case one gets 
𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐶
𝐶  ≡  𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5  , where 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 ≥ 𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 ≥ 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5  (with 
𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 + 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 + 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5 = 1); on the other hand, considering the projection of 
𝜔 into Ω𝐵, one gets 𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐵
𝐵  ≡  𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5  , where 𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 ≥
𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 ≥ 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5  (with 𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 + 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 + 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5 = 1); moreover, considering the 
projection of 𝜔 into Ω∅, one gets 𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  ≡  𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5  , where 
𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 = 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 = 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5 =
1
3
.  
Further, in order to simplify the notation, I shall drop the player-index 
and simply write 𝑝1, 𝑝3, 𝑝5 for 𝑝 𝑠𝑗1 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗3 , 𝑝 𝑠𝑗5  (∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁), respectively. 
Thus, it is clear that – if 𝑗 is aware of Ω𝐶 only – a mixed strategy of player 𝑗 
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for 𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐶
𝐶  can be written as 
𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐶
𝐶  =  𝑝1, 𝑝3, 𝑝5 , where 𝑝3 ≥ 𝑝1 ≥ 𝑝5; then, assuming the game is 
played between two players 𝑖, 𝑗, the expected payoff to both players is 
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maximized only when players 𝑖 and 𝑗 play the same mixed strategy, and 
hence amounts to  𝑝1 
2 +  𝑝3 
2 +  𝑝5 
2, which in turn implies that the mixed 
strategy that uniquely maximizes player 𝑖‟s payoff subject to the above 
constraint is given by the vector of probabilities  𝑝1, 𝑝3, 𝑝5 =  0,1,0  (i.e.: 
more explicitly, in definition I.7, if 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 = 1 the payoff to player 𝑖 is 
maximized when 𝜍𝑖 = 𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐶
𝐶  ⟹ 𝜍𝑖 =  0,1,0 ). On the other hand – if 𝑗 is 
aware of Ω𝐵 only – a mixed strategy of player 𝑗 respecting remark I.1 and 
assumption I.1 for 𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐵
𝐵  can be written as 𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐵
𝐵  =  𝑝1, 𝑝3, 𝑝5 , where 
𝑝1 ≥ 𝑝3 ≥ 𝑝5; then, the expected payoff to both players is again maximized 
only when players 𝑖 and 𝑗 play the same mixed strategy, and hence amounts 
to  𝑝1 
2 +  𝑝3 
2 +  𝑝5 
2, which here implies that the mixed strategy that 
uniquely maximizes player 𝑖‟s payoff subject to the above constraint is given 
by the vector of probabilities  𝑝1, 𝑝3, 𝑝5 =  1,0,0  (i.e.: in definition I.7, if 
𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 = 1 the payoff to player 𝑖 is maximized when 𝜍𝑖 = 𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐵
𝐵  ⟹ 𝜍𝑖 =
 1,0,0 ). Moreover – if 𝑗 is aware of Ω∅ only – the mixed strategy of player 𝑗 
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for 𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  can be written as 
𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  =  𝑝1, 𝑝3, 𝑝5 , which here implies that the mixed strategy that 
uniquely maximizes player 𝑖‟s payoff is 𝜍𝑖 = 𝜌𝑗  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅  ⟹ 𝜍𝑖 =  
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
 . 
Now, assume that I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 , hence I
𝑖
=  Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 ; then, the 
assumption about the players‟ naïveté in forming beliefs about the 
opponents‟ (un)awareness implies that, before playing, 𝑖 will presume that 
player 𝑗 must be aware of either Ω∅ or Ω𝐵 or Ω𝐶 (but not of a union of Ω𝐵 and 
Ω𝐶). It is clear that player 𝑖‟s expected payoff is given by: E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|I𝑖 =
  𝜏𝑖 Ω 𝑢𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡  + 𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
∅  𝑡∈𝑇: 𝑡≠∅Ω∈I
𝑖
≡
𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐶
𝐶   + 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐵
𝐵   +
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𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅   . Therefore, the mixed strategy of player 𝑖 that 
uniquely maximizes E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|I𝑖  is as follows: 
 𝜍𝑖 =  0,1,0  for 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 > 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵  and 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 >
1
3
𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ ; 
 𝜍𝑖 =  1,0,0  for 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 > 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶  and 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 >
1
3
𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ ; 
  𝜍𝑖 =  
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
  for 𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ > 3𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶  and 𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ > 3𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 ; 
 𝜍𝑖 =  
1
2
,
1
2
, 0  for 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 = 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 >
2
3
𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ . 
For instance, consider the case of 𝜐 Ω  being defined as 𝜐 Ω𝐵 =
1
4
, 𝜐 Ω𝐶 =
1
2
. Formula (1.4.3) above implies: 
𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 ≡
1
2
3
4
1
8 +
3
8 +
3
8
=
3
7
; 
𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐵 ≡
1
4
1
2
1
8 +
3
8 +
3
8
=
1
7
; 
𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ ≡
3
4
1
2
1
8 +
3
8 +
3
8
=
3
7
. 
It follows that, in this case, the mixed strategy of player 𝑖 that uniquely 
maximizes E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖 |I𝑖  is 𝜍𝑖 =  0,1,0 , that is, 𝑖 chooses the red object.
44 
                                  
44
 Notice that, as mentioned above, players with different knowledge functions face different 
games. Here this means that if player 𝑖 is unaware of the block orderings, then I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐶  
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The above example shows that player 𝑖‟s best response (to the expected 
strategies of player 𝑗 respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1) varies with 
the objective probability 𝜐 Ω  of a player being aware of some space Ω ∈ 𝑺.  
 
I.5. Conventions as equilibria 
This section defines a “convention” as an equilibrium of a game with which a 
frame and a set of salience relations are associated.  
 
Definition I.8. Given a strategic form game 𝐺 and the associated knowledge 
structure  𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , frame  Ω
∗, φ, Λ, 𝑇,  Π𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 , salience 
relations  ≽𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇, and distribution 𝜐, a convention of 𝐺 is a profile of mixed 
strategies 𝜍∗ =  𝜍𝑖
∗ 𝑖∈𝑁 such that for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: 
𝜍𝑖
∗ ∈ arg max
𝜍𝑖∈∆ 𝑆𝑖 
E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|𝐼𝑖 𝜔  . 
 
In plain words, a convention is in place if every player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 maximizes 
E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|𝐼𝑖 𝜔  , given her knowledge function: I give a dual interpretation. 
                                                                                              
and I
𝑖
=  Ω𝐶 . Hence, in this case, player 𝑖‟s expected payoff is simply given by: 
E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|I𝑖 =   𝜏𝑖 Ω 𝑢𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
𝑡  + 𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖 𝜆.
∅  𝑡∈𝑇: 𝑡≠∅Ω∈I
𝑖
≡
𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝐶 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖  𝜆𝜔
Ω𝐶
𝐶   + 𝜏𝑖 Ω
∅ 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌−𝑖  𝜆𝜔
Ω∅
∅   . 
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Conventions as the result of a game of incomplete information with 
“blind” players. Again, suppose that 𝐺 is played many times between 𝑖 and 𝑗, 
with players drawn at random from large populations: as before, 𝜏𝑖 ⋅  is 
thought of as the statistical distribution of the “mixed strategies 𝜌𝑗  𝜆.
.  
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for the available 𝜆.
𝑡”, in a population 
of agents playing 𝐺 in the role of player 𝑗; besides, each 𝜏𝑖 Ω   also 
represents 𝑖‟s prior belief about player 𝑗 respecting remark I.1 and 
assumption I.1 for the available 𝜆.
𝑡 , in a play of 𝐺. Now – assuming that an 
individual does not get to see who the matched co-player is until after having 
played – a convention is in place if every player maximizes E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌𝑗 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|𝐼𝑖 𝜔  , 
given her beliefs  𝜏𝑖 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
∪Ω∅
: since 𝑖‟s way of deriving  𝜏𝑖 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
∪Ω∅
 from 
an exogenously given  𝜐 Ω  
Ω∈𝑺
 depends on I
𝑖
, it follows that a convention is 
implemented when every pair of matched players is characterized by the 
same knowledge function.   
Conventions as the result of a game with differently-aware players. 
Consider an awareness operator 𝐴𝑖 𝐸 = K𝑖 𝐸 ∪K𝑖 ∼ K𝑖 𝐸  , where the 
knowledge operator is derived from a generalized information function 𝐼𝑖  
respecting properties (gi.i-vi), as in section I.4.a. above. Similarly to the 
“everybody knows” and the “common knowledge” operators, one can define 
“everybody is aware” and “common awareness” operators. (Indeed, Heifetz 
et al. [2006] prove that when everybody is aware of an event 𝐸, then 
everybody is also aware that everybody is aware of 𝐸: it follows that the 
events “everybody is aware of 𝐸” and “common awareness of 𝐸” coincide.) 
Now – assuming that an individual does get to see who the matched co-
player is before playing – a convention is in order if every player maximizes 
E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌𝑗 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖 |𝐼𝑖 𝜔  , given her beliefs  𝜏𝑖 Ω  Ω∈I
𝑖
∪Ω∅
: yet, contrary to the previous 
case, here player 𝑖 has access to 𝑗‟s information, therefore she can use the 
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awareness operator in a way similar to the knowledge operator so as to 
define what “𝑖 is aware of 𝑗 being aware of”. For example, in the game of 
Choose an Object, let player 𝑖 be aware of both block orderings and colour 
differences (i.e.: I𝑖 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶  and I
𝑖
=  Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 ) while player 𝑗 be 
aware of colour differences only (i.e.: I𝑗 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐶  and I
𝑗
=  Ω𝐶 ). Using the 
awareness operator, it follows that 𝐴𝑖  ∼ 𝐴𝑗  Ω
𝐵  : as a consequence, 𝑖 can 
be thought of as updating her beliefs so that 𝜏 𝑖 Ω
𝑐 = 1; it is clear that, in this 
case, a convention corresponds to the profile of mixed strategies  𝜌𝑖 𝜆.
𝐶  
𝑖∈𝑁
 
respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 for 𝜆.
𝐶 such that  𝜍𝑖 =  0,1,0  𝑖∈𝑁. It 
should be noticed that here, contrary to the previous case, for a convention to 
be in operation it is not necessary that every pair of players is characterized 
by the same knowledge function, but just that every player is commonly  
aware of a state space, that is, I𝑖 ∩ I𝑗 ≠ ∅.
45 Once again, it should be 
stressed that it would be impossible to model such a situation by using 
standard information structures in which the knowledge function only satisfies 
the standard properties (k.i-vi) described in section I.2.c. above: as a matter 
of fact, in a standard single-space information structure there will always be 
common knowledge of the unique state space. 
                                  
45
 In the case in which I𝑖 ∩ I𝑗 ≠ ∅ and there is not a unique optimal convention (i.e.: as in the 
case where I𝑖 = I𝑗 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶  for a given pair of players  𝑖, 𝑗 ), then one may 
assume that individuals play the mixed strategy respecting remark I.1 and assumption I.1 
with strategies labelled and ranked according to the property (or basic vocabulary) 𝑡 that has 
maximum prior probability 𝜏𝑖 Ω
𝑡 . 
 - 71 - 
 
The following proposition applies to the latter of the above 
interpretations/settings, thereby relating conventions to Aumann‟s [1974, 
1987] notion of correlated equilibrium. 
 
Proposition I.1. Take a strategic form game 𝐺 and the associated 
knowledge structure  𝐾,  Ω𝑘 , 𝑞𝑘 𝑘∈𝐾 , ≼,  𝑟Ω
Ω′  ,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , frame 
 Ω∗, φ, Λ, 𝑇,  Π𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 , and salience relations  ≽
𝑡 𝑡∈𝑇 . Let 
𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔 ∈ arg max
𝜍𝑖∈∆ 𝑆𝑖 
E𝜍𝑖 ,𝜌−𝑖 ,𝜐 𝑢𝑖|𝐼𝑖 𝜔
∗   denote an optimal strategy when 
strategy-indices are expected to be labelled and ranked according to some 
𝑡 ∈ 𝑇, given that 𝜔 ∈ Ω∗ obtains. Let 𝜍𝑡 𝜔∗  denote a convention defined by 
strategy profile  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔∗  
𝑖∈𝑁
: the set of all such strategy profiles (one for each 
 𝐼𝑖 𝜔  𝑖∈𝑁) is a correlated equilibrium of 𝐺. 
Proof. Consider a game (e.g.: Choose an Object, with 𝑺 =  Ω∅, Ω𝐵 , Ω𝐶 , Ω𝐵𝐶 ), 
where every pair of matched players is characterized by the same knowledge 
function: for simplicity, assume that every pair of players is aware of either 
𝑡 = 𝐶 or 𝑡 = 𝐵 (i.e.: I𝑖 = I𝑗 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐶  or I𝑖 = I𝑗 =  Ω
∅, Ω𝐵  for every pair 
 𝑖, 𝑗 ). Remark I.1 and assumption I.1, along with the definition of each 
player‟s expected payoff (definition I.7), imply that a convention is a profile of 
strategies in which a pair  𝑖, 𝑗  plays, with probability one, the most salient 
labelled strategy (as ranked by ≽𝐶  or ≽𝐵) in  𝜆𝜔
𝐶  𝑆𝑖 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐶  𝑆𝑗    or 
 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑆𝑖 , 𝜆𝜔
𝐵  𝑆𝑗   , respectively (depending on the state obtaining, and the 
players‟ “awareness type”). Denote a strategy profile given by a pair of such 
strategies by 𝜍𝑡 𝜔 , with 𝑡 ∈  𝐵, 𝐶 . Then, it is straightforward to see that the 
set of all such strategy profiles (one for each  𝐼𝑖 𝜔  𝑖∈𝑁, as strategies are 
such that 𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔 = 𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔′  whenever 𝜔 and 𝜔′  are in the same cell of the 
information partition) is a correlated equilibrium of 𝐺, which is simply defined 
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by   Ω𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 ,  I𝑖 , I𝑗  ,  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡  , where:  Ω𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡  is a finite probability space; 
 I𝑖 , I𝑗   is a profile of partitions of Ω
𝑡 ∪ Ω∅;  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡  is a profile of decision 
functions, with 𝜍𝑖
𝑡 : Ω𝑡 → 𝜆.
𝑡 𝑆𝑖  and 𝜍𝑗
𝑡 : Ω𝑡 → 𝜆.
𝑡 𝑆𝑗  . Note that, in order for 
  Ω𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 ,  I𝑖 , I𝑗  ,  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡   to define a correlated equilibrium, the following 
inequality must hold for all players:  𝑞𝑡 𝜔 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡 𝜔  𝜔∈Ω𝑡 ≥
 𝑞𝑡 𝜔 𝑢𝑖  𝜍 𝑖 𝜔 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡 𝜔  𝜔∈Ω𝑡 ; in other words, for every state 𝜔 ∈ Ω
𝑡  (of which 
the probability is 𝑞𝑡 𝜔 ), the strategy 𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔  must be optimal given the other 
player‟s strategy and 𝑖‟s knowledge about 𝜔. It is clear that the inequality 
holds when 𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔  is given as in proposition I.1, hence 
𝑢𝑖
𝑡 ∶=  𝑞𝑡 𝜔 𝑢𝑖  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡 𝜔  𝜔∈Ω𝑡  may be referred to as the correlated 
equilibrium payoff to player 𝑖 (generated by conventions  𝜍𝑖
𝑡 𝜔 , 𝜍𝑗
𝑡 𝜔  
𝜔∈Ω𝑡
); 
similarly, 𝑢𝑗
𝑡  is the correlated equilibrium payoff to player 𝑗.∎ 
 
It should be noted that, unlike Aumann‟s traditional notion of correlated 
equilibrium (where strategy choices are pegged on events defined on a 
single state space),  here 𝜔, 𝜔′  are actually the projections of states in Ω𝐵𝐶  
into a weakly less expressive space Ω𝑡 , with 𝑡 ∈  𝐵, 𝐶 . Also, it should be 
stressed that Aumann‟s notion of correlated equilibrium assumes that players 
enter an agreement in the form of a pre-determined collection of decision 
functions; instead – given a set of strategies labelled and ranked according to 
some property (or basic vocabulary) 𝑡 – for a convention to be in place 
players are required to respect remark I.1 and assumption I.1, with the 
strategies to be played being determined as the result of expected utility 
maximization. Interestingly, notice that the idea of conventions (in the sense 
of Lewis [1969]) defined as Aumann‟s correlated equilibria has been explored 
informally by philosopher Peter Vanderschraaf [1998]. Yet, it should be noted 
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that, since Vanderschraaf‟s application of the correlated equilibrium would 
require an explicit agreement between players, that may not capture a great 
deal of social phenomena which involve no explicit act of agreement. (In this 
connection, John Locke [1689] highlighted the notion of a “tacit agreement”, 
with a tacit agreement occurring when there has been no explicit agreement 
but matters are otherwise as if an explicit agreement occurred.)    
 
I.6. Concluding remarks 
This study has presented an original theory of conformity in coordination 
games. The core of the problem has been to provide a framework for the 
player‟s own perception of the strategic situation so as to show that 
coordination may occur when “normal” players use, and expect others to use, 
similar conceptual schemes. Again, here it is suggested that, for a convention 
to be in operation, conformity is dependent on the states perceived by the 
agents: therefore, the model has implemented a notion of unawareness so as 
to account for multiple descriptions of the world. Thus, the present theory has 
defined the player‟s own framing system in such a way as to allow for the 
possibility that both stochastic and non-stochastic procedures may determine 
the labelling of strategies; besides, it has provided a precise link between a 
player‟s information function and her labelled strategies. Further, introducing 
a salience relation on each set of strategy labels, along with two 
requirements (relating to symmetry and salience) has resulted in the set of a 
player‟s mixed strategies being restricted. To sum up, this essay has 
suggested that conventions may arise as the result of a four-step procedure: 
(i) perception; (ii) labelling; (iii) salience comparison; (iv) expected utility 
maximization. Such a theory is consistent with the intuitions of Lewis [1969] 
and Schelling [1960] in that conventions are defined as solutions to 
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coordination games where there are multiple equilibria; also, certain 
characteristics of a strategy set as perceived by the player – which would not 
explicitly enter the formal description of a standard game – here can make 
some strategies more salient than others.  
It should be noted that the game introduced during the exposition of 
the theory is indeed meaningful, as it shows that conventions are determined 
by the context in which the game itself appears and, in part, are the result of 
random eventualities. Moreover, it should be stressed that, in the spirit of 
Schelling [1960], such a theory can work even in the case of impure 
coordination games (or tacit bargaining problems). The intuition is confirmed 
by an experimental study (Mehta et al. [1992]) in which two subjects had to 
agree on how to divide £10 between them, with each bargainer receiving 
zero if no agreement was reached. Before the bargaining took place, 
subjects were dealt four playing cards each, from a deck consisting of 8 
cards, including 4 aces and 4 twos. Subjects were told that a set of 4 aces 
was worth £10 (whereas any other combination of cards was worth nothing), 
and in order to be paid they had to pool their aces and agree on how to 
divide the £10; notice that only situations in which neither player held all 4 
aces were considered in the analysis. Although Mehta et al. observed that 
equal divisions were the modal proposal by holders of 1, 2, or 3 aces, they 
also noted a tendency to give more to the bargainer with more aces: in effect, 
they recorded a second modal demand of only £2.50 by holders of 1 ace. 
Their suggestion is that the bargainers use the cards dealt to them as cues to 
help solve the coordination problem which lies at the heart of the bargaining 
game. Interestingly, reading their essay through the lens of the present 
theory, Mehta et al. seem to implicitly suggest that in their experiment players 
could be aware of (at least) two state spaces (i.e.: one containing three 
states, with each state corresponding to the number of aces held by a player; 
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the other containing only one state) associated with a salience relation, as 
follows: 
We assumed that participants may perceive aces to be worth £2.50 each and 
our prior expectation was that subjects would use this perception in 
conjunction with one of two principles. The principle of “closeness” would lead 
subjects to the rule “distribute according to the value of the cards”. The 
principle of “equality” would lead to the rule “distribute by equal shares”. Thus, 
we would expect the predominant demands to be as follows: (p. 215) 
  “Closeness” “Equality” 
Subjects holding 1 ace £2.5 £5 
 2 aces £5 £5 
 3 aces £7.5 £5 
Indeed, their hypothesis testing confirms that the average demand of 
subjects holding 1 ace is significantly lower than that of subjects holding 2 
aces, which in turn is significantly lower than that of subjects holding 3 aces. 
To conclude, such a game-theoretic study of conventions may 
contribute to shed some light on the mental tâtonnements enabling the 
convergence of players‟ beliefs and the emergence of a stable pattern of 
behaviour in problems with many possible equilibria, thereby tackling the 
widespread equilibrium selection problem for which no satisfactory solution is 
yet known. Possible applications may involve a number of economic 
situations in which all parties can realize mutual gains, but only by making 
mutually consistent decisions: for example, think of the choice of 
technological standards (a product which becomes generally accepted and 
dominant is often considered a de facto standard, even without an 
established norm or requirement about technical systems, e.g.: the QWERTY 
keyboard) or the emergence of aesthetic rules and trends (as a matter of 
fact, every year or so a different colour is made salient by the fashion 
industry).  
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II. A Theory of Belief-Dependent Conformity to 
Social Norms  
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II.1. Introduction 
Socio-economic behaviour is generally modelled on rational choice theory‟s 
prescriptions: economic theory assumes that an agent has preferences 
satisfying some rationality requirements, yet most traditional economic 
applications simply view those requirements as implying that the self-interest 
of the agent is narrowly self-centred and unaffected by the others‟ outcome. 
On the other hand, the widely documented regularities of behaviour 
inconsistent with the standard predictions of models with rational self-centred 
individuals have motivated alternative accounts. Everyday life examples of 
such “incidents” might be brought about by norms that informally prescribe 
how people ought to behave in the community or workplace, and which are 
enforced out of fear of social sanctions: Arrow‟s [1972] investigation suggests 
that entrepreneurs, who could turn a profit on hiring labour cheaply from a 
racially discriminated group, were restrained from doing so owing to the 
establishment of social customs involving discriminatory tastes; or rather, as 
Akerlof [1980] claims, if the custom prohibits an employer from hiring labour 
at a reduced wage, employees will not cooperate in training new workers 
(who undercut existing wages), because by doing so they would suffer a loss 
of reputation for participating in disobeying the norm. Other situations that 
may be explained by the enforcement of informal norms regulating social 
behaviour include the voluntary supply of public goods (Sugden [1984]) and 
reciprocity-based transactions such as gift-giving, etc. (Sacco et al. [2006]).  
The above instances seem to be validated by a wealth of experimental 
evidence in social dilemma (i.e.: mixed-motive) games, which is thoroughly 
collected by Camerer [2003], Ch. 2; Fehr and Schmidt [2006]; Ledyard 
[1995]. Such paradigms as the Prisoner‟s Dilemma, the Ultimatum Game or 
the Trust Game are particularly meaningful since they clearly embody a 
tension – between individual incentives and other motivations – which can be 
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well observed in many everyday social interactions: indeed, the 
aforementioned experimental games all provide support against the 
traditional self-centred view of economic agents and its related descriptive 
predictions. In this connection, the present investigation focuses on the very 
motivation that makes people comply with default rules of behaviour when 
facing a social dilemma; this essay suggests that individuals may feel guilt at 
violating a norm (and this painful emotion generates conformity under 
precisely stated conditions), with a norm being modelled as a rule that 
dictates the strategy profile/s most “appropriate” for each decision node of a 
given mixed-motive game in extensive form. 
According to a line of thought which has been popular especially 
among philosophers, mixed-motive games make it possible to highlight that, 
in some cases, traditional economic applications do not seem normatively 
adequate either (Gold and Sugden [2007; 2008]). A famous puzzle is 
suggested by the Prisoner‟s Dilemma: there a positive theory (implicitly 
assuming that the agent only cares about her own material payoff) would 
forecast that both subjects will defect, whereas experimental evidence 
(collected in Sally [1995]) shows that almost half of the subjects in the 
laboratory cooperate;46 besides, a normative theory – neutral on matters of 
social welfare – would suggest that both players ought to defect, however 
both would benefit from mutual cooperation. In a nutshell, mixed-motive 
games raise some problems since the “conventional” fashion, in which 
                                  
46
 For a review of Prisoner‟s Dilemma experiments, see also: Colman [1995], Ch. 9; Cooper 
et al. [1996]; Davis and Holt [1993], Ch. 9; Goeree and Holt [2001]; Ledyard [1995]. Early 
experiments are more extensively discussed in: Lave [1962]; Rapoport and Chammah 
[1965], Pt. 1. 
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economic applications are modelled, may appear to be unconvincing with 
regard to both its positive and normative facet. In this respect, it should be 
stressed that game theory (in its classic, normative form) is certainly effective 
in prescribing strategies that maximize the individual player‟s payoff, even 
though in most mixed-motive games it fails to induce collectively desirable 
outcomes; on the other hand, most economists reply to this argument by 
pointing out that there is no such normative problem or, equivalently, that the 
above analysis would be correct only if the Prisoner‟s Dilemma were a game 
with just one player (Binmore [2007], Ch. 19). Now, whichever view is 
correct, the Prisoner‟s Dilemma leaves us with a problem of externalities, and 
a consequent policy-modelling problem: indeed, in most economic 
applications, the precise tools of analytical game theory are used to describe 
and prescribe the best policy options for actual economic agents, with the 
unfortunate result of promoting socially inefficient allocations.47  
                                  
47
 The one-shot Prisoner‟s Dilemma is an example of a game with a unique Pareto-inefficient 
Nash equilibrium; likewise, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely-repeated 
Prisoner‟s Dilemma, as every Nash equilibrium, consists of strategies that prescribe 
defection in every period (again, it is Pareto-inefficient). Similarly other puzzles of game 
theory, generally referred to as social dilemmas (including the Investment Game, the 
Centipede Game, etc.), all present a unique Pareto-inefficient subgame perfect equilibrium – 
with the exception of the Ultimatum Game. In effect, the Ultimatum Game is an example of a 
mixed-motive game where the only subgame perfect equilibrium (i.e.: the strategy pair in 
which the “Proposer” offers the smallest amount and the “Responder” accepts all offers) is 
not Pareto-inefficient: yet in evaluating economic allocations, other mechanisms (e.g.: other 
social norms, perhaps involving issues of welfare distribution) might arise; as a matter of 
fact, in the laboratory Proposers‟ offers average 40% of the money, while Responders reject 
offers of about 20% of the money half the time (Camerer [2003], Ch. 2). 
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In response to the shortcomings associated with the conventional 
economic model of rational self-centred agents, (relatively) recent 
developments in game theory improve the analysis of strategic interaction by 
allowing for diverse assumptions about players‟ beliefs, emotions, 
preferences, and rationality: most of these models have been designed to 
tackle experimental evidence, otherwise inexplicable, and address the 
positive facet of the problem.48 One line of research explains experimental 
regularities about “other-regarding” behaviour by suggesting adjusted utility 
functions, which allow the individual‟s welfare to reflect a range of motivations 
besides narrow self-interest. Some of the social preference theories, namely 
the so-called models of “reciprocal fairness”, seem to be most effective in 
accounting for other-regarding behaviour where intentions matter: think of 
Rabin [1993], Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger [2004], Falk-Fischbacher [2006], 
Charness-Rabin [2002]; all such intention-based models – with the exception 
of Battigalli and Dufwenberg‟s [2007] framework – explicitly assume that 
players have a preference for a somehow specified equitable payoff (Rabin 
[1993], Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger [2004]) or they are just (intention-based) 
inequity averse (Falk-Fischbacher [2006]49) or they have a taste for both 
                                  
48
 One exception being the body of literature rejecting the notion of individual rationality, 
which addresses the normative facet by hinging on alternative concepts of rationality (e.g.: 
collective rationality, rational commitment, etc.), thereby allowing groups of individuals to 
count as agents (Bacharach [1999]; Gold and Sugden [2007; 2008]; Sugden [2003]) or rely 
on moral arguments which prescribe a certain behaviour, even if it is not in one‟s self-interest 
to do so (Collard [1983]; Harsanyi [1980]; Laffont [1975]; Sugden [1984]). 
49
 Falk and Fischbacher [2006] do not define “kindness” in terms of the feasible payoffs of 
Player 𝑖 in relation to an equitable payoff, but directly in relation to the payoff that Player 𝑗 
gets: in this respect, their model can therefore be viewed as an intention-based inequity 
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fairness and efficiency (captured by quasi-maximin preferences in Charness-
Rabin [2002]). Thus, the aforementioned models may be interpreted as more 
or less implicitly assuming that players have internalized a (variously defined) 
“social norm of fairness or reciprocity”. 
In a different perspective, surveys from diverse disciplines – including 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience50 – support the view that human 
conduct is often guided by “conformist preferences”, which thrive on 
behavioural expectations within a society or group, with conformity being the 
act of changing one‟s behaviour to match the purported beliefs of others 
(Cialdini and Goldstein [2004]). To that end, the present essay takes the 
investigation of other-regarding motives in social dilemmas one step further: 
despite a growing body of literature considering preferences for a fair 
outcome allocation among players, most economic theories do not explain 
the underpinning conditions for a social norm to exist and to be in operation 
among players with conformist motivations. Therefore, inspired by Cristina 
Bicchieri‟s [2006] philosophical account of social norms,51 here I develop an 
original model of conformist preferences in mixed-motive games, building on 
the guilt aversion framework of Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2007]. 
In what follows, I will define what are the mechanics of those informal 
norms regulating social behaviour; I will further maintain that social norms are 
                                                                                              
aversion theory (as opposed to a simple inequity aversion theory à la Fehr and Schmidt 
[1999] or Bolton and Ockenfels [2000]). 
50
 See: Klucharev et al. [2009]; for a scientific review of studies that use experimental games 
in combination with either PET scans or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), refer 
to Montague and Lohrenz [2007]. 
51
 For another book-length philosophical treatment of norms, see Ullmann-Margalit [1977]. 
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brought about by a certain type of (conditionally) conformist preferences; I 
will finally claim that different social norms may be made salient in different 
environments (depending on the individuals‟ beliefs about the “currently-
normal” behaviour of other group-members). Two points naturally arise. 
(i) On psychological games: consistent with most sociological 
publications holding that social norms are necessarily sustained by 
expectations (Hechter and Opp [2001]), a psychological game 
framework à la Geanakoplos et al. [1989] (recently extended by 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2009]) appears to be most suitable to grasp 
situations where informal rules may play a major role; in this respect, 
the current study departs from López-Pérez‟s [2008] model of norm 
compliance while is in line with Li‟s [2008] (although the latter restricts 
attention to normal form games).52 
(ii) On inducing socially desirable outcomes: if social norms vary – 
according to the individuals‟ expectations – the aforementioned policy-
modelling problem could be resolved through some finely tuned 
process of belief manipulation. To that end, a full understanding of the 
mechanics of social norms is required, thereby allowing a neutral 
theoretical framework which can account for different (conjectures 
about) norms; in this regard, the current study leads to a 
generalization of the above theories of reciprocal fairness. 
That being said, other considerations are in order. First of all, a quick note on 
methodology: this essay aims at explaining in game-theoretic terms why 
                                  
52
 Both models are extensively reviewed in the appendix (section II.8.b. below). 
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social norms emerge, assuming that players are (fully) rational utility-
maximizers. This implies that social norms emerge because they yield 
“benefits” for the agents themselves; therefore, the study at hand departs 
both from those theories relaxing the assumption of common knowledge of 
rationality (e.g.: Kreps et al. [1982]; Fudenberg and Maskin [1986]53) and 
those rejecting the notion itself of individual rationality (see footnote 48).  
Another important issue concerns the evolution of norms. This essay 
aims at providing a framework for the analysis of social norms, without 
recourse to evolutionary arguments: under the hypothesis that, in the short 
run, one can treat the biological or cultural aspects of human nature as fixed 
(save for changes in the players‟ own beliefs, of which they are obviously 
fully aware and accordingly adjust their strategies), I will not consider the 
dynamics of evolutionary change.54 Instead, the present approach hinges on 
the idea that a social norm will be enforced if the actions prescribed by that 
norm do not allow, on the part of any player, a positive incentive to 
unilaterally deviate; in other words, a social norm will be enforced if the 
actions prescribed by that norm are supported by a refinement of the 
sequential equilibrium (allowing for belief-dependent conformist preferences). 
In shaping a theory of conformist preferences in mixed-motive games, 
I will draw on the widely maintained view (Sugden [2000]; Elster [1989], Ch. 
                                  
53
 Such theories explain behaviour in terms of reputation-building by assuming incomplete 
information about rationality, although they only account for experimental regularities specific 
to a narrow domain, i.e.: repeated games. 
54
 Notice that, conversely, evolutionary game theory often assumes that players have no 
control over the strategy they play, they do not need to know the structure of the game, and 
may not even realize they are playing a game at all. 
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6) that individuals may feel guilt at violating a social norm, and this painful 
emotion would generate conformity even in the absence of external 
sanctioning; therefore, Battigalli and Dufwenberg‟s [2007] model of guilt 
aversion naturally lends itself to depict players with (conditionally) conformist 
preferences. To sum up, in what follows: I define a “norm” as a rule that 
dictates a set of strategy profiles; I assume that players, conditional on each 
history of an extensive form game, hold a conjecture about the active player‟s 
norm-complying actions available at that history; I then model a norm-driven 
decision maker as a player with conformist preferences, whose utility function 
is a linear combination of her material payoff and a component representing 
the social cost of deviating, in the form of the sum of losses that other 
conformist players would suffer because of a norm violation. A “social norm” 
is said to exist and to be followed by a population if players have conditionally 
conformist preferences, they hold correct beliefs about the strategies in line 
with some “normally-expected behaviour”, and are sensitive enough to the 
potential social cost of deviating. 
The remainder of the essay is organized in this manner: II.2. reviews 
Bicchieri‟s [2006] account of norms; II.3. introduces some general notation on 
extensive form games, and conditional systems of beliefs; II.4. formally lays 
out the model; II.5. discusses an equilibrium solution; II.6. provides some 
illustrations, and II.7. concludes. 
 
II.2. Bicchieri’s account of norms 
This section reviews Bicchieri‟s [2006] philosophical account of norms, which 
lays the foundations for the model of conformity to be introduced later. 
Bicchieri‟s analysis starts by distinguishing “social norms” from “moral norms” 
and “descriptive norms”, where social norms (as well as descriptive norms) 
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are necessarily sustained by expectations about the others‟ compliance while 
moral norms are not; furthermore, while descriptive norms (involving fashions 
or fads) have no intrinsic value, may eventually evolve into standard 
“conventions” and are used to solve a (pre-existing) pure coordination game, 
social norms usually apply to mixed-motive games only. In a nutshell, an 
established social norm can be seen as an informal, non-binding rule for 
choosing in a mixed-motive game, (transforming this into a coordination 
game) so that members of a population prefer to follow such a norm 
depending on whether they expect sufficiently many in the population to 
follow it; the “conditions for a social norm to exist” are described as follows. 
Let 𝑅 be a behavioural rule for situations of type 𝑆, where 𝑆 is a strategic 
interaction that can be represented as a mixed-motive game. Then, 𝑅 is a 
social norm in a population 𝑃, if there exists a sufficiently large subset 
𝑃𝑐𝑓 ⊆ 𝑃 such that for each individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑐𝑓  the below properties hold:
55  
1. (contingency) 𝑖 knows that a rule 𝑅 exists and applies to situations of type 𝑆; 
2. (conditional preference) 𝑖 prefers to conform to 𝑅 in situations of type 𝑆, if 
2.1. (empirical expectations) 𝑖 believes that a sufficiently large subset of 𝑃 
conforms to 𝑅 in situations of type 𝑆; 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 
2.2. a. (normative expectations) 𝑖 believes that a sufficiently large subset of 𝑃 
expects 𝑖 to conform to 𝑅 in situations of type 𝑆, 
                                  
55
 In Bicchieri‟s view, different individuals may have different beliefs about what “sufficiently 
large” means, yet what matters to conformity is that each individual believes that her 
threshold has (at least) been reached. 
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2.2. b. (normative expectations with sanctions) 𝑖 believes that a sufficiently 
large subset of 𝑃 expects 𝑖 to conform to 𝑅 in situations of type 𝑆, 
prefers 𝑖 to conform, and may sanction behaviour. 
A social norm 𝑅 (exists and) is followed by population 𝑃, if there exists a sufficiently 
large subset 𝑃𝑓 ⊆ 𝑃𝑐𝑓  such that for each individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑃𝑓  conditions 2.1 and either 
2.2.a or 2.2.b are met for 𝑖 and, as a result, 𝑖 prefers to conform to 𝑅 in situations of 
type 𝑆. 
A few comments are in order. First, note that 𝑃𝑐𝑓  denotes the set of 
conditional followers of 𝑅 (i.e.: “individuals who know about 𝑅 and have a 
conditional preference for conforming to 𝑅”), while 𝑃𝑓  denotes the set of 
followers of 𝑅 (i.e.: “individuals who know about 𝑅 and have a preference for 
conforming to 𝑅”, because they believe that the conditions for their 
conditional preference are fulfilled). Hence, in Bicchieri‟s view, 𝑅 can be a 
social norm for a population 𝑃, even though it is not currently being followed 
by 𝑃: indeed, 𝑅 is a social norm if 𝑃𝑐𝑓  is sufficiently large; 𝑅 is also followed if 
𝑃𝑓  is sufficiently large.
56 
In the appendix to Chapter 1 Bicchieri develops a general utility 
function based on norms. Considering an n-player normal form game, let 𝑆𝑖  
denote the strategy set of Player 𝑖 and 𝑆−𝑖 =  𝑆𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  be the set of strategy 
profiles of players other than 𝑖. A norm 𝑁𝑖  is defined as a (set-valued) 
function from one‟s expectation about the opponents‟ (norm-complying) 
                                  
56
 This implies that not every conditional follower of a norm 𝑅 eventually decides to conform 
to it, as some (conditional followers) might think that their expectations have not been 
fulfilled. 
 - 87 - 
 
strategies to one‟s own strategies, that is, 𝑁𝑖 : 𝐿−𝑖 → 𝑆𝑖 , with 𝐿−𝑖 ⊆ 𝑆−𝑖.
57 A 
strategy profile 𝑠 =  𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛  is said to instantiate a norm for Player 𝑗 if 
𝑠−𝑗 ∈ 𝐿−𝑗  (i.e.: if 𝑁𝑗  is defined at 𝑠−𝑗 ), and to violate a norm if 𝑠𝑗 ≠ 𝑁𝑗  𝑠−𝑗  . 
Player 𝑖‟s utility function is a linear combination of 𝑖‟s material payoff 𝜋𝑖 𝑠  
and a component that depends on norm compliance: 
 
𝑈𝑖 𝑠 = 𝜋𝑖 𝑠 − 𝑘𝑖 max
𝑠−𝑗∈𝐿−𝑗
  max
𝑚≠𝑗
 𝜋𝑚  𝑠−𝑗 , 𝑁𝑗  𝑠−𝑗   − 𝜋𝑚  𝑠 , 0 , 
(2.2.1) 
 
where 𝑘𝑖 ≥ 0 shows 𝑖‟s sensitivity to the norm and 𝑗 refers to the norm 
violator. The norm-based component represents the maximum loss (suffered 
by players other than the norm violator 𝑗) resulting from all norm violations: 
the first maximum operator aims at taking care of the possibility that there 
might be multiple norm-complying strategy profiles (a situation which does 
not occur in the example below, where it degenerates); the second maximum 
operator ranges over all the players other than the norm violator 𝑗. To sum 
up, the player‟s utility equals her own material payoff, minus a quantity 
corresponding to the norm followers‟ maximum loss resulting from the norm 
violation, multiplied by the player‟s sensitivity parameter (notice that in braces 
is the difference between what the most negatively-affected norm follower 
                                  
57
 For example, in an n-player Prisoner‟s Dilemma a shared norm may be to cooperate: in 
that case, 𝐿−𝑖  includes the cooperate strategies of all players other than 𝑖. Note that in the 
case where – given the others‟ strategies – there is not a norm prescribing how Player 𝑖 
should behave, then 𝑁𝑖  is not defined at 𝐿−𝑖 . 
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would get in case of norm compliance and what she actually gets). In order to 
illustrate the above utility function, consider a 2-player Prisoner‟s Dilemma 
and suppose that a norm of reciprocal cooperation has been established: 
then, the norm dictating cooperation is defined at 𝐶 (cooperate) and 
undefined at 𝐷 (defect). Now, if Player 1 violates the norm by choosing 𝐷 – 
while Player 2 follows the norm – Player 1‟s utility will be 
 
𝑈1 𝐷, 𝐶 = 𝜋1 𝐷, 𝐶 − 𝑘1 𝜋2 𝐶, 𝐶 − 𝜋2 𝐷, 𝐶  . 
 
Notice that, according to Bicchieri‟s theory, Player 1 suffers even in the case 
in which she conforms to the norm but the opponent does not; in such a case 
Player 1‟s utility is in fact  
 
𝑈1 𝐶, 𝐷 = 𝜋1 𝐶, 𝐷 − 𝑘1 𝜋1 𝐶, 𝐶 − 𝜋1 𝐶, 𝐷  . 
 
To conclude, Bicchieri uses the above utility function to explain experimental 
results from a variety of social dilemmas, reading the differences in the 
observed rate of cooperation as changes in the players‟ sensitivity or in the 
players‟ beliefs about the opponents‟ sensitivity or changes in the relevant 
norm itself: this provides an insightful starting point for a dynamic model of 
norm compliance, which I am now to introduce. 
 
II.3. Preliminaries 
II.3.a. Notation on extensive form games 
An extensive form game (with perfect recall) is given by the structure 
 𝑁, 𝐻, 𝑃,  I𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 , where: 𝑁 =  1, … , 𝑛  is the set of players, H is the finite set 
 - 89 - 
 
of feasible histories, P is the player function, I𝑖  is the information partition of 
Player 𝑖.  
Each element of 𝐻 is a history, which is a (finite) sequence of actions 
taken by the players: let 𝑕 𝑎𝑙  denote a sequence  𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑙 , with 𝑎𝑙  being 
the 𝑙-th action chosen along the game tree.58 Let the set of histories satisfy 
the usual properties, i.e.: (i) the empty sequence (of length 0) 𝑕0 is a member 
of 𝐻; (ii) if  𝑎𝑙 𝑙=1,…,𝐿 ∈ 𝐻 and 𝑀 < 𝐿, then  𝑎
𝑙 𝑙=1,…,𝑀 ∈ 𝐻. Further, let 𝑍 
denote the set of terminal histories (leading to the leaves, or end-nodes, of 
the game tree), with 𝐻\𝑍 being the set of non-terminal histories; given that, 
let 𝐴𝑖 𝑕  denote the set of feasible actions for Player 𝑖 at history 𝑕 (𝐴𝑖 𝑕  is 
singleton if Player 𝑖 is not active at 𝑕, while 𝐴𝑖 𝑕  is empty if and only if 𝑕 is a 
terminal history). 
The player function 𝑃 is defined, in the usual way, as a function that 
assigns to each element of 𝐻\𝑍 an element of 𝑁, with 𝑃 𝑕  being the player 
choosing an action after the history 𝑕. Then, for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, I𝑖  denotes 
the information partition of Player 𝑖 – and 𝐼𝑖 ∈ I𝑖  is an information set of 
Player 𝑖 – where a partition I𝑖  of 𝐻𝑖 =  𝑕 ∈ 𝐻: 𝑃 𝑕 = 𝑖  has the property that 
𝐴 𝑕 = 𝐴 𝑕′  if 𝑕 and 𝑕′  are in the same cell of the partition (for some 𝐼𝑖 ∈ I𝑖 , 
one may denote by 𝐴 𝐼𝑖  the set 𝐴 𝑕 , and by 𝑃 𝐼𝑖  the player 𝑃 𝑕 , for any 
𝑕 ∈ 𝐼𝑖).  
The material payoffs of players‟ strategies are described by functions 
𝑚𝑖 : 𝑍 → ℝ for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. Further, for each player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 let 𝑆𝑖  denote 
                                  
58
 Note that, in what follows, a node of the game tree is identified with the history leading up 
to it (i.e.: a path in the game tree), as in Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]. 
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the set of pure strategies of Player 𝑖: hence, 𝑠𝑖 =  𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕 𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 is a strategy for 
Player 𝑖, that is, a plan specifying the action chosen at every history after 
which Player 𝑖 moves (with 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕  being the action implemented by 𝑠𝑖  if history 𝑕 
occurred). A strategy profile 𝑠 is a tuple of strategies, with one strategy for 
each player of the game: let 𝑆 =  𝑆𝑖𝑖∈𝑁  be the set of strategy profiles; 
similarly define 𝑆−𝑖 =  𝑆𝑗𝑗≠𝑖  for players 𝑗 other than 𝑖. Finally denote the set 
of Player 𝑖’s pure strategies allowing history 𝑕 (i.e.: strategies leading to – 
and succeeding – 𝑕) as 𝑆𝑖 𝑕 ; strategy profiles allowing history 𝑕 are defined 
as 𝑆 𝑕 =  𝑆𝑖 𝑕 𝑖∈𝑁 , and 𝑆−𝑖 𝑕 =  𝑆𝑗  𝑕 𝑗≠𝑖  for all players 𝑗 other than 𝑖. 
With a slight abuse of notation, let 𝑧 𝑠  indicate a terminal history induced by 
some strategy profile 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆.  
II.3.b. Conditional systems of beliefs 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2009] provide a framework for the analysis of 
dynamic psychological games, where conditional higher-order systems of 
beliefs influence the players‟ motivation. As in their model, here behavioural 
strategies are used to describe Player 𝑗‟s beliefs about Player 𝑖‟s actions at 
each history after which 𝑖 has to play: formally, a behavioural strategy of 
Player 𝑖 is a collection of independent probability measures 
𝜍𝑖 =  𝜍𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 ∈
 ∆ 𝐴𝑖 𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 , where 𝜍𝑖 𝑎 𝑕  is the probability of 
action 𝑎 at history 𝑕 and ∆ 𝐴𝑖 𝑕   denotes the set of probability measures 
over the set of Player 𝑖‟s feasible actions at history 𝑕. Then, Pr𝜍𝑖 ∙  𝑕
  ∈
∆  𝑆𝑖 𝑕    is the probability measure over Player 𝑖‟s strategies conditional on 
𝑕  derived from 𝜍𝑖  and, therefore, for some strategy 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑕   Pr𝜍𝑖 𝑠𝑖 𝑕
  
∶=  𝜍𝑖 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕  𝑕 𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍: 𝑕≽𝑕  indicates the conditional probability of 𝑠𝑖 , given that 𝑕  
has occurred (note that 𝑕 ≽ 𝑕  is a history subsequent or equal to 𝑕 , and 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕  is 
the action selected by 𝑠𝑖  if history 𝑕 took place). 
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Now, every player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 holds a system of first-order beliefs 𝛼𝑖 =
 𝛼𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻𝑖
 about the strategies of all the co-players, that is, at each 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖  
Player 𝑖 holds an updated (i.e.: revised) belief 𝛼𝑖 ∙  𝑕 ∈ ∆ 𝑆−𝑖 𝑕  . At each 
𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖  Player 𝑖 further holds a second-order belief about the first-order belief 
system of each of the opponents: yet, for simplicity, here for some 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 , 
𝛽𝑖 𝑕  merely indicates 𝑖‟s belief about an arbitrary 𝑗‟s first-order belief system 
(i.e.: 𝛽𝑖 𝑕  denotes 𝑖‟s belief about 𝛼−𝑖 ≡  𝛼𝑗  ∙  𝑕
′  
𝑗 ≠𝑖 , 𝑕 ′ ∈𝐻𝑗
); given that, let 
𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑖 𝑕 ∈ ∆ 𝑆𝑖 𝑕   denote 𝑖‟s strategy-part of 𝛽𝑖 𝑕 , which represents 𝑖‟s belief 
about what every other player unanimously believes about 𝑖‟s strategies. 
Finally it is assumed that players‟ beliefs at different information sets must 
satisfy Bayes‟ rule and common knowledge of Bayesian updating.59  
 
                                  
59
 Recalling that a behavioural strategy 𝜍𝑖  is used to describe the other players‟ beliefs about 
Player 𝑖‟s behaviour, the reader can anticipate that (as it will be imposed later on) in 
equilibrium 𝛼𝑖 𝑠−𝑖 𝑕  ≡  Pr𝜍𝑗  𝑠𝑗  𝑕
  𝑗≠𝑖 . Also, since in equilibrium 𝛼𝑖  will be derived from the 
behavioural strategy profile 𝜍 =  𝜍𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁, the beliefs of every player 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 about Player 𝑖‟s 
strategies will be the same, which will render the above simplifying assumption about 𝛽𝑖 𝑕  
innocuous and (through an additional consistency requirement) will imply that, in equilibrium, 
𝛽𝑖 𝑕 = 𝛼−𝑖 ≡  𝛼𝑗  ∙  𝑕
′  
𝑗≠𝑖 , 𝑕 ′∈𝐻𝑗
. For a discussion of the consistency requirements in 
equilibrium, see section II.5. below. 
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II.4. A model of social norms 
II.4.a. Norms and perfectly norm-driven decision makers 
I can now turn to shape an original theory of conformity to social norms out of 
a dynamic game with belief-dependent motivations. In this sub-section a 
“norm” is defined as a rule that dictates a set of strategy profiles at each 
decision node of the game tree: thus, the dictated set of strategy profiles is 
intended as showing the behaviour most in accordance with a certain 
(exogenous) principle after a given history; this implies that if no player ever 
deviates from the prescripts dictated by a norm at the initial history, then the 
strategy profiles dictated by that very norm at all the successor nodes will be 
the same as those dictated at the root of the game tree. Further, it is 
assumed that all norms regulating human behaviour are contained in a 
universal set of norms, while each player is only aware of the norms 
contained in her personal subset of norms (as determined by a collection of 
attitudes, values, goals, and practices characterizing her group, organization 
or institution).  
 
Definition II.1. Given an extensive form game 𝐺, a norm is a set-valued 
function 𝑟 that assigns to every non-terminal history 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻\𝑍 one or more 
elements from the set 𝑆 𝑕  of strategy profiles allowing history 𝑕; that is, a 
norm 𝑟: 𝐻\𝑍 → 𝑆 is a rule dictating the strategy profile/s most “appropriate” – 
according to a certain principle – for each node of the given (mixed-motive) 
game.  
 
Hence, denote by 𝑅 the set of norms and for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 let 𝑅𝑖  be the norm 
subset of Player 𝑖, with 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅. The interpretation is as follows: given a 
universal set of norms (𝑅), the culture of each player 𝑖 marks out a subset 𝑅𝑖 , 
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stored in 𝑖‟s memory, which contains default rules of behaviour in accordance 
with set usage, procedure, discipline or principle (e.g.: Pareto optimality, 
“equitable” income distribution, etc.).60 It is assumed that each player‟s norm 
subset may contain all or just part of the rules of the other players‟ norm 
subsets (depending on the extent to which players share the same culture), 
or may even be empty. 
Now, given an extensive form game 𝐺 and a certain norm 𝑟 , with 𝑟 ∈
𝑅, let 𝑟 𝑕0  denote the set of strategy profiles completely consistent with 𝑟 , 
where the expression “completely consistent” refers to the fact that such a 
set contains the very strategy profiles the norm dictates at all subsequent 
histories (whenever no deviation occurs along the play). Further, let 𝑟 𝐻  
denote the set of strategy profiles (partly) consistent with 𝑟 , which depicts the 
set of all the strategy profiles dictated by the norm at each history 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻\𝑍 
(including histories that would be impossible to reach if 𝑟 𝑕0  was played); 
that is,  𝑟 𝐻  contains all the strategy profiles consistent with 𝑟 only from 
some history 𝑕 onwards (for all 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻\𝑍, with 𝑕 ≽ 𝑕0), i.e.: 𝑟 𝐻 =
 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 𝑕 : ∃𝑕 ∈ 𝐻 ∖ 𝑍 s. t. 𝑠 = 𝑟 𝑕  . Similarly, given a norm subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅 for 
each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, denote by 𝑅𝑖 𝐻  the set of strategy profiles (partly) consistent 
with any 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 , i.e.: 𝑅𝑖 𝐻 =  𝑟 𝐻 𝑟∈𝑅𝑖 : 𝑅𝑖⊆𝑅 . For each 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻\𝑍 denote by 
𝑅𝑖 𝑕  the set of norm-complying strategy profiles allowing history 𝑕, which is 
defined as 𝑅𝑖 𝑕 =  𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 𝑕 : ∃𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖  s. t. 𝑠 = 𝑟 𝑕  ; also, note that 𝑅𝑖 𝐻 ≡
 𝑅𝑖 𝑕 𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 . Given that, let 𝐴𝑖 ,𝑕  𝑅𝑖 𝑕    denote the set of Player 𝑖’s norm-
complying actions at history 𝑕 (for any 𝑕 ≽ 𝑕 ), which depicts the set of actions 
                                  
60
 For some examples of norms, see section II.6. below. 
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prescribed to Player 𝑖 at history 𝑕, as dictated at 𝑕  by any norm in 𝑅𝑖 : so, if 
Player 𝑖 – once at history 𝑕 – takes an action being part of the norm-
complying strategy profiles allowing 𝑕 , then 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕 ∈ 𝐴𝑖 ,𝑕  𝑅𝑖 𝑕   . Finally, denote 
the set of Player 𝑖’s norm-complying strategies allowing history 𝑕 as 
𝑆𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝑕  , which represents 𝑖‟s strategy-component of the set of norm-
complying strategy profiles allowing 𝑕;61 notice that, in the event that 𝑅𝑖 ≠ 𝑅𝑗  
(for some 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) the set of Player 𝑖‟s norm-complying strategies 
allowing 𝑕 – according to 𝑖‟s norm subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅 – may not be the same as 
the set of Player 𝑖‟s norm-complying strategies according to 𝑗‟s norm subset, 
in other terms it might well be that 𝑆𝑖  𝑅𝑖 𝑕   ≠ 𝑆𝑖  𝑅𝑗  𝑕    for some history 𝑕 . 
Given that, it is assumed that players, conditional on each history of an 
extensive form game, hold a conjecture about the active player‟s norm-
complying actions at that history. 
 
Definition II.2. Given an extensive form game 𝐺 and for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 a norm 
subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅, a norm-conjecture of Player 𝑖 is a collection of independent 
probability measures 𝜌𝑖 =  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 ∈
 ∆  𝐴𝑃 𝑕  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 , with 𝜌𝑖 𝑎 𝑕  
being the probability of action 𝑎 at history 𝑕, such that: 
                                  
61
 Obviously the set of norm-complying strategy profiles allowing history 𝑕0 can be defined 
from actions as 𝑅𝑖 𝑕
0 ≡    𝐴𝑦 ,𝑕 𝑅𝑖 𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍  𝑦∈𝑁 , that is, the Cartesian product of all 
players‟ (sequences of) norm-complying actions at all histories or, in other words, the 
Cartesian product of all players‟ norm-complying strategies allowing 𝑕0. 
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supp 𝜌𝑖 = supp  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 ∈  𝐴𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕 𝑅𝑖
 𝑕  
𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍
, 
where supp 𝜌𝑖  denotes the support of 𝜌𝑖 , and 𝐴𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕 𝑅𝑖 𝑕   is the set of norm-
complying actions of the active player (e.g.: 𝑃 𝑕 = 𝑦) at history 𝑕.62 
 
Notice that the support of 𝜌𝑖  is the set of the active player‟s (norm-complying) 
actions which are assigned positive probability by 𝑖‟s norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖  at 
each history. In plain words – in order for (the potentially conformist) Player 𝑖 
to identify the actions being part of a strategy profile appearing to best 
describe some “normally-expected behaviour” (according to the standards 
set in 𝑖‟s social group and reflected in 𝑅𝑖) – conditional on each 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻 ∖ 𝑍, 
she holds a conjecture 𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  about the active player‟s norm-complying 
actions at history 𝑕.63 It should be stressed that (possibly depending on the 
size of the social group) it may not be obvious to the members of a group that 
one norm is more adequate than another, so they have to form beliefs about 
what is expected (from the group as a whole) to do. It follows that Player 𝑖’s 
belief about the strategy profiles consistent with some norm in 𝑅𝑖  is a 
probability measure over 𝑅𝑖 𝐻 ; therefore, Pr𝜌 𝑖 ∙  𝑕
  ∈ ∆  𝑅𝑖 𝑕    is the 
probability measure over norm-complying strategy profiles conditional on 𝑕  
                                  
62
 Recall that, for each player 𝑦 ∈ 𝑁 that takes an action after some history 𝑕, the value of 
the player function at 𝑕 is 𝑦, i.e.: 𝑃 𝑕 = 𝑦. 
63
 Notice that, while the above system of first-order beliefs 𝛼𝑖  is a probability measure over 
the strategies of all the co-players (i.e.: all players other than 𝑖), here 𝜌𝑖 =  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 is a 
collection of independent probability measures over the actions the active player ought to 
take at each history 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻\𝑍. Also, note that it is assumed that 𝜌𝑖  is undefined if 𝑅𝑖 = ∅. 
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and so, for some 𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 𝑕  , the conditional probability of norm-complying 
strategy profile 𝑠 (given that 𝑕  has occurred) is computed by Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠 𝑕
  
=  𝜌𝑖 𝑠𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕  𝑕 𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍: 𝑕≽𝑕 . 
Before proceeding, notice that the above definition of norm reminds us 
of the one suggested by López-Pérez [2008], where a norm is defined as a 
correspondence mapping 𝑕 into 𝐴 𝑕 .64 However, on a mere conceptual 
level, here it is assumed that defining a norm as a correspondence mapping 
non-terminal histories into strategy profiles allows to better capture the 
strategic complexity of such rules, in that a certain action of Player 𝑃 𝑕  
might be considered most appropriate for some decision node (i.e.: for some 
history 𝑕) only in light of what is expected from all players to do at the 
successor nodes. In substance, on the one hand, assuming a unique 
possible norm in the society, like the E-norm of López-Pérez, the value of 
that norm at the initial history (i.e.: 𝑠 = 𝑟 𝑕0  for some 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆) would induce the 
same leaves as López-Pérez‟s fairmax paths; on the other hand, in the event 
of a player‟s deviation from the initially-recommended path, López-Pérez‟s 
norm selects the whole set 𝐴 𝑕  whereas the present theory allows the norm 
𝑟 to determine the actions in accordance with a given principle also at 
histories that would be impossible to reach if 𝑟 𝑕0  was played. Also, 
disregarding the role of expectations in sustaining a social norm seems to be 
a conceptual drawback of López-Pérez‟s model, although that makes his 
framework a parsimonious one. 
                                  
64
 For a detailed review of López-Pérez‟s [2008] and Li‟s [2008] models of norm compliance, 
refer to the appendix (section II.8.b. below). 
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The present definition of norm appears more similar to Li‟s [2008] 
convention, where “the right thing to do” depends also on what the co-player 
is (believed to be) doing. Indeed, Li models a norm as belief-dependent 
rankings over one‟s strategy space and normalizes them to the unit interval; 
more precisely, given a strategic form game and denoting Player 𝑖‟s set of 
mixed strategies as Σ𝑖  and 𝑖‟s belief about 𝑗‟s strategy as 𝑏𝑗 ∈ Σ𝑗 , Li defines a 
convention as a mapping 𝜔: Σ𝑖 × Σ𝑗 →  0,1 
2. Notice that, by applying her 
definition (which is given in the context of 2-player normal form games) to a 
2-player extensive form game with no proper subgames, in some cases one 
would get a collection of values corresponding to what is here referred to as 
“Player 𝑖‟s belief about the strategy profiles consistent with some norm in 𝑅𝑖” 
(i.e.: Pr𝜌 𝑖 ∙  𝑕
0 ∈ ∆ 𝑅𝑖 𝐻  ); however, the two notions do not generally 
coincide since Li‟s convention is not a probability measure and so in her 
model it may well be that  𝜔𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  ≠ 1 𝜍𝑖 ,𝑏𝑗  ∈Σ𝑖×Σ𝑗 . 
Now, I can move on to introduce a notion of “pure social response to a 
norm-conjecture” (which reminds of a moral choice, as intended in some 
philosophical literature), as follows. 
 
Definition II.3. A strategy 𝑠𝑖
∗∗ =  𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕 𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 is a pure social response to norm-
conjecture 𝜌𝑖 =  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 at history 𝑕
  if the following condition holds for 
all 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑕  : 
Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖
∗∗|𝑕  ≥ Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖|𝑕
  , 
where Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖|𝑕
   is the conditional probability of a pure strategy of Player 𝑖 at 
history 𝑕  – according to 𝑖‟s own norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖  – and is computed by 
Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖  𝑕
  =  𝜌𝑖 𝑠𝑖 ,𝑕  𝑕 𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍: 𝑕≽𝑕 . 
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Notice that, by definition II.2, 𝜌𝑖 =  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 assigns positive probability 
only to (some) norm-complying actions at history 𝑕, which trivially implies that 
a pure social response 𝑠𝑖
∗∗ to norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖  at history 𝑕  must be a norm-
complying strategy, i.e.: 𝑠𝑖
∗∗ ∈ 𝑆𝑖  𝑅𝑖 𝑕   . Given that, one can define the set of 
pure social responses to 𝜌𝑖  at 𝑕  as 𝐶𝑖 𝜌𝑖 ∶= arg max
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖 𝑕  
Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖|𝑕
  . 
 
Definition II.4. A perfectly norm-driven decision maker is an agent 𝑖 such 
that – facing a decision problem defined by an extensive form game 𝐺 and 
given a non-empty norm subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅 – 𝑖 plays a pure social response 
𝑠𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝑕
0   to norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖 . 
  
To sum up, definition II.3 determines the set (𝐶𝑖) of Player 𝑖‟s social 
responses to 𝜌𝑖  at 𝑕  as a collection of pure strategies with the highest 
probability of adhering to some principle, as prescribed by some 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 , from 
some history 𝑕  onwards. Definition II.4 suggests a notion of extremely 
socially-conscientious agent 𝑖 by which 𝑖 takes the actions selected by 
strategy 𝑠𝑖
∗ that, according to 𝜌𝑖 , are most appropriate for all histories after 
which she moves (regardless of the material payoff to 𝑖). In the next sub-
section the utility function of a perfectly norm-driven decision maker will be 
devised as a special case of that of another category of socially-
conscientious agents, namely the “fairly norm-driven decision makers”. 
II.4.b. Belief-dependent conformist preferences 
I model a (fairly) norm-driven decision maker 𝑖 as a player with conformist 
preferences, whose utility function is a linear combination of her material 
payoff and a component representing the social cost of deviating, in the form 
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of the sum of losses that other conformist players 𝑗 would suffer because of a 
norm violation. For that, one needs to define some player 𝑗‟s expectation 
about her material payoff, given her strategy 𝑠𝑗  and her initial belief 𝛼𝑗 =
 ∙  𝑕0  about the strategies of the co-players (as it will be soon clear, 𝑗‟s 
expectation affects 𝑖‟s utility function): so, drawing on Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg‟s [2007] concept of simple guilt, such an expectation is given by 
E𝑠𝑗 ,𝛼𝑗  𝑚𝑗 |𝑕
0 =  𝛼𝑗𝑠−𝑗  𝑠−𝑗  𝑕
0 𝑚𝑗  𝑧 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑠−𝑗   . Here, if Player 𝑗 is a norm-
driven decision maker – and presumes that her co-players are norm-driven 
too – she can form her belief 𝛼𝑗  by assuming her co-players‟ behaviour to be 
consistent with some 𝑟, with 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅−𝑗 . 
Now, the present theory assumes that players are naïve in the 
following way: if Player 𝑗 presumes that her co-players are norm-driven, then 
she believes that they hold the same norm-conjecture as hers (i.e.: 𝜌𝑗 =
 𝜌𝑗  ∙  𝑕  
𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍
); hence, Player 𝑗 forms her first-order belief 𝛼𝑗  by assuming 
her co-players‟ behaviour (at each history where they are active) to be 
consistent with her own norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑗 . Notice that, here, her initial belief 
𝛼𝑗 =  ∙  𝑕
0  would still correspond to a probability measure over the strategies 
of all the opponents, but with the support of 𝛼𝑗  containing only opponents‟ 
norm-complying strategies – according to 𝑗‟s norm subset 𝑅𝑗  – therefore the 
probability of a certain strategy profile of all players other than 𝑗 is now given 
by:  
 
𝛼𝑗  𝑠−𝑗  𝑕
0 ≡ Pr𝜌𝑗  𝑠−𝑗 |𝑕
0 =  𝜌𝑗  𝑠−𝑗 ,𝑕 |𝑕 
𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍: 𝑕≽𝑕0
. 
(2.4.1) 
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Note that, for the sake of simplicity, the present theory assumes that 
players cannot randomize, yet randomized choices enter the analysis as an 
expression of the players‟ beliefs about the opponents‟ (norm-complying) 
strategies. Given that, a “fairly norm-driven decision maker” is defined as 
follows. 
 
Definition II.5. A fairly norm-driven decision maker has conditionally-
conformist preferences characterized by the following utility function 
 
𝑢𝑖
𝐶 𝑧, 𝑠−𝑖 , 𝛼𝑗  = 𝑚𝑖 𝑧 − 𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑖
𝐶𝑑𝑖
𝐸  𝑚𝑎𝑥  0, E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝑠𝑗 ,𝛼𝑗  𝑚𝑗 |𝑕
0 − 𝑚𝑗  𝑧  
𝑗≠𝑖
, 
 
with 𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖 𝑧 , 𝑘𝑖 ∈  0,  ∞  , and where: 
 𝑘𝑖  is Player 𝑖‟s sensitivity to the norm, which measures the agent‟s 
degree of conformity, thereby the “marginal cost” of a norm violation; 
 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 is a dummy variable equal to one if agent 𝑖 is aware of one or more 
norms applicable to the given decision problem (i.e.: whenever 𝑅𝑖 ≠
∅), equal to zero otherwise; 
 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 is a dummy variable equal to one if agent 𝑖 believes that at least 
one 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 will adhere to some 𝑟, with 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 , depending on the leaf 𝑧
𝑡−1 
reached in a previous instance of the same multi-person decision 
problem (whenever the game is repeated) as follows 
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      𝑑𝑖
𝐸 =  
1 :
1 :
0 :
     
in period 1,
in period 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 ∃𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 𝐻  s.t. 𝑧
𝑡−1 = 𝑧 𝑠 ,
in period 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 ∄𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 𝐻  s.t. 𝑧
𝑡−1 = 𝑧 𝑠 .
65  
 
It is now clear that the psychological loss comes from any positive difference 
between the presumed expected payoff to 𝑗 and the payoff 𝑗 would get in the 
event of a norm violation; notice that 𝑖 does not know what 𝛼𝑗  is, yet she can 
estimate it in the same fashion as in formula (2.4.1) by presuming that every 
𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 holds the same norm-conjecture as hers. Also notice that the dummy 
variable 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 contributes to conceiving of a motive of conditionally conformist 
behaviour in that – whenever the game is repeated – 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 takes on the value 1 
if there exists at least one strategy profile consistent with some 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖  (i.e.: 
𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 𝐻 ) such that it induces the terminal history realized in the previous 
period. To sum up, if 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 1, 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 1, and 𝑘𝑖 > 0 Player 𝑖 will exhibit 
conformist preferences;66 besides, the larger her sensitivity 𝑘𝑖 , the more will 
she experience some disutility from someone‟s not conforming to her 
(presumed) norm. In this respect, it should be stressed that the sensitivity 
parameter 𝑘𝑖  sets the size of a hypothetical feeling of uneasiness of member 
𝑖 of a social group in which (because of someone‟s norm violation) some 
other member‟s welfare gets unjustly, or unexpectedly, reduced. 
                                  
65
 Note that 𝑧𝑡−1 denotes the terminal history realized in the previous period (i.e.: period 𝑡 −
1), with the set of periods being 𝑇 =  1, … , 𝑞 . Recall that 𝑅𝑖 𝐻  is the set of strategy profiles 
consistent with any 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 (as defined in section II.4.a. above). 
66
 Obviously if 𝑘𝑖 = 0 or 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 0 or 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 0 the utility function reduces to one of classical, non-
conformist motivation. 
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Further, it should be stressed that such a utility function differs from 
the one Bicchieri presents in the appendix to Chapter 1 (Bicchieri [2006], Ch. 
1) since, according to Bicchieri‟s motivation function, Player 𝑖 would suffer a 
psychological loss even in the case in which she conforms to the norm but 
Player 𝑗 does not and, by doing so, 𝑗 gets a material payoff larger than the 
one implied by the norm (see the Prisoner‟s Dilemma example in section II.2. 
above). However, even though Bicchieri‟s formulation seems plausible, here 
it is assumed that the most prominent cause of conformity in social dilemmas 
is some painful emotion which an individual 𝑖 may feel in the event that any 
other member of the social group gets an outcome inferior to the “normally-
expected” one (according to 𝜌𝑖), regardless of 𝑖’s direct responsibility: in this 
respect, notice that here an agent with preferences represented by a utility 
function 𝑢𝑖
𝐶, on the one hand, would not suffer a psychological loss in the 
case in which she conforms to her (presumed) norm but her only co-player 
does not and, as a consequence, 𝑖 gets a material payoff lower than the one 
implied by her norm; on the other hand, 𝑖 would suffer a psychological loss in 
the case in which she conforms to her presumed norm but Player 𝑔 does not 
and, because of 𝑔‟s strategy, a third player 𝑗 gets a material payoff lower 
than the one implied by 𝑖‟s norm.67 
                                  
67
 A justification of the present modelling of the psychological disutility (from someone‟s not 
conforming to a norm) comes from the following argument: if, on the one hand, it might seem 
more suitable to let Player 𝑖‟s psychological loss equal the opponents‟ “disappointment” due 
to 𝑖‟s behaviour only (and not due to someone else‟s strategy), on the other hand, it should 
be further stressed that such psychological loss has to be intended as the malaise of a 
member of a social group in which some peer‟s welfare gets unjustly reduced. Indeed, the 
current modelling accounts for Player 𝑖‟s suffering a psychological loss in the case in which 
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Before proceeding, in light of definition II.5, one further observation is 
necessary. 
 
Remark II.1. A perfectly norm-driven decision maker (see also definition II.4) 
has unconditionally-conformist preferences characterized by a utility function 
𝑢𝑖
𝐶, with: 
(i) 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 1 [𝑅𝑖 ≠ ∅]; 
(ii) 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 1 [𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛 in period 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 𝑖𝑓 ∄𝑠 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 𝐻  s.t. 𝑧
𝑡−1 = 𝑧 𝑠 ]; 
(iii) 𝑘𝑖 → ∞. 
 
A perfectly norm-driven decision maker represents an agent 𝑖 who cares 
infinitely much about the social implications of her actions, even though – in 
previous occurrences (if any) of the same social dilemma – no other member 
of the population has complied with any of the norms contained in 𝑅𝑖 . In other 
words, a perfectly norm-driven decision maker has unconditional preferences 
for conformity to some norm 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 ; that is, norm 𝑟 constitutes a moral norm 
for 𝑖 (in this respect, empirical expectations set the boundaries between 
moral, often referred to as “Kantian”, norms and social norms). 
                                                                                              
she conforms to her presumed norm but Player 𝑔 does not and, because of 𝑔‟s behaviour 
only, a third player 𝑗 gets a material payoff lower than expected (by 𝑖) whereas Player 𝑖, 
along with 𝑔, gets a material payoff higher than the one implied by 𝑖‟s norm. As a matter of 
fact, norm-enforcing instincts have been probed using neuroimaging: results show that 
humans have an automatic drive to react to social wrongs perpetrated on themselves as well 
as others (Montague and Lohrenz [2007]). 
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II.4.c. Social norms 
Given the above apparatus, I shall introduce a set of conditions for a social 
norm to exist or, more explicitly, conditions for a norm 𝑟 to constitute a “social 
norm for 𝑖”. Before stating such conditions it should be highlighted that, as 
mentioned above, the present theory of conformity draws on guilt aversion in 
that guilt is a driver for conformity in mixed-motive games; however, this is 
not a social preference model proper because, as it will be soon clear, social 
norms rather serve as an equilibrium selection device, which here means that 
– when beliefs are correct – the guilt component of the utility function is 
always null in equilibrium.68 In fact, the form of the current utility function 
incorporates a taste for conditional social preferences which characterize, for 
example, a scenario where people dislike vandalism or littering, although 
they are more likely to indulge in misbehaviour whenever evidence of 
vandalism or littering are present in the environment; more generally, the 
present theory well depicts the case of an agent having a preference for 
some principle – whatever the norm specifically prescribes to her – only on 
condition that others do not deviate from the precepts of that norm (which is 
in sharp contrast with the social preference models mentioned in the 
introduction).  
 
Definition II.6. Let 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 be a norm applicable to a certain class ℂ of mixed-
motive games, where each game is a structure 𝐺 =  𝑁, 𝐻, 𝑃,  𝑢𝑖
𝐶 
𝑖∈𝑁
 . 𝑟 is a 
social norm for Player 𝑖 of game 𝐺, if the following conditions hold for 𝑖. 
                                  
68
 For a discussion of possible equilibrium scenarios, see section II.5. below. 
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1. (contingency) 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 ⟹ 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 1. 
2. (conditional preference) ∃𝑠∗ ∈ 𝑟 𝑕0  s. t. 𝑢𝑖
𝐶 𝑧 𝑠𝑖
∗, 𝑠−𝑖
∗   ≥ 𝑢𝑖
𝐶 𝑧 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗    
for ∀ 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , where 𝑟 𝑕
0  is the set of strategy profiles completely 
consistent with 𝑟. That is, 𝑖 prefers to adhere to 𝑟 in a play of 𝐺 𝑖𝑓 
2.1. (empirical expectations) 
 
𝛼𝑖 𝑠−𝑖 𝑕
0 =  Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑗  𝑕
0 𝑗≠𝑖  𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖 ,
𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑕  supp  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 ∈
 𝐴𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕 𝑟 𝑕
0  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍
 ⟹ 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 1; 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟 2.2. 𝑎 𝑜𝑟 2.2. 𝑏 
2.2. a. (normative expectations) 𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑖 𝑕0 =  Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖 𝑕
0  
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
, 
2.2. b. (normative expectations with “psychological sanctions”  
i. 𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑖 𝑕0 =  Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖 𝑕
0  
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
ii. 𝐷𝑖
𝑗
= E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽𝑖 ,𝛼𝑖 𝑚𝑗 |𝑕
0 − 𝑚𝑗  𝑧 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗   ≥ 0 for ∀ 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 
∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 (𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, with 𝐷𝑖
𝑗
> 0 for at least one 𝑗), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
iii. 𝑘𝑖 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒. 
  
The above set of conditions for a social norm to exist introduces a 
mathematically-precise definition of social norm, which in part formulizes 
Bicchieri‟s [2006] verbalization.69 Besides, the overall interpretation is not 
                                  
69
 See section II.2. above, for Bicchieri‟s own conditions: in this regard note that Bicchieri‟s 
conditions for a social norm to exist differ from the conditions of the present theory (as stated 
in definition II.6), among the other issues, also in that such conditions are here defined from 
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dissimilar: indeed, for both theories, a social norm has to be intended as 
informal (it is not a legal rule) and not necessarily enforced (it is non-binding); 
yet, and most importantly, it is necessarily sustained by expectations in that it 
is not unconditional (it is not a moral norm). In this connection, a few 
comments are in order. Condition 1 (i.e.: 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖) states that 𝑖 is aware of norm 
𝑟 applicable to game 𝐺. Condition 2.1 (i.e.: (𝛼𝑖 𝑠−𝑖 𝑕
0 =  Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑗  𝑕
0 𝑗≠𝑖  for 
∀ 𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖 , with supp  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 ∈
 𝐴𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕 𝑟 𝑕
0  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍 ) states that 𝑖 
believes that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 adheres to 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗 ; that is, 𝑖‟s first-order belief is 
derived from 𝑖‟s norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖 , with the support of 𝜌𝑖  containing only 
norm-complying actions dictated by 𝑟.70 Conditions 2.2.a and 2.2.b apply to 
alternative situations, that is: the former refers to the case where 𝑖 believes 
that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 expects her to behave according to 𝑖‟s norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖  
(which means that 𝑖‟s second-order belief is derived from 𝜌𝑖), simply because 
𝑗 acknowledges the legitimacy of 𝑖‟s norm-conjecture; the latter refers to the 
case where 𝑖 believes that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 expects her to behave according to 𝜌𝑖 , 
and 𝑗 also prefers 𝑖 to conform.71 More precisely, condition 2.2.b holds 
                                                                                              
the viewpoint of Player 𝑖, irrespective of the correctness of her beliefs; a discussion of 
additional points of difference is provided below. 
70
 Notice that 𝐴𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕 𝑟 𝑕
0   is the set of norm-complying actions of the active player at 
history 𝑕, as dictated at 𝑕0 by 𝑟.  
71
 Condition 2.2.a depicts a situation in which 𝑖 believes that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 expects 𝑖 to conform 
to the norm, yet 𝑖 does not necessarily believe that 𝑗 prefers 𝑖 to conform: in other words, 
condition 2.2.a accounts for a situation where 𝑗 conforms because 𝑗‟s cost of a norm violation 
(i.e.: 𝑘𝑗 ) is high enough to make 𝑗‟s deviation from 𝑠𝑗
∗ unprofitable, although there could be a 
terminal history induced by some strategy profile  𝑠−𝑗 , 𝑠𝑗
∗  where 𝑗 would be better off. An 
example of a case where condition 2.2.a is fulfilled is discussed in section II.6.a. below (see 
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whenever its three components hold at once: (i) the first expression (i.e.: 
𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑖 𝑕0 =  Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖 𝑕
0  
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
) states that 𝑖 believes that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 expects her 
to behave according to 𝑖‟s norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖  (that is, 𝑖‟s second-order belief 
is derived from 𝜌𝑖); (ii) the second expression (i.e.: 𝐷𝑖
𝑗
= E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽𝑖 ,𝛼𝑖 𝑚𝑗 |𝑕
0 −
𝑚𝑗  𝑧 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗   ≥ 0 for ∀ 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁) states that 𝑖 believes that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 
prefers her to behave according to 𝑖‟s norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖  (that is, 𝑖’s 
expectation of 𝑗’s disappointment 𝐷𝑖
𝑗
 in the event of a norm violation is non-
negative for each 𝑧 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗  ≠ 𝑧 𝑠𝑖
∗, 𝑠−𝑖
∗  ); (iii) the final expression (i.e.: 𝑘𝑖 > 0 
and 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒) states that 𝑖‟s cost of a norm violation is 
psychologically hurting (whenever 𝑘𝑖 > 0) and is high enough to make 𝑖‟s 
deviation from 𝑠𝑖
∗ unprofitable. 
Before introducing the conditions for a social norm to (exist and) be 
followed by every 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, I shall briefly illustrate how the above sufficiently-
large-𝑘𝑖  requirement operates in a simple decision problem. Hence, it is 
required that 𝑘𝑖 ≥ max   𝑘 𝑖
𝑠 𝑖 , … , 𝑘 𝑖
𝑠 𝑖 , where each 𝑘 𝑖
𝑠𝑖  is a sensitivity parameter 
such that 𝑢𝑖
𝐶 𝑧 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠−𝑖
∗   = 𝑢𝑖
𝐶 𝑧 𝑠𝑖
∗, 𝑠−𝑖
∗    for some 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , with 𝑠
∗ ∈ 𝑟 𝑕0 . 
Consider the following Discrete Dictator Game.72 
 
                                                                                              
second scenario in proposition II.2); note that Bicchieri‟s interpretation of condition 2.2.a is 
slightly different. 
72
 Notice that 𝐷𝐷𝐺, as represented in Figure II.1, is a peculiar case of Dictator Game in that it 
presents an inefficient option (i.e.: for 𝑠1 = 𝑐). 
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Figure II.1 - Discrete Dictator Game “DDG”  
 
Now, suppose that a social norm based on some equitable principle has 
been established (i.e.: an “equitable” social norm 𝑟∗ exists for Player 1),73 
then the set of strategy profiles completely consistent with 𝑟∗ is singleton, 
that is, 𝑟∗ 𝑕0 =  𝑎 . Therefore – given that in this case Player 1 believes that 
𝜌𝑖 𝑎 𝑕
0 = 1 for 𝑖 = 1,2, and that 𝛽1 𝑠1 𝑕
0 = Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠1|𝑕
0 = 1 for 𝑠1 = 𝑎 – it 
follows that Player 1‟s expectation of Player 2‟s (expected) material payoff at 
𝑕0 equals E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 = 1 ∙ 3 = 3. Further, Player 1‟s expectation of Player 
                                  
73
 See section II.6. below for some precise definitions of norms based on equitable 
principles. 
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2‟s “disappointment” at  𝑏|𝑕0  is E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏  = 3 − 2 = 1; this 
implies that Player 1‟s utility at  𝑏|𝑕0  equals 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛽1 = 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑏  −
𝑘 1
𝑏  E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏   = 4 − 𝑘 1
𝑏 ∙ 1. Similarly, Player 1‟s expectation of 
Player 2‟s “disappointment” at  𝑐|𝑕0  is E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑐  = 3 − 0 = 3; 
this implies that Player 1‟s utility at  𝑐|𝑕0  equals 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛽1 = 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑐  −
𝑘 1
𝑐 E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑐   = 5 − 𝑘 1
𝑐 ∙ 3. On the other hand, Player 1‟s 
expected utility (=payoff) at  𝑎|𝑕0  is given by 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧 𝑎 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛽1 = 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎  =
1 ∙ 3 = 3. Finally, Player 1‟s conformist preferences against 𝑏 and 𝑐 can be 
expressed, respectively, as: 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧 𝑏 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛽1 = 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎  ⟹ 4 − 𝑘 1
𝑏 = 3 ⟹
𝑘 1
𝑏 = 1; 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧 𝑐 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛽1 = 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎  ⟹ 5 − 3𝑘 1
𝑐 = 3 ⟹ 𝑘 1
𝑐 = 2/3. 
Consequently, the sufficiently-large-𝑘𝑖  requirement (for social norm 𝑟
∗ to exist 
for Player 1 of 𝐷𝐷𝐺) imposes that 𝑘1 ≥ max   𝑘 1
𝑏 , 𝑘 1
𝑐 = max   1,
2
3
 , that is, 
𝑘1 ≥ 1. 
Now, the above conditions for a social norm to exist are to be intended 
as those necessary for a norm 𝑟 to be held in place: if fulfilled for every 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 
at least one of the strategy profiles dictated by that norm 𝑟 is an equilibrium – 
provided that all beliefs are correct and that players maximize expected 
utilities – as implied by the remarks II.2-3 below. Hence, definition II.6 results 
in a social norm (existing and) being “followed by population 𝑁” if the 
conditions in remark II.2 simultaneously hold. 
 
Remark II.2. A social norm 𝑟∗ (exists and) is followed by population 𝑁, if: 
every player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 has conformist preferences represented by a utility 
function 𝑢𝑖
𝐶, with 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 1, 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 1, and 𝑘𝑖 > 0; every 𝑖 maximizes her 
expectation of 𝑢𝑖
𝐶; every 𝑖 holds correct beliefs about every 𝑗‟s (𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, with 
𝑗 ≠ 𝑖) first-order belief and behaviour; every player 𝑖‟s behaviour is consistent 
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with at least one of the end-nodes yielded by 𝑟∗ ∈ 𝑅𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗  (according to norm-
conjectures 𝜌𝑗 = 𝜌𝑖 , for ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁); 𝑘𝑖  is sufficiently large for every 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. 
 
Note that the expression “a social norm 𝑟∗ is followed by population 𝑁” (or 
“every player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 conforms to 𝑟∗”) implies that every player in the 
population plays her part of one of the strategy profiles contained in 𝑟∗ 𝐻 , 
which in turn implies that every player plays her part of one of the strategy 
profiles contained in 𝑟∗ 𝑕0 .  
 
II.5. Equilibrium concept 
In this section an equilibrium concept for mixed-motive games with belief-
dependent conformist preferences is discussed: by imposing the requirement 
that all beliefs (and norm-conjectures) are correct in equilibrium, I derive a 
“Social Sequential Equilibrium” as a special case of the sequential 
equilibrium notion of Kreps and Wilson [1982]. Kreps and Wilson‟s definition 
of equilibrium for generic extensive form games consists of sequentially 
rational, consistent assessments, where: (i) an assessment is a profile of 
behavioural strategies and conditional first-order beliefs (along with higher-
order beliefs in Battigalli and Dufwenberg‟s [2009] specification); (ii) an 
assessment is consistent if the profile of first-order beliefs 𝛼 =  𝛼𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 is 
derived from the behavioural strategy profile 𝜍 =  𝜍𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁, that is, for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 
∀ 𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖 , ∀ 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 , it must be that 𝛼𝑖 𝑠−𝑖 𝑕  =  Pr𝜍𝑗  𝑠𝑗  𝑕
  𝑗≠𝑖 ; notice that, 
since 𝛼𝑖  is derived from 𝜍 =  𝜍𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁, the beliefs of every player 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 about 
Player 𝑖‟s strategies must be the same; given that, Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg‟s [2009] specification of sequential equilibria for psychological 
games extends the consistency requirement by demanding that higher-order 
beliefs at each information set are correct for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀ 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 , that is, 
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𝛽𝑖 𝑕 = 𝛼−𝑖 ; (iii) finally, an assessment is sequentially rational if, for every 
player 𝑖 and every information set 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 , the strategy of 𝑖 is a best response 
to the other players‟ strategies given 𝑖‟s beliefs at 𝑕. 
In the present framework I further extend the consistency requirement 
by imposing that every player 𝑖 holds correct beliefs about every 𝑗‟s first-order 
belief, which is derived from norm-conjectures 𝜌𝑗 = 𝜌𝑖  (for ∀ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, with 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖). 
It follows the definition of a “socially consistent assessment”. 
 
Definition II.7. A socially consistent assessment is a profile  𝜍, 𝜌, 𝛼, 𝛽 =
 𝜍𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 that specifies behavioural strategies, norm-conjectures, first- 
and second-order beliefs, such that for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, ∀ 𝑠−𝑖 ∈ 𝑆−𝑖, ∀ 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 : 
(i) 𝛼𝑖 𝑠−𝑖 𝑕  =  Pr𝜍𝑗  𝑠𝑗  𝑕
  𝑗≠𝑖 ; 
(ii) 𝛽𝑖 𝑕  = 𝛼−𝑖 ; 
(iii) 𝛽𝑖
𝑠𝑖 𝑕  =  Pr𝜌 𝑖 𝑠𝑖  𝑕
   
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
 and  𝜌𝑗  ∙  𝑕  
𝑗≠𝑖 , 𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍
=  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍. 
  
Notice that condition (iii) in definition II.7 is the distinguishing feature of a 
socially consistent assessment in that it implies that (not only are beliefs 
derived from a behavioural strategy profile but also) a behavioural strategy 
profile 𝜍 =  𝜍𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁 contains probability measures which equal those 
contained in norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖 , with 𝜌𝑗 = 𝜌𝑖  for every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖.  
The core equilibrium concept for mixed-motive games with belief-
dependent conformist preferences can now be presented. 
  
Definition II.8. Given an extensive form game 𝐺 and a norm subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅, 
for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, where 𝐺 =  𝑁, 𝐻, 𝑃,  𝑢𝑖
𝐶 
𝑖∈𝑁
 , a Social Sequential Equilibrium 
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(“SSE”) of 𝐺 is a socially consistent assessment, such that for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 
∀ 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 , ∀ 𝑠𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑕 : 
Pr𝜍𝑖 𝑠𝑖
∗ 𝑕 > 0 ⟹ 𝑠𝑖
∗ ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝑕  ⟹ 𝑠𝑖
∗ ∈ arg max
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖 𝑕 
E𝑠𝑖 ,𝛼𝑖 ,𝛽𝑖 ,𝜌𝑖 𝑢𝑖
𝐶|𝑕 . 
 
In plain words, a socially consistent assessment is a social sequential 
equilibrium if each probability measure Pr𝜍𝑖 ∙  𝑕  assigns positive conditional 
probability only to conditional expected-payoff maximizing norm-complying 
strategies; that is, all players hold the same belief about the strategy profiles 
consistent with some norm in 𝑅𝑖  and maximize the expectation of the utility 
function (given their correct beliefs). Note that, here, it is assumed common 
knowledge of the utility functions 𝑢𝑖
𝐶, implying that the sensitivity parameters 
𝑘𝑖  are commonly known (and are, in effect, sufficiently large) as well as the 
fact that each player 𝑖 knows that every 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 adheres to some 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 ∩ 𝑅𝑗  
(i.e.: resulting in 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 1), given that each player‟s norm-subset is non-empty 
(i.e.: resulting in 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 1).  
Further, note that (if 𝑑𝑖
𝐶 = 1 and 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 1) one could define a sequential 
equilibrium à la Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2007] by specifying a consistent 
assessment  𝜍, 𝛼, 𝛽  dropping condition (iii) of definition II.7 above: given 
that, their equilibrium notion can be obtained by dropping the requirement 
that each probability measure Pr𝜍𝑖 ∙  𝑕  assigns positive conditional 
probability only to norm-complying strategies in definition II.8 above; this 
implies that every game with simple guilt has a psychological sequential 
equilibrium à la Battigalli and Dufwenberg, irrespective of the magnitude of 
the sensitivity parameter  𝑘𝑖 𝑖∈𝑁. Conversely, here, a fairly norm-driven 
decision maker with utility function 𝑢𝑖
𝐶 (as in definition II.5) has conditionally-
conformist preferences such that if – for some player 𝑔 ≠ 𝑖 – 𝑔‟s cost of a 
norm violation is not high enough to make 𝑔‟s deviation from 𝑠𝑔
∗ unprofitable 
 - 113 - 
 
(i.e.: 𝑘𝑔  is not sufficiently large), then condition 2.1 of definition II.6 will not 
hold for 𝑖 (i.e.: resulting in 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 = 0) and so the utility function 𝑢𝑖
𝐶 will reduce to 
one of classical (“non-psychological”) motivation, thereby implying a standard 
notion of equilibrium.74 
On the other hand, it should be stressed that the present theory 
considers the possibility that players may deviate from the precepts of a norm 
in the case where norm 𝑟 constitutes a social norm only for some player 𝑗 of 
game 𝐺, as due to the fact that 𝑗 may hold incorrect beliefs about others‟ 
belief and behaviour and, as a consequence, 𝑟 might not be followed by all 
members of 𝑁: this is due to the definition of social norm being based on 
expectations and conditional preferences. Instead, if condition 1 of definition 
II.6 holds for every player 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 and every 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 holds correct norm-
conjectures 𝜌𝑗 = 𝜌𝑖  (as well as first- and second-order beliefs), then the 
following equilibrium scenarios are possible: 
(i) conditions 2.1-2.2 of definition II.6 hold for every player 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 ⟹ 
social norm 𝑟∗ exists (for ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁) and is followed by population 𝑁 ⟹ 
a social sequential equilibrium of 𝐺 occurs; 𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
(ii) conditions 2.1-2.2 of definition II.6 do not hold ⟹ social norm 𝑟 does 
not exist for any player 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 (and it is not followed by population 𝑁) 
⟹ a social sequential equilibrium of 𝐺 does not occur (yet a subgame 
perfect equilibrium occurs if 𝐺 is a game with observable actions and 
                                  
74
 That is justified by the classical interpretation of equilibrium beliefs as the result of a 
transparent reasoning process. 
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no chance moves; a standard sequential equilibrium à la Kreps and 
Wilson occurs otherwise). 
Note that in scenario (ii) the utility function reduces to one of classical, non-
conformist motivation, which justifies the standard notions of equilibrium 
adopted. It should be stressed that – for a given extensive form game 𝐺, and 
a norm subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅 for each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 – a social sequential equilibrium does 
not always exist: this perfectly captures the fragility of social norms in actual 
society. 
Finally, the following result is a direct consequence of definition II.8. 
 
Remark II.3. Given an extensive form game 𝐺, and a norm subset 𝑅𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅 for 
each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, if a social norm 𝑟∗ ∈ 𝑅𝑖  (exists and) is followed by population 𝑁, 
then some social sequential equilibrium of 𝐺 occurs. 
 
Notice that the converse is not necessarily true, as a certain socially 
consistent, sequentially rational assessment (i.e.: a social sequential 
equilibrium) might be induced by multiple norms in 𝑅, some of which may not 
even belong to 𝑅𝑖  for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. For example, consider a 2-player game 
and let each player‟s norm subset be defined as 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝐸 , 𝑟𝑀  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. 
Then, assume that at the initial node of the game, the norm 𝑟𝐸 dictates the 
strategy profiles 𝑟𝐸 𝑕0 =   𝑏, 𝑐 ,  𝑎, 𝑐   whereas the norm 𝑟𝑀 dictates the 
strategy profiles 𝑟𝑀 𝑕0 =   𝑎, 𝑐 ,  𝑎, 𝑑  , with each pair of lower-case letters 
denoting a strategy profile. Further, assume that both players are fairly norm-
driven decision makers with utility functions  𝑢𝑖
𝐶 
𝑖∈𝑁
 and that, while holding 
correct beliefs, they play the strategy profile  𝑎, 𝑐 . Now, while  𝑎, 𝑐  is a 
social sequential equilibrium of the game, this does not necessarily imply 
that, say, 𝑟𝐸 (rather than 𝑟𝑀) constitutes a social norm and is being followed 
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by the players of the game.75 Interestingly, this well captures the case of a 
traveller who, once in a foreign country, observes some locals interacting 
(without taking part in the actual game herself): while the outcome of the 
interaction may turn out to be compatible with some of the norms stored in 
the observer‟s mind, she may not be able to tell which one has been held in 
place, especially if the foreign country is particularly culturally-different from 
hers; on a smaller case, a similar problem occurs the first time we happen to 
interact with members of a group, organization or institution whose social 
norms we do not yet know.  
 
II.6. Illustrations 
In this section I turn to analyse some specific dynamic interactions 
accounting for belief-dependent conformist preferences. Recalling that a 
norm (definition II.1 above) is a set-valued function 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 that assigns to 
every non-terminal history 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻\𝑍 one or more elements from the set 𝑆 𝑕  
of strategy profiles allowing history 𝑕 – and following my discussion about a 
pattern of belief formation relative to a presumed social norm – here I move 
on to define an illustrative set of norms, comprising the following principles, 
which are assumed to regulate behaviour in social dilemmas: 
 
 
𝑅 =  𝑟𝐸 , 𝑟𝐹 , 𝑟𝑀 , 𝑟𝑊 , where each norm is defined as below. 
                                  
75
 Obviously the players of the game know which social norm they are following. 
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 Equity principle:  
𝑟𝐸 𝐻 =  𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 𝑕 : 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻 ∖ 𝑍; 𝑧 𝑠  s.t. 𝑚1 𝑧 =. . . = 𝑚𝑛 𝑧  . 
 Inequity reducing principle: 
𝑟𝐹 𝐻 =  𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 𝑕 : 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻 ∖ 𝑍; 𝑧 𝑠  s.t. 𝑧 ∈ arg min
𝑧∈𝑍
 
1
𝑛
  𝑚𝑖 𝑧 −𝑖∈𝑁
𝑚  𝑧  2  .76 
 Classical-utilitarian welfare maximization principle: 
𝑟𝑀 𝐻 =  𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 𝑕 : 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻 ∖ 𝑍; 𝑧 𝑠  s.t. 𝑧 ∈ arg max
𝑧∈𝑍
  𝑚𝑖 𝑧 𝑖∈𝑁   .
77 
 Rawlsian (minimax) welfare maximization principle: 
𝑟𝑊 𝐻 =  𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 𝑕 : 𝑕 ∈ 𝐻 ∖ 𝑍; 𝑧 𝑠  s.t. 𝑧 ∈ arg max
𝑧∈𝑍
𝑊 𝒎 𝑧   , 
where 𝑊 𝒎 𝑧   denotes a Rawlsian social welfare function and is 
defined as 𝑊 𝑚1 𝑧 , … , 𝑚𝑛 𝑧  = min
𝑖∈𝑁
  𝑚1 𝑧 , … , 𝑚𝑛 𝑧  . 
 
It should be stressed that the above set does not aim at representing the 
whole range of social norms that may emerge in strategic interactions but is 
only meant to provide a useful (yet simple) illustration of the conditions under 
which conformity sets in, in mixed-motive games. 
                                  
76
 Note that 𝑚  𝑧  denotes the mean value of the players‟ material payoffs, for a given 
terminal node 𝑧. 
77
 Obviously any allocation consistent with the classical-utilitarian welfare maximization 
principle is a Pareto-efficient solution. 
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II.6.a. Trust Games 
Consider the following trust game: at the initial node 𝑕0, Player 1 (the 
“trustor”) chooses either “a” or “b” – when opting for “b”, the game terminates 
and material outcomes are allocated as shown in the vector of payoffs at the 
end-node 𝑧 𝑏  (with the number on top referring to Player 1‟s payoff); on the 
other hand, if Player 1 opts for “a”, the choice passes to Player 2 (the 
“trustee”), who in turn can decide on “c” or “d”, the consequences of which 
are shown in the vector of payoffs at the end-nodes 𝑧 𝑐  and 𝑧 𝑑 , 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure II.2 - Trust Game “TG” 
 
Now, assume that players believe that there may exist some social norm 
𝑟 ∈ 𝑅𝑖  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁: more precisely, assume that a norm dictating a strategy 
profile yielding an equal (material) payoff among players is the presumed 
social norm; thus, given the above set of norms, one may let 𝑅1 = 𝑅2 =  𝑟
𝐸 . 
It is clear that, at the initial node, the norm 𝑟𝐸 dictates the following strategy 
profiles: 𝑟𝐸 𝑕0 =   𝑏, 𝑐 ,  𝑎, 𝑐  , i.e.: 𝑟𝐸 𝑕0  is the set of strategy profiles 
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completely consistent with 𝑟𝐸. Recalling that a norm-conjecture of player 𝑖 
(definition II.2 above) is a collection of independent probability measures 
𝜌𝑖 =  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 ∈
 ∆  𝐴𝑃 𝑕  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍  – with 𝜌𝑖 𝑎 𝑕  being the probability 
of 𝑎 at 𝑕, such that supp 𝜌𝑖 = supp  𝜌𝑖 ∙  𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻∖𝑍 ∈
 𝐴𝑃 𝑕 ,𝑕 𝑅𝑖 𝑕  𝑕∈𝐻\𝑍  – the 
norm-conjecture induced by 𝑟𝐸, for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, can be represented by the 
following matrix:  
 
𝜌𝑖 =  
𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 𝜌𝑖 𝑏|𝑕
0 
𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  𝜌𝑖 𝑑|𝑕 𝑎  
 =  
𝜌 1 − 𝜌 
1 0
 , 
 
where 𝜌 ∈  0,1 ; that is, if 𝜌 = 0 then strategy profile  𝑏, 𝑐  is implemented, 
whereas if 𝜌 = 1 then  𝑎, 𝑐  is implemented.78 Thus, recall that (if player 𝑖 is a 
norm-driven decision maker and presumes that her co-player is norm-driven 
too) player 𝑖 can form her belief 𝛼𝑖  by assuming her co-player‟s behaviour to 
be consistent with her norm-conjecture 𝜌𝑖 : 𝑖‟s initial belief 𝛼𝑖 =  ∙  𝑕
0  
corresponds to a probability measure over the strategies of the opponent, 
with the support of 𝛼𝑖  containing only the opponent‟s norm-complying 
strategies; for instance, here, the probability of a certain strategy of Player 2 
is given by 𝛼1 𝑠2 𝑕
0 ≡ Pr𝜌1 𝑠2|𝑕
0 = 𝜌1  𝑠2,𝑕 𝑎  𝑕 𝑎  . 
Then, Player 1 can calculate her expected payoff as well as the 
opponent‟s expected payoff and potential disutility from 1‟s not conforming to 
                                  
78
 It is assumed that players cannot randomize, as per section II.4.b. above. 
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the norm (again assuming that 𝜌1 = 𝜌2). In brief, Player 1‟s expectation of 
Player 2‟s (expected) material payoff at 𝑕0 equals E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 = 3𝜌 +
1 1 − 𝜌  = 2𝜌 + 1, for 𝑖 = 1,2. Further, Player 1‟s expectation of Player 2‟s 
disappointment at  𝑏|𝑕0  is E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏  =  2𝜌 + 1 − 1 = 2𝜌 ; 
this implies that Player 1‟s utility at  𝑏|𝑕0  equals 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼1, 𝛽1 =
𝑚1 𝑧 𝑏  − 𝑘1 E𝜌𝑖 ,𝛼1 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏   = 1 − 𝑘1 2𝜌  . On the other hand, 
Player 1‟s expected utility (=expected payoff) at 𝑕 𝑎  is given by 
𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼1, 𝛽1 = E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 𝑚1|𝑎 = 1 ∙ 3 = 3. Then, Player 1‟s conformist 
preferences can be expressed as 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧 𝑏 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼1, 𝛽1 ≤ E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 𝑚1|𝑎 ⟹ 1 −
𝑘1 2𝜌  ≤ 3 ⟹ 𝑘1 𝜌  ≥ −1, which is always satisfied. Similarly, Player 2‟s 
expected utility at  𝑑|𝑕 𝑎   equals 𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 = 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑  −
𝑘2 E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼2 ,𝛽2 𝑚1|𝑎 − 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑   = 6 − 3𝑘2, whereas Player 2‟s expected 
utility (=payoff) at  𝑐|𝑕 𝑎   is given by 𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 = 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑐  = 1 ∙ 3 =
3. Then, Player 2‟s conformist preferences can be expressed as 
𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 ≤ 𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑐 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 ⟹ 6 − 3𝑘2 ≤ 3 ⟹ 𝑘2 ≥ 1. To 
conclude – recalling that a socially consistent assessment is a social 
sequential equilibrium (definition II.8 above) if each probability measure 
Pr𝜍𝑖 ∙  𝑕  assigns positive conditional probability only to conditional expected-
payoff maximizing norm-complying strategies – it follows that the only norm-
conjecture induced by 𝑟𝐸 that yields an SSE is given by the matrix:  
 
𝜌𝑖 =  
𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 𝜌𝑖 𝑏|𝑕
0 
𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  𝜌𝑖 𝑑|𝑕 𝑎  
 =  
1 0
1 0
 , 
 
in which case  𝑎, 𝑐  is an SSE for 𝑘2 ≥ 1; instead, if 𝑘2 < 1, norm 𝑟
𝐸 is (not a 
social norm and is) not followed by population 𝑁 (by remark II.2 above). It 
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should be further stressed that – given the norm subset 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝐸  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 
– in the case where 𝑘2 < 1 no social sequential equilibrium of 𝑇𝐺 occurs (by 
remark II.3 above). Yet, for 𝑘2 < 1, 𝑇𝐺 (with conformist preferences) has the 
same solution as the standard subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e.:  𝑏, 𝑑 . 
I shall now generalize the analysis by means of the following 
Standardized Trust Game, with parameters 𝑥 and 𝑣 such that 𝑥 > 0 and 
𝑣 > 1. 
 
 
Figure II.3 - Standardized Trust Game “STG” 
 
Proposition II.1. Given the norm subset 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝐸 , 𝑟𝐹  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, the only 
SSE of 𝑆𝑇𝐺 is  𝑎, 𝑐 , whenever 𝑘2 ≥ 1. 
Proof: the proof is analogous to that for 𝑇𝐺 (where 𝑥 = 1, 𝑣 = 3), and is 
therefore omitted. 
 
The following results refer to alternative specifications of the norm 
subsets. 
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Proposition II.2. Given the norm subset 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝑀  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, the following 
SSE of 𝑆𝑇𝐺 may occur: 
 for 𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 = 1, 𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  = 1;  𝑎, 𝑐 , whenever 𝑘2 ≥ 1, 
 for 𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 = 1, 𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  = 0;  𝑎, 𝑑 , whenever 𝑘1 ≥
1
2𝑣−1
. 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Proposition II.3. Given the norm subset 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝑊  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, the only SSE 
of 𝑆𝑇𝐺 is  𝑎, 𝑐 , whenever 𝑘2 ≥ 1. 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Notice that the second scenario in proposition II.2 (i.e.: SSE  𝑎, 𝑑 ) provides 
an example of an interaction where condition 2.2.a of definition II.6 above is 
fulfilled: in fact, Player 1 conforms to 𝑟𝑀 because her cost of a norm violation 
is high enough to make 1‟s deviation from 𝑠1
∗ = 𝑎 unprofitable (i.e.: if 𝑘1 ≥
1
2𝑣−1
), although there is one terminal history induced by a strategy profile 
 𝑠2, 𝑠1
∗ =  𝑐, 𝑎  – other than that implied by norm conjecture 𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 = 1, 
𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  = 0 – where Player 1 would be better off.
79 So from the viewpoint 
of Player 2, in the second scenario (i.e.: SSE  𝑎, 𝑑 ), Player 2 believes that 
Player 1 expects him to behave according to 𝜌2, simply because Player 2 
                                  
79
 This implies that condition 2.2.b of definition II.6 above is not fulfilled in this case, because 
the second expression of condition 2.2.b, from the viewpoint of Player 2, does not hold here. 
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believes that Player 1 acknowledges the legitimacy of 2‟s norm-conjecture 
(i.e.: 𝜌2 𝑎|𝑕
0 = 1, 𝜌2 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  = 0). Now, even though an equilibrium 
consisting of the strategy profile  𝑎, 𝑑  may seem a controversial solution, this 
well captures many situations characterized by what I shall call “rationally-
(mis)placed” trust: an example is given by a set of circumstances where a 
woman (marries and) brings a dowry to a man of dubious reputation; in 
effect, she (Player 1) may lucidly expect the man (Player 2) to use and invest 
the dowry, keeping all the proceeds for himself, and still, she may prefer to 
marry him if the local culture pushes women to get a husband; thus, if the 
cost of deviating is high (i.e.: if 𝑘1 =
1
2𝑣−1
), the influence of culture (and its 
norms) is such that the woman is indifferent between remaining unmarried 
(i.e.:  𝑠2, 𝑠1 =  ⋅, 𝑏 ) and getting married-but-losing-everything (i.e.:  𝑠2, 𝑠1 =
 𝑑, 𝑎 ). 
To sum up, the above exercise has shown that the range of equilibria 
obtained could possibly explain much of the experimental results (collected in 
Camerer [2003], pp. 83-100), based on the norm-conjectures induced by a 
variety of culture-dependent principles; indeed, different cultures may give 
prominence to different norms and, in turn, different conjectures about norms. 
The intuition is confirmed by a large cross-cultural experimental study 
undertaken in fifteen small-scale societies (Henrich et al. [2001]): the 
investigation directly addressed the question of whether the individual‟s 
social environments shape behaviour by implementing a study of behaviour 
in a set of social dilemma games; a number of field researchers, working in 
twelve countries on five continents, recruited subjects from small-scale 
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societies presenting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions.80 
Their results show that group-level differences in the structure and 
organization of everyday economic activity explain a substantial part of the 
experimental variation observed across societies (the higher the degree of 
market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation of everyday life, 
the greater the level of cooperation in experimental games); moreover, and 
quite interestingly, individual-level economic and demographic variables do 
not explain observed behaviour either within or across groups. 
 
II.7. Closing Remarks 
This essay has presented an original theory of conformist preferences in 
mixed-motive games, building on Battigalli and Dufwenberg‟s [2007] model of 
guilt aversion; a notion of Social Sequential Equilibrium allowing for belief-
dependent conformist motivations has been proposed by refining Battigalli 
and Dufwenberg‟s [2009] specification of the sequential equilibrium concept 
of Kreps and Wilson [1982]. Such a theory departs from the existing game-
theoretic literature, since it explicitly defines (social) norms as rules that 
dictate a set of strategy profiles, where the norms considered here are 
informal, not necessarily enforced, and necessarily sustained by 
expectations. Although the motivational factors considered here are related 
to the much-investigated concepts of fairness and reciprocity, I shall stress 
                                  
80
 Their sample comprised three foraging societies, six that practice slash-and-burn 
horticulture, four nomadic herding groups, and three (sedentary) small-scale agriculturalist 
societies. 
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that the focus of this study has been on a “mere” conformity motivation in 
social dilemmas, implying that the (presumed) behaviour of other members of 
a social group – be it fair or not – serves the individual as a means to guiding 
her own actions. 
Further, the focus of this study has been on why people follow rules 
rather than on the specifics of what the rules are. This implies that the 
present theory can account for the reasons that have led to the establishment 
of a given norm, but not for the reasons that have led to the evolution of an 
individual‟s norm subset (which is exogenously determined) and consequent 
norm-conjectures; notice that this is also due to the fact that the model partly 
relies on past compliance to explain future uniform behaviour.81 A justification 
for the present modelling approach comes from the assumption that – in the 
short run – one can treat the biological or cultural aspects of human nature 
as fixed; it also seems reasonable to assume that it is the players‟ culture to 
mark out each player‟s norm subset, with the norm subset containing rules of 
behaviour in accordance with set usage. Therefore, this theory implies a 
tendency for all agents (with conformist motivations) to conform to the 
“currently-normal” behaviour, which leads to the absence of evolution in the 
present setting. 
The above considerations seem to undermine the predictive power of 
such a theory since it relies on an exogenous (culture-dependent) definition 
                                  
81
 In fact, the empirical expectations component of social norms is related to past compliance 
in that 𝑑𝑖
𝐸 equals one if the agent believes that at least one other agent will adhere to some 
norm in her norm subset, depending on the terminal history reached in a previous instance 
of the same multi-person decision problem. 
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of the norm subsets, implying that the system will not evolve away from its 
current position, provided that no exogenous variation in the beliefs about 
peers‟ behaviour occurs. On the other hand, the model suggests that – if 
social norms are based on beliefs and beliefs are, in effect, exogenously 
manipulated – it may be possible to induce pro-social behaviour at low cost. 
Indeed, a finely-tuned process of belief transmission could possibly favour 
the occurrence of the desired equilibrium. 
For instance, social psychology research conducted at several U.S. 
universities shows that students hold exaggerated beliefs about the alcohol 
consumption habits of their peers (Berkowitz and Perkins [1986]). Such 
studies have concluded that students consume greater quantities of alcohol 
in order to fit in with their (biased) perceptions of acceptable social behaviour, 
that is, in order to comply with their presumed drinking norm in operation on 
campus. Research further shows that students that participate in a peer-
oriented discussion focusing on correcting such inflated perceptions report 
drinking significantly less: in particular, a study from the National Institute on 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, an agency of the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services, reports that several educational institutions 
that persistently communicated actual student norms have experienced 
reductions of up to twenty percent in high-risk drinking over a relatively short 
period of time (NIAAA [2002]). 
To conclude, future research should delve into the study of alternative 
systems of belief elicitation and transmission: only through a full 
understanding of the mechanics of social norms, an institution or policy-
maker will be able to predict how external signals may alter beliefs and drive 
behaviour towards more socially desirable outcomes. 
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II.8. Appendix II 
II.8.a. Proofs 
Proof of Proposition II.2. 
Given the norm subset 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝑀  for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, at the initial node the norm 𝑟𝑀 
dictates the following strategy profiles: 𝑟𝑀 𝑕0 =   𝑎, 𝑐 ,  𝑎, 𝑑  . Hence, the 
norm-conjecture induced by 𝑟𝑀, for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, can be represented by the 
following matrix:  
 
𝜌𝑖 =  
𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 𝜌𝑖 𝑏|𝑕
0 
𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  𝜌𝑖 𝑑|𝑕 𝑎  
 =  
1 0
𝜌 1 − 𝜌 
 , 
 
where 𝜌 ∈  0,1 ; that is, if 𝜌 = 0 then strategy profile  𝑎, 𝑑  is implemented, 
whereas if 𝜌 = 1 then  𝑎, 𝑐  is implemented. Then, Player 1‟s expectation of 
Player 2‟s (expected) material payoff at 𝑕0 equals E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 = 𝑣𝑥𝜌 +
2𝑣𝑥 1 − 𝜌  = 2𝑣𝑥 − 𝑣𝑥𝜌 , for 𝑖 = 1,2. Further, Player 1‟s expectation of Player 
2‟s disappointment at  𝑏|𝑕0  is E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏  =  2𝑣𝑥 − 𝑣𝑥𝜌  −
𝑥; this implies that Player 1‟s utility at  𝑏|𝑕0  equals 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼1, 𝛽1 =
𝑚1 𝑧 𝑏  − 𝑘1 E𝜌𝑖 ,𝛼1 ,𝛽1 𝑚2|𝑕
0 − 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏   = 𝑥 − 𝑘1 2𝑣𝑥 − 𝑣𝑥𝜌 − 𝑥 . On the 
other hand, Player 1‟s expected utility (=expected payoff) at 𝑕 𝑎  is given by 
𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼1, 𝛽1 = E𝜌 𝑖 ,𝛼1 𝑚1|𝑎 = 𝑣𝑥𝜌 . Then, Player 1‟s conformist preferences 
can be expressed as 𝑢1
𝐶 𝑧 𝑏 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼1, 𝛽1 ≤ E𝜌𝑖 ,𝛼1 𝑚1|𝑎 ⟹ 𝑥 − 𝑘1 2𝑣𝑥 − 𝑣𝑥𝜌 −
𝑥 ≤ 𝑣𝑥𝜌 ⟹  
𝑘1 ≥ −1 𝑖𝑓 𝜌 = 1
𝑘1 ≥ 1/ 2𝑣 − 1 𝑖𝑓 𝜌 = 0
 , where the first case is always 
satisfied. Similarly, Player 2‟s expected utility at  𝑑|𝑕 𝑎   equals 
𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 = 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑  − 𝑘2 E𝜌𝑖 ,𝛼2 ,𝛽2 𝑚1|𝑎 − 𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑   = 2𝑣𝑥 −
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𝑘2𝑣𝑥𝜌 , whereas Player 2‟s expected utility (=payoff) at  𝑐|𝑕 𝑎   is given by 
𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧, 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 = 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑐  = 𝑣𝑥. Then, Player 2‟s conformist preferences 
can be expressed as 𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 ≤ 𝑢2
𝐶 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑐 , 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼2, 𝛽2 ⟹ 2𝑣𝑥 −
𝑘2𝑣𝑥𝜌 ≤ 𝑣𝑥 ⟹  
𝑘2 ≥ 1 𝑖𝑓 𝜌 = 1
𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑓 𝜌 = 0
 . Therefore, the following SSE of 𝑆𝑇𝐺 
may occur:  𝑎, 𝑐 , whenever 𝑘2 ≥ 1, for 𝜌 = 1;  𝑎, 𝑑 , whenever 𝑘1 ≥
1
2𝑣−1
, for 
𝜌 = 0.∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition II.3. 
A Rawlsian social welfare function is defined as 𝑊 𝑚1 𝑧 , … , 𝑚𝑛 𝑧  =
min
𝑖∈𝑁
  𝑚1 𝑧 , … , 𝑚𝑛 𝑧  . Such a function has to be evaluated at each of the 
three leaves of the game tree, i.e.: 𝑊  𝑚1 𝑧 𝑏  , 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑏   = min
𝑖∈𝑁
  𝑥, 𝑥 = 𝑥; 
𝑊  𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑  , 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑑   = min
𝑖∈𝑁
  0,2𝑣𝑥 = 0; 
𝑊  𝑚1 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑐  , 𝑚2 𝑧 𝑎, 𝑐   = min
𝑖∈𝑁
  𝑣𝑥, 𝑣𝑥 = 𝑣𝑥. It follows that here the set 
of maximizers of 𝑊 is singleton: hence, given the norm subset 𝑅𝑖 =  𝑟
𝑊  for 
∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, at the initial node the norm 𝑟𝑊 dictates the strategy profile 𝑟𝑊 𝑕0 =
  𝑎, 𝑐   only; then, the norm-conjecture induced by 𝑟𝑊, for ∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, can be 
represented by the following matrix:  
 
𝜌𝑖 =  
𝜌𝑖 𝑎|𝑕
0 𝜌𝑖 𝑏|𝑕
0 
𝜌𝑖 𝑐|𝑕 𝑎  𝜌𝑖 𝑑|𝑕 𝑎  
 =  
1 0
1 0
 . 
 
The rest of the proof is trivial.∎ 
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II.8.b. A review of alternative theories of norm compliance 
López-Pérez [2008] proposes a model of norm compliance which builds on 
Charness and Rabin‟s [2002] in that it assumes players to have a taste for 
fairness and efficiency, and to be influenced by previous history as well. In 
brief, López-Pérez‟s model applies to any extensive form game of perfect 
recall, where 𝑁 =  1, … , 𝑛  is the set of players, 𝑢 𝑧  is a vector of the 
players‟ utility at terminal node 𝑧, and 𝑥 𝑧  is a vector of the players‟ 
(material) payoffs at 𝑧. The main feature here is the explicit introduction of a 
norm, defined as a non-empty correspondence 𝜓: 𝑕 → 𝐴 𝑕  that applies to 
any information set 𝑕: thus, 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 𝑕  is said to be consistent with norm  𝜓 if 
𝑎 ∈ 𝜓 𝑕 , otherwise 𝑎 is a deviation from  𝜓; the interpretation is that a norm 
is a prescription indicating how a player should move at a decision node. 
Given that, López-Pérez examines a specific norm, namely the “Efficiency 
and equity norm” (E-norm), on the assumption that the E-norm is the only 
norm in the society; he further assumes that there exist two types of agents, 
that is, “selfish” and “principled”, where the former ignore the E-norm while 
the latter have internalized the E-norm (and suffer from violating it). The size 
of the emotional cost of a deviation is assumed to depend directly on the 
number of norm followers, so a principled player‟s utility function takes the 
form: 
 
𝑢𝑖 𝑧 =  
𝑥𝑖 𝑧 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑅 𝑧 
𝑥𝑖 𝑧 − 𝛾 ∙ 𝑟 𝑧 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∉ 𝑅 𝑧 
,  
(2.8.1) 
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where 𝑅 𝑧  is the set of players that complied with the norm in the history 
leading to 𝑧,82 𝑟 𝑧  denotes the cardinality of 𝑅 𝑧 , and 𝛾 is a positive 
parameter indicating how intensely principled types have internalized the 
norm. Given (an) initial decision node 𝑡0, and denoting by 𝑋 𝑡0  the set of all 
𝑥 𝑧  succeeding 𝑡0,
83 López-Pérez defines a “fairmax distribution”  𝜀, 𝛿  as an 
allocation 𝑥 =  𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝑋 𝑡0  that maximizes the function: 
 
𝐹𝜀𝛿 = 𝜀 ∙  𝑥𝑖 − 𝛿  max
𝑖∈𝑁
 𝑥𝑖 − min
𝑖∈𝑁
 𝑥𝑖 
𝑖∈𝑁
, 
(2.8.2) 
 
over 𝑋 𝑡0 ; a path connecting 𝑡0 and one of its fairmax distributions  𝜀, 𝛿  is 
said to be a “fairmax path”. It is assumed that if information set 𝑕 has at least 
one node on a fairmax path, then the E-norm selects all actions of 𝐴 𝑕  that 
belong to a fairmax path; otherwise, any action becomes commendable, that 
is, the E-norm selects the whole set 𝐴 𝑕 . The author then normalizes the 
efficiency parameter 𝜀 to one and keeps 𝛿 strictly positive but smaller than 
one, in order to show that social efficiency (captured by the sum of material 
payoffs) is relatively more important than equality. Finally, López-Pérez 
                                  
82
 More specifically, 𝑅 𝑧  includes all the players who acted consistently with the E-norm or 
made no choice at all in the history of 𝑧. 
83
 In the event of an initial chance move, 𝑡0 denotes any node immediately succeeding any 
such move. 
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assumes that each player‟s type (i.e.: selfish or principled) is private 
knowledge, while the objective probability 𝜇 of being a principled agent is 
common knowledge; he thus applies a standard perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
concept to explain experimental evidence coming from a variety of games. 
To conclude, the main advantage of this model is its tractability, in addition to 
having the merit of defining a norm explicitly; on the other hand, disregarding 
the role of expectations in sustaining a social norm seems to be its major 
drawback. 
In the same line of research Li [2008] develops a more complex model 
of norm compliance, building on the psychological game framework of 
Geanakoplos et al. [1989]. The model is designed for 2-player normal form 
games only, where 𝑆𝑖  and Σ𝑖  are Player 𝑖‟s sets of pure strategies and mixed 
strategies, respectively; 𝜋𝑖 𝜍  indicates Player 𝑖‟s material payoff when 
strategy profile 𝜍 =  𝜍1, 𝜍2 ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is played. Letting 𝑏𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖  and 𝑐𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖  
denote 𝑗‟s first-order belief and 𝑖‟s second-order belief, respectively, Li 
models a norm (or “convention” in her terminology) as belief-dependent 
rankings over the players‟ strategy space, normalizing them to the interval 
 0,1 . In formulae, a norm is a mapping 𝜔: Σ1 × Σ2 →  0,1 
2 such that, for 
𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2: 
 
(i) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐𝑕 𝑏𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑗 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟 𝜔𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  = 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 , 
𝑜𝑟 max
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
 𝜔𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 min
𝑠𝑖∈𝑆𝑖
 𝜔𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  = 0; 
(ii) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ∀ 𝜍𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖 , ∀ 𝑏𝑗 ∈ Σ𝑗 , 𝜔𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  =   𝜍𝑖 𝑠𝑖 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑖 𝑏𝑗  𝑠𝑗  𝜔𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑠𝑗  .   
(2.8.3) 
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The author refers to the number 𝜔𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗   as the “social index” of 𝑖 taking 
action 𝑠𝑖  given belief 𝑏𝑗 , and interprets it as a measure of the adequateness 
of 𝑖‟s action: condition (i) says that the function 𝜔𝑖  ranks Player 𝑖‟s pure 
actions given 𝑖‟s belief of 𝑗‟s action (with the first line depicting the case of a 
“trivial convention” where all the pure actions are equally adequate and 
assigned 𝜔𝑖 𝑠𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  = 1); condition (ii) simply generalizes the norm 
specification to account for mixed strategies. Furthermore, given common 
knowledge of the norm, “𝑖‟s belief of the social index of 𝑗‟s action” is denoted 
by 𝜔𝑗  𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖 , whereas 𝑓𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 0, 𝜔𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  − 𝜔𝑗  𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖   indicates 
“𝑖‟s belief about how much more her own action conforms to the convention 
compared to her opponent‟s”. Player 𝑖‟s utility function takes the form: 
 
𝑢𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖 , 𝜔 = 𝜋𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗  + 𝜃𝑖  𝑔𝑖  𝜔𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗   + 𝑕𝑖  𝑓𝑖 𝜍𝑖 , 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑖   , 
(2.8.4) 
 
where – 𝑔𝑖 , 𝑕𝑖 :  0,1 → ℝ are continuous and have the following properties – 
𝑔𝑖  is increasing in 𝜔𝑖  (“conformity effects”), 𝑕𝑖  is decreasing in 𝑓𝑖  (“interaction 
effects”),84 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑕𝑖  is concave in 𝜔𝑖 . Hence, players‟ utility depends both on 
material payoffs and social implications of their strategies (as captured by the 
expression in square brackets), with 𝜃𝑖 ∈  0,  ∞   indicating how salient the 
convention is to Player 𝑖 (𝜃 = 0 representing the traditional agent). Li adapts 
                                  
84
 The interaction effects of conventions capture the fact that a player prefers the opponent 
to comply with the norm. 
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the psychological-Nash equilibrium concept of Geanakoplos et al. [1989] to 
define a “social equilibrium”, that is, a Nash equilibrium satisfying an 
additional consistency condition that all beliefs correspond to actual 
strategies; the author then turns to examine a norm embodying both a 
principle of efficiency and fairness,85 thereby applying it to some symmetric 
and public goods games. To sum up, Li‟s theory proves to be an insightful 
model for the analysis of conformity in mixed-motive games: her approach 
draws on Geanakoplos et al.‟s [1989] framework as well as on Charness and 
Rabin‟s [2002] theory of quasi-maximin preferences, the result being a model 
more complicated than López-Pérez‟s [2008] but also more realistic (as it 
crucially captures the conformity and interaction effects of conventions); on 
the other hand, its main drawback is to be designed for 2-player normal form 
games only.  
  
                                  
85
 Measures for efficiency and fairness are defined in a way relatively similar to the 
distributional preferences of Charness and Rabin [2002]. 
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III. A Test for Conformist Motivations in 
Experimental Games 
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III.1. Introduction 
The first tests for conformity were conducted by Solomon E. Asch [1955, 
1956], a pioneer in social psychology who undertook a series of small-group 
studies on the social pressures to conform: his experimental subjects were 
asked to answer a basic puzzle on the length of lines, while others provided 
an obviously incorrect answer – all but one of the participants in each session 
were confederates of the experimenter and had beforehand been instructed 
to give wrong answers in unanimity at certain points – as a result, many 
subjects (approximately 35%) felt under pressure to give the same incorrect 
answer as the misleading majority. The social psychology literature defines 
conformity as the act of changing one‟s behaviour to match the purported 
beliefs of others (Cialdini and Goldstein [2004]); yet, while the psychology 
literature offers plenty of experimental evidence of conformist behaviour, very 
few of their insights have been adopted by economists to describe the social 
pressures to conform in problems of strategic interdependence. In this 
respect, the present investigation sheds some light on conformity as a 
strategically-relevant motivation in social dilemmas: a motivation which 
implies that the peers‟ presumed behaviour serves the individual as a means 
of forming beliefs and taking actions (in games where one another‟s actions 
and beliefs enter one another‟s utility functions). 
Hence, unlike the classical social psychology experiments, here 
conformity is put to test in a problem of strategic interdependence: what is 
being hypothesized is that a conformist player will behave as she thinks that 
other (conformist) players in the same role behave, in a social dilemma. 
Thus, the first hypothesis to test is that the experimenter can predict a 
conformist‟s behaviour from the conformist‟s guess about the behaviour of 
other players in the same role. Now, it should be noted that a false 
consensus effect hypothesis will predict an analogous correlation between 
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beliefs and behaviour, although with an inverse causal relationship: in fact, 
false consensus is usually referred to as an egocentric bias that occurs when 
people estimate consensus for their own behaviour (Ross et al. [1977]); so, in 
the case of false consensus effects, when forming a belief about the others‟ 
behaviour, a player will estimate the others‟ decisions based on her own 
decision.  
In a nutshell, in order to disentangle consensus from conformity, one 
of the experimental treatments introduces an exogenous variation in beliefs 
by showing subjects some aggregate information about the others‟ beliefs. 
Indeed, if the experimenter can predict a subject‟s choice from the subject‟s 
guess (about the behaviour of other participants in the same role) in 
conjunction with the subsequently transmitted information about others‟ 
guesses, then one has effectively disentangled consensus from conformity 
and provided evidence in support of a conformity hypothesis. In fact, if false 
consensus is present, then there will be a causal relationship from behaviour 
to beliefs, and thus there will not be an effect of providing exogenous 
information; but if, on the other hand, conformity is present (in which case the 
causality runs from beliefs to behaviour), one will find that exogenously 
varying beliefs has an impact on behaviour. 
More specifically, the experiment measures the impact of the beliefs of 
players in the same role, on behaviour, in a discrete Trust Game. Note that – 
in order to introduce an exogenous variation in beliefs, and to ensure that 
some subjects received information about an average belief of low 
cooperation and some others received information about an average belief of 
high cooperation – each subject was shown the average guess made by a 
specifically selected sample of participants: more precisely, the samples 
were selected in such a way that the beliefs transmitted to each participant 
were in the vicinity of either 25% or 75% (with 100% indicating the belief that 
all subjects in the same role will cooperate). Notice that the design does not 
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involve deception because the transmitted information about the others‟ 
guesses explicitly stated that such information referred to a sample of other 
participants. 
In brief, the data show that the transmitted information can indeed 
influence one‟s behaviour, with the strength of the impact depending on one‟s 
prior (i.e.: stated) beliefs. By regressing a subject‟s choice on the stated 
belief, the transmitted information and their interaction, the probit model 
predicts a probability of cooperating equal to 0.55 for Trustees who received 
a low transmitted belief and 0.72 for those who received a high transmitted 
belief. 
The remainder of the essay is organized in this manner: III.2. briefly 
reviews the “conventional” economic account of conformity, before exploring 
some related belief-dependent motivations (with a special focus on Trust 
Game experiments); III.3. discusses the implications of consensus and 
conformity in more detail, hence presents the experimental design, procedure 
and hypotheses; III.4. discusses the experimental results, and III.5. 
concludes. 
 
III.2. Tests for conformity and related belief-dependent 
motivations 
Conformity implies that the peers‟ presumed behaviour serves the individual 
as a means of forming beliefs and taking actions; hence, “conformist 
preferences” thrive on behavioural expectations within a society or group. 
Now, just as much of the social psychology literature revolves around 
variations of Asch‟s [1955, 1956] experiments, so have many economic 
studies on conformity drawn on the theory of informational cascades. An 
informational cascade (otherwise referred to as “herding behaviour”) occurs 
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when individuals observe the predecessors‟ actions and then make the same 
choice that others have made, irrespective of their own private information 
signals: the idea, which is based on observational learning theory, was 
formally developed by Banerjee [1992] and Bikhchandani et al. [1992], and 
has been experimentally investigated in several studies since the seminal 
Anderson and Holt [1997]. Yet, while such studies are primarily focused on 
the effects of the transmission of information on conformist behaviour – in a 
“non-strategic” setting – the present essay follows a different approach in 
that, unlike informational cascade models, here an individual‟s payoff directly 
depends on what all preceding or subsequent players do (in other words, not 
only does an individual‟s action influence the others‟ choice of action, but 
also co-determines one another‟s payoff).86   
In this connection, substantial pieces of research have been delving 
into the effects of a different belief-dependent motivation, which nevertheless 
turns out to be related to conformity in mixed-motive games, that is, guilt 
aversion. In effect, Charness and Dufwenberg‟s [2006] investigation is fairly 
connected to the present test: the guilt aversion hypothesis implies that 
players may feel guilty if their behaviour falls short of the others‟ expectation; 
hence, in order to seek evidence of such a motivation, the experimenter asks 
subjects what they believe their opponents expect (thereby collecting 
                                  
86
 The payoff structure of informational cascade models involves everyone who chooses the 
right option getting the same reward, irrespective of how many others have chosen that 
option before and after them. (An alternative specification of the payoff structure may allow 
for the total reward to be fixed or may grant extra rewards for being first or second to choose 
the correct option.) 
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second-order beliefs).87 More specifically, after collecting the strategic 
choices of both the Trustor and the Trustee,88 Charness and Dufwenberg 
have subjects make guesses about the choices of players in a different role 
(and offer to reward good guessers): Trustors are asked to guess the 
“proportion of Trustees who choose to cooperate”, while Trustees are asked 
to guess the “average guess made by Trustors who choose to cooperate”; 
notice that such guesses represent the experimenter‟s measurement of the 
Trustor‟s first-order beliefs and the Trustee‟s second-order beliefs, 
respectively. To sum up their findings, the guilt aversion hypothesis is 
confirmed by a strong correlation between beliefs and behaviour: the 
Trustees who cooperated made significantly higher guesses about the 
Trustors‟ guesses than did the Trustees who chose not to cooperate (i.e.: the 
Trustees who cooperated held significantly higher second-order beliefs 
regarding their choice to cooperate).  
                                  
87
 Note that, while Charness and Dufwenberg‟s study is primarily conceived to examine the 
role of pre-play communication (in the form of nonbinding promises, transmitted through 
written free-form messages) in shaping beliefs and enhancing cooperative behaviour, it does 
nevertheless disclose an interesting relationship between beliefs and choices; indeed, their 
results reveal significant correlations between second-order beliefs and actions, even in the 
treatments without pre-play communication (note that Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2000] 
provide an analogous test in a similar experimental game setting without pre-play 
communication). 
88
 They examine one-shot non-simultaneous Trust Games with hidden action (i.e.: if the 
Trustee chooses to fulfil trust and cooperates, a chance move will determine whether the 
Trustor gets some material payoff with probability 5/6; the Trustor gets a payoff of zero 
otherwise); note that they use the strategy method. 
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Given that, of particular interest is Ellingsen et al.‟s [2010] design: 
again, their aim is to test for guilt aversion but in a way that reduces the 
scope for consensus effects which, in their view, may have driven such a 
strong correlation between beliefs and behaviour. According to their 
argument, Charness and Dufwenberg‟s [2006] test is weak as the observed 
correlation does not prove that second-order beliefs affected behaviour (as 
postulated by guilt aversion); instead, Ellingsen et al.‟s hypothesis is that 
those Trustees who made large back transfers would hold higher second-
order beliefs (regarding their choice to cooperate), just because they thought 
that everyone would (expect to) behave like them.89 Hence, in order to rule 
out that eventuality, Ellingsen et al. provide each Trustee with straightforward 
information about the co-paired Trustor‟s first-order belief.90 (Notice that, from 
the viewpoint of the Trustee, this represents her induced second-order belief; 
also note that the experimenter omits to tell Trustors that Trustees will have 
access to their beliefs so as to avoid some strategic, untruthful reporting of 
beliefs.) More specifically, in Ellingsen et al.‟s design, first each Trustor 
chooses whether to continue or to withdraw, then she guesses what fraction 
of the Trustees will choose to cooperate; after that, each Trustee is informed 
about the guess of the respective Trustor, and therefore decides whether to 
cooperate or not. In brief, their results are interesting, because – in contrast 
to Charness and Dufwenberg [2006] – Ellingsen et al. do not find a 
                                  
89
 I shall return to Ellingsen et al.‟s interpretation of Charness and Dufwenberg‟s results in 
the next section. 
90
 Similarly, in their Dictator Game treatment, the Recipients‟ first-order beliefs are 
communicated to the respective Dictators. 
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correlation between (induced) second-order beliefs and behaviour, which 
seems to deny a guilt aversion motivation. 
I conclude this section with studies testing for a related motivation, 
namely trust responsiveness, which is defined as a «tendency to fulfil trust 
because you believe it has been placed in you» (Bacharach et al. [2007], p. 
350). Thus, in the treatments of Bacharach et al. [2007] and Guerra and 
Zizzo [2004], first beliefs from Trustors are elicited, and then the 
experimenter informs Trustees about the mean prediction made by the 
Trustors with whom they are not matched (i.e.: each Trustee receives a 
report about the mean value of the first-order beliefs of her non co-paired 
players). More specifically, in Bacharach et al.‟s [2007] design, each Trustee 
is shown the mean value of the first-order beliefs of the Trustors with whom 
she is not matched, before the experimenter elicits each Trustee‟s second-
order belief about her co-paired player. (Notice that, while this could provide 
an interesting exogenous variation in beliefs – since each Trustee may use 
the information about her non co-players‟ first-order beliefs, in order to 
update her second-order belief about the co-paired player – the authors do 
not investigate such an issue: in fact, to that end, each Trustee‟s second-
order belief should rather be elicited before she is informed about the non co-
players‟ guesses.) Lastly, Bacharach et al.‟s results show that Trustees‟ 
cooperative behaviour varies with Trustees‟ second-order beliefs, in two of 
their experimental game variants, but unfortunately they do not further 
explore the relationship between Trustees‟ behaviour and the transmitted 
information, which could have given a good insight into the conformity 
motivation. 
In the next section I shall further discuss how the above belief-
dependent motivations relate to conformity: the discussion of the conformity 
hypothesis will lead the way to a novel experimental design. 
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III.3. Experimental design 
III.3.a. False consensus effects vs. conformity to social norms 
This study aims at disentangling conformity from consensus effects. In the 
theory of conformity to social norms that I have previously formalized, I 
assume that some subjects have conditional preferences for conformity to a 
norm, with the norm dictating a set of strategy profiles which depict the 
“currently-normal” or “appropriate” behaviour within a certain social group. 
Hence, in order for a potentially conformist player to identify the strategy 
profile/s that best describe(s) some normal behaviour, she forms a conjecture 
about the norm-complying actions at each history. To sum up, in such a 
theory, a conformist player is motivated by her beliefs about others‟ beliefs 
and behaviour, and consequently adapts to her presumed social norm. Now, 
the present experiment does not provide a direct test for such a theory of 
conformity, because for that – before treating the subjects – one needs to 
isolate those with conformist preferences from those with classical, non-
conformist motivations. However, the present experiment does shed some 
light on conformity as a motivation, which implies that the peers‟ presumed 
behaviour serves the individual as a means of forming beliefs and taking 
actions. 
A conformist player, in a social dilemma, would do her part of what is 
presumed to be the norm-complying strategy profile. It should be recalled 
that in the aforementioned theory, for a social norm to be in operation a 
certain set of conditions must hold, where such conditions involve empirical 
as well as normative expectations of conformity to the norm (see also 
Bicchieri [2006], Ch. 1). Now, in this study I shall focus on the empirical 
expectations, that is, a player‟s beliefs about the others conforming to a given 
rule of behaviour; more specifically, the experiment will assess the 
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importance of the expectations regarding the behaviour of other participants 
in the same role.91  
Thus, what is being hypothesized here is that a conformist player will 
behave as she thinks that other (conformist) players in the same role behave. 
Hence, the key hypothesis is that the experimenter should be able to predict 
a conformist‟s behaviour from the conformist‟s beliefs about the behaviour of 
other players in the same role: to that end, the first two treatments (i.e.: “T0” 
and “T1”) are designed to test for any such relationship by asking subjects to 
guess how many of the other participants in the same role will choose one of 
two actions of a discrete Trust Game. 
Now, it should be noted that a false consensus effect hypothesis will 
predict an analogous relation (although an inverse one). False consensus is 
usually referred to as an egocentric bias that occurs when people estimate 
consensus for their own behaviour: in that case, when forming a belief about 
the others‟ behaviour, a player will estimate the others‟ decisions based on 
her own decision (i.e.: according to the traditional definition of false 
consensus, a player who chooses a certain action – with a higher probability 
than some other player 𝑔 does – will give a higher estimate of a third player 𝑗 
choosing that action than the estimate given by player 𝑔);92 or else – if  some 
player 𝑔‟s decision is observable – false consensus implies that an individual 
                                  
91
 Note that normative expectations are distinct from second-order empirical expectations in 
that the former embody an ought-to-do statement. See Bicchieri and Xiao [2009] for a test of 
both empirical and normative expectations of conformity to a norm, in a Dictator Game. 
92
 Dawes [1990] notes that the traditional definition does not justify the label “false”: for this 
reason, Engelmann and Strobel [2000] provide the above alternative definition.  
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𝑖, when forming a belief about the behaviour of a third player 𝑗, will estimate it 
by attaching more weight to her own decision than to that of 𝑔 (Engelmann 
and Strobel [2000]). Given that, empirically conformity and consensus are 
related in that both imply that a subject‟s guess regarding the number of 
other people choosing a certain strategy is higher, if the guess is made by 
subjects choosing that very strategy (compared with the guess made by 
subjects choosing some other strategy). Therefore, on consideration the 
aforementioned results of Charness and Dufwenberg [2006] might have been 
driven by a conformity motivation rather than consensus (the latter being 
argued by Ellingsen et al. [2010]).93  
To sum up, both conformity and consensus imply that in a discrete 
Trust Game, say, a second-mover‟s guess regarding the fraction of other 
second-movers choosing a certain action is higher, if the guess is made by 
second-movers choosing that very action (compared with the guess made by 
second-movers choosing another action). Therefore, in order to disentangle 
consensus from conformity, a third treatment (i.e.: “T2”) introduces an 
exogenous variation in beliefs by showing subjects some aggregate 
                                  
93
 In this connection, it should be stressed that guilt aversion and conformity in mixed-motive 
games are related since – in the aforementioned theory of social norms – guilt is the feeling 
that generates conformity, but only if a certain set of conditions holds: in fact, a conformist 
player is usually motivated by conditional social preferences. Note that, according to such a 
theory, the expectations regarding the behaviour of all other participants in the experiment 
matter, whatever role they are assigned; instead, to a purely guilt-averse individual (in the 
sense of Battigalli and Dufwenberg [2007]) only the expectations of the (other-role) subject 
with which one is matched matter. In order to rule out any confounding element, the present 
experiment focuses on the (empirical) expectations regarding the behaviour of other 
participants in the same role. 
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information about the others‟ guesses (i.e.: the average guess made by a 
sample of other participants in the same role).94 In a nutshell, if the 
experimenter can predict a subject‟s choice from the subject‟s guess (about 
the behaviour of other participants in the same role) in conjunction with the 
transmitted information about others‟ guesses, then one has effectively 
disentangled the two effects. More precisely, in a player affected by 
consensus one should find a relationship between her behaviour (and, 
underweighted, the observed behaviour of others) and her beliefs about 
some others‟ behaviour; yet, in a player affected by consensus, one should 
not find a relationship between her behaviour and some others‟ beliefs about 
others‟ behaviour. Again, in the case of conformity, the causal relationship 
runs from beliefs to behaviour; instead, in the case of consensus, one‟s 
action influences one‟s beliefs about some others‟ actions. It is therefore 
clear that if, in the lab, a subject‟s guess about some others‟ actions is 
elicited before the very subject is shown the average guess made by other 
players, then only the conformity hypothesis can be consistent with that 
subject using (also) the transmitted information to decide on the action to 
take.95 
                                  
94
 Notice that such an exogenous variation in beliefs – to a potentially conformist player – 
represents an exogenous variation in empirical expectations of conformity to a norm. 
95
 In this respect, it should be noted that Ellingsen et al.‟s design (while ruling out consensus) 
would not be apt to investigate how conformity works in social dilemmas because, in their 
Trust Game experiment, Ellingsen et al. transmit the sole information about each co-paired 
player‟s guess. Instead, social psychologists describe conformity as the act of matching 
beliefs, attitudes and behaviours to what individuals perceive is normal of their group or 
society, as opposed to what one other individual expects. 
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III.3.b. Game specification and treatments structure 
Here I shall focus on the below discrete version of the Trust Game since a 
substantial amount of the prior evidence on suspected conformist behaviour 
comes from this family of games and it is therefore easier to compare results.  
 
 
Figure III.1 - Trust Game “TG” 
 
Note that in each experimental session players were referred to as 
“Participant A” or “Participant B”: at the initial node 𝑕0 Player 1 (i.e.: 
Participant A, in the lab) chooses either 𝑎 or 𝑏 – when opting for 𝑏, the game 
terminates and material outcomes are allocated as shown in the vector of 
payoffs at the end-node 𝑧 𝑏  (with the number on top referring to Player 1‟s 
payoff); on the other hand, if Player 1 opts for 𝑎, the choice passes to Player 
2 (i.e.: Participant B, in the lab), who in turn can decide on 𝑐 or 𝑑, the 
consequences of which are shown in the vector of payoffs at the end-nodes 
𝑧 𝑐  and 𝑧 𝑑 , respectively. Given that, each experimental session was 
comprised of one of three treatments: I shall refer to the treatments as “T0”, 
“T1”, and “T2”.  
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T0. Each instance of T0 is divided into three stages, as follows (i.e.: 
Introduction Stage; Play Stage I-II; Payment Stage). 
Introduction Stage – subjects were randomly allocated to terminals and given 
the paper instructions; there, they were told that (in Part I) they would be 
assigned one of two roles (hence, randomly matched with a participant in a 
different role), and explained the decisions involved in each role; each 
subject was then asked to answer a set of control questions; a summary of 
the instructions was finally read aloud by the experimenter.  
Play Stage, Part I – all plays were conducted using the “strategy method”. 
The order of subsequent tasks was as reported below: 
(i) subjects were assigned the role of Participant B;96 
(ii) each subject was asked to guess how many of the other Participants 
B (in the same session) would choose either 𝑐 or 𝑑 (labelled as 
“share” and “keep”, respectively); subjects entered their guess by 
positioning a slider to the desired percentage;97 
(iii) each subject was invited to wait until all participants had entered their 
guesses; 
(iv) each subject was asked to choose either 𝑐 or 𝑑 (i.e.: “share” and 
“keep”, respectively). 
                                  
96
 Given that each subject was privately assigned a role, each subject did not know that 
every other person in Part I was assigned the role of Participant B. 
97
 The slider was initially positioned at a value of 50%: subjects had to enter a guess by 
moving it towards a higher 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 rate (i.e.: towards a value of 100%) or towards a higher 
𝑘𝑒𝑒𝑝 rate (i.e.: towards a value of 0%). Note that subjects could not leave the slider in the 
initial position. 
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Play Stage, Part II – subjects were told that Part II involved exactly the same 
steps as in Part I, although they would be assigned a different role and 
matched with a different participant; after they had been given a brief 
reminder of the instructions (both on-screen and orally), subjects were 
assigned the role of Participant A. Steps (i)-(iv) of Part II had the same 
structure as above, although each subject‟s decision and guess were about 𝑎 
or 𝑏 (labelled as “in” and “out”, respectively). 
Payment Stage – the payment mechanism consists of two parts: 
 each subject received a £3 show-up fee; 
 each subject was paid according to the outcome, as shown in the 
vector of payoffs, at the end-node realized in Part I as well as the end-
node realized in Part II (payoffs were in pound sterling). 
A few comments are now due. First, it should be noticed that the above order 
of the decisions (which is reversed with respect to the natural sequence 
Player 1, Player 2) is made possible by the adoption of the strategy method; 
also, it should be stressed that in Part II each subject was randomly matched 
with a participant other than that she was matched with in Part I; besides, 
subjects did not know about the tasks to be undertaken in Part II until the end 
of Part I. Obviously, notice that subjects did not know how much they had 
earned in Part I until the end of Part II (because every subject in each part is 
assigned the same role). 
T1. Given that an important element of conformist preferences 
involves expectations regarding the behaviour of other subjects in the same 
role – in order to induce participants to state their true beliefs – a few 
sessions (i.e.: treatment T1) presented an incentivizing scheme as follows. 
As in Part I of T0, before entering their decision as Participant B, each 
subject was asked to guess how many of the other Participants B (in the 
same session) would choose to transfer half the money back: yet, in Part I of 
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T1 subjects were also told that they would receive an additional payment of 
£2 if their guess differed by no more than 5 percentage points from the 
realized value. Moreover, as in Part II of T0, before entering their decision as 
Participant A, each subject was asked to guess how many of the other 
Participants A (in the same session) would opt in: yet, in Part II of T1 subjects 
were also told that they would receive an additional payment of £2 if their 
guess differed by no more than 5 percentage points from the realized value. 
To sum up, each instance of T1 has exactly the same structure as T0, except 
for the incentivizing scheme for the elicitation of beliefs.98 
T2. Each instance of T2 has exactly the same structure as T0, except 
for step (iii) of Play Stage I-II, which in T2 was as follows: 
(iii) each subject was invited to wait until all participants had entered their 
guesses, after which each subject was given feedback about other 
Participant B‟s guesses (about other Participant A’s guesses in Part 
II). 
Note that such feedback consisted of the average guess made by a sample 
of other participants in the same role (in the same session); also, when 
entering their guesses (at step (ii)), subjects did not know that those guesses 
would be pooled and transmitted to other participants (at step (iii)). Further, 
notice that such feedback was shown in the lower part of the same screen in 
which subjects were asked to enter their guesses: the message was phrased 
in such a way as to look like the outcome of an opinion survey; the font style 
                                  
98
 If a subject‟s guess differed by more than 5 percentage points from the realized value, that 
subject would receive no additional belief-payment; note that each subject was not informed 
about the correctness of her guesses until the end of Part II. 
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and size were the same as those of the other messages, in order not to make 
the information too prominent. In Part I the message read: «A sample of 
other participants B in this session expects on average that <x>% will 
transfer half the money, whereas <100-x>% will keep all the money»; 
similarly, in Part II the message read: «A sample of other participants A in 
this session expects on average that <x>% will OPT IN, whereas <100-x>% 
will OPT OUT» (see Appendix III for a transcript of all the on-screen 
messages). 
Lastly, given that (in Part I of T2) each subject was provided with an 
aggregate measure of the guesses made by other subjects in the role of 
Participant B, there might be interaction effects between Part I and Part II of 
T2: in effect, (in Part II of T2) some Participant A‟s choice might be affected 
by the fact that that very subject got some information in Part I. For this 
reason – and also because of the small difference in payoff between  𝑏,⋅  
and  𝑎, 𝑑 , which encourages Participants A to choose 𝑎 – as in other studies 
(e.g.: Ellingsen et al. [2010]) the focus of this treatment will be on Trustees‟ 
rather than on Trustors‟ behaviour. 
III.3.c. Hypotheses 
Before stating the key hypotheses of the experiment, I shall recall that the 
conformity motivation implies that a conformist player will behave as other 
(conformist) players are thought to be behaving. To this end, T0 provides a 
preliminary measure of conformity: there, conformity predicts a positive 
correlation between one‟s behaviour and one‟s guesses about the behaviour 
of other participants in the same role. Then, given that an important element 
of conformist preferences involves expectations, in order to induce subjects 
to state their true beliefs, T1 presents an incentivizing scheme for the 
elicitation of beliefs. Further, T2 is motivated by the acknowledgment that 
consensus and conformity may concause the aforementioned correlation; for 
 - 150 - 
 
this reason, T2 provides the definitive test since – by transmitting information 
about the others‟ guesses – the experimenter should be able to disentangle 
consensus from conformity by regressing a subject‟s choice on the stated 
and transmitted beliefs (or their interaction). In fact, if a subject‟s guess about 
some others‟ actions is elicited before the very subject is shown the average 
guess made by others, then only the conformity hypothesis is consistent with 
that subject using (also) the transmitted information to decide on the action to 
take.  
In summary, of particular interest are the following hypotheses: 
H1 – positive correlation between behaviour and beliefs about the behaviour 
of other participants in the same role; 
H2 – neither the rate of cooperative behaviour nor the beliefs about the 
others‟ behaviour vary when beliefs are incentivized; 
H3 – behaviour is influenced by the transmitted information about the others‟ 
beliefs. 
 The account of conformity outlined before leads one to expect to find 
support for H1 and H3, and to have open minds about H2.99 In particular 
                                  
99
 It should be noticed that T2 does not present an incentivizing scheme for the elicitation of 
beliefs, in order to avoid rewarding subjects based on the manipulated, transmitted 
information. In effect, the design of T2 was finalized after observing the results supporting 
both H1 and H2, in T0 and T1. As a consequence, if neither offering (in T1) nor not-offering 
(in T0) to pay for beliefs changes behaviour – when subjects are not shown an aggregate 
measure of the others‟ beliefs – then one can reasonably assume that offering or not-offering 
to pay for beliefs will not change behaviour even when subjects are shown an aggregate 
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notice that, while H1 is consistent with both conformity and consensus, H3 is 
consistent with conformity only. 
III.3.d. Procedure 
The experiment was run with zTree (Fischbacher [2007]) in the Experimental 
Economics Lab at Royal Holloway, between February and May 2012; 
subjects were recruited via emails forwarded across all faculties at Royal 
Holloway. A total of 209 subjects participated in the experiment; each session 
consisted of one of the three treatments (no subject could participate in more 
than one session). Each session took around 45 minutes and average 
earnings were £8 (including a £3 show-up fee), with minimum and maximum 
payments being £4 and £14, respectively.  
A crucial element of the current conformity test involves introducing an 
exogenous variation in conjectures about group norms, as expressed by 
beliefs about other players‟ behaviour in treatment T2. In order to collect 
enough data so as to conveniently test for the key hypothesis H3, a 
computerized sampling method was used for selecting the guesses (made at 
step (ii)) to be pooled and passed on to participants in the same session, at 
step (iii) of each part of T2. Before describing such a sampling method, first, 
let 𝛾𝑖 𝑐  and 𝛾𝑖 𝑑 = 1 − 𝛾𝑖 𝑐  denote Participant B’s stated guess about the 
fraction of the other Participants B (in the same session) that will choose 𝑐 
and 𝑑 (labelled as “share” and “keep”, in the lab), respectively; similarly, let 
𝛾𝑖 𝑎  and 𝛾𝑖 𝑏 = 1 − 𝛾𝑖 𝑎  denote Participant A’s stated guess about the 
                                                                                              
measure of the others‟ beliefs (besides, in Part I of T2 subjects did not know that, after 
stating their guesses, these would be pooled and transmitted to other participants). 
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fraction of the other Participants A (in the same session) that will choose 𝑎 
and 𝑏 (labelled as “in” and “out”, in the lab), respectively. Then, let 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐  and 
𝛾 𝑖 𝑎  denote the average guess (made by a sample of other participants in 
the same role, in the same session) transmitted to subject 𝑖.  
Now, in order to introduce an exogenous variation in beliefs, and to 
ensure that – in Part I of T2 – some subjects received information about an 
average belief of low cooperation (i.e.: 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 < 0.5) and some others received 
information about an average belief of high cooperation (i.e.: 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 > 0.5), 
each subject 𝑖 was in fact shown the average guess made by a specifically 
selected sample of participants: more precisely, the guesses were selected in 
a way such that all 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐  converged to the values of 0.25 and 0.75. Similarly, 
in Part II of T2 the guesses were selected in a way such that all 𝛾 𝑖 𝑎  
converged to the values of 0.25 and 0.75. It should be noted that, for a given 
subject 𝑖, the pieces of information transmitted in Part I and II formed one of 
the following combinations: 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.25, or 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.75, or 
𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~0.25 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.75, or  𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~0.75 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.25; that is, some 
subjects received information about an average belief of low (or high) 
cooperation in both Part I and Part II, whereas some subjects received 
information about an average belief of low cooperation in Part I and high 
cooperation in Part II (or vice versa).    
Before proceeding to the commentary on the data, a few observations 
are in order. First, the reason why the sampling algorithm has been devised 
in a way to select samples of subjects (i.e.: guesses) such that all 𝛾 𝑖 ⋅  
converge to 0.25 and 0.75 is just to obtain two distributions of transmitted 
beliefs per each part of a session, that is, the “low transmitted belief” and the 
“high transmitted belief” distributions. In this respect, it should be noticed that 
one could have chosen any other value; on the other hand, 0.25 and 0.75 
have been preferred for the only reason that they are unique in that each is 
the central value of a range of beliefs about low cooperation and high 
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cooperation, respectively. Finally, it should be stressed that the current 
design does not involve deception because – as mentioned above – the 
message shown on screen explicitly stated that the reported information 
referred to a sample of other participants.   
 
III.4. Results 
III.4.a. Analysis of treatments T0-T1 
The analysis of treatments without belief manipulation, that is, the treatments 
with non-incentivized (T0) and incentivized (T1) elicitation of beliefs shows 
that there is a relationship between behaviour and expectations regarding the 
behaviour of other participants in the same role. To begin with, Table III-1 
and Table III-2 summarize the data for the decision to cooperate and the 
stated belief (for each part) with reference to T0 and T1, respectively. Note 
that the decision to cooperate is dichotomous, taking on value 1 when a 
subject chooses 𝑐 (i.e.: “shares” in Part I) or 𝑎 (i.e.: “opts in” in Part II), and 
taking on value 0 otherwise; also note that the stated beliefs 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  are 
expressed as percentages. 
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Variable  Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. m M 
        
share   53 .509434 .5046949 0 1 
𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒   53 38.62264 25.97945 0 99 
in   53 .6415094 .4841463 0 1 
𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛    53 50.41509 30.91765 0 100 
Table III-1 - T0 summary statistics (m and M indicate the minimum and 
maximum values, respectively); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  indicate stated beliefs 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. m M 
        
share   46 .5869565 .4978213 0 1 
𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒   46 45.69565 25.48888 0 100 
in   46 .6086957 .4934352 0 1 
𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛    46 62.54348 25.84458 5 100 
Table III-2 - T1 summary statistics (m and M indicate the minimum and 
maximum values, respectively); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  indicate stated beliefs 
 
One can perform formal tests of the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between behaviour and expectations regarding the behaviour of 
other participants in the same role; the alternative hypothesis is that decision 
and belief are not independent. By using the data for T0, one gets a positive 
Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.5022 (𝑝 = 0.0001) for Part I, and a 
positive Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.6028 (𝑝 = 0.0000) for Part II; 
similarly, using the data for T1, one gets a positive Spearman correlation 
coefficient of 0.4994 (𝑝 = 0.0004) for Part I, and a positive Spearman 
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correlation coefficient of 0.4953 (𝑝 = 0.0005) for Part II.100 Hence, in both 
cases there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Additionally, one 
could compare the difference in beliefs between those who chose to 
cooperate and those who chose not to: the following table presents the mean 
values of the beliefs for both cooperators and non-cooperators in each part, 
along with Z Statistics for the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests of the 
null hypotheses 
𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒   𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ≡ 0 = 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒   𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ≡ 1 , 
𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛   𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛 ≡ 0 = 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛   𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛 ≡ 1 . 
 
Trea~t Obs. 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  Z Stat 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  Z Stat 
 
 
 if 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ≡ 0 if 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ≡ 1  if 𝑖𝑛 ≡ 0 if 𝑖𝑛 ≡ 1  
T0 53 25.88462 50.88889 -3.621 26.36842 63.85294 -4.347 
    (***)   (***) 
T1 46 30.68421 56.25926 -3.350 46 73.17857 -3.323 
    (***)   (***) 
Table III-3 - Mean values of belief variables; the Z Statistic reflects the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for the two populations compared (in brackets 
are significance levels for the tests above, with *** indicating 𝑝 < 0.01); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  
indicate stated beliefs 
                                  
100
 By using aggregate data for T0 and T1 (no. of obs.=99), one gets a Spearman correlation 
coefficient of 0.5064 (𝑝 = 0.0000) for Part I, whereas a Spearman correlation coefficient of 
0.5440 (𝑝 = 0.0000) for Part II. 
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Again, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis in all cases, 
thereby highlighting a relationship between behaviour and expectations 
regarding the behaviour of other participants in the same role. In other words, 
the tests fully support H1 as stated in section III.3.c. above, that is, there is 
strong evidence of a positive correlation between behaviour and expectations 
regarding the behaviour of other participants in the same role, across both 
treatments T0 and T1. 
Given that, I shall move on to run a probit regression for each part of 
the above treatments so as to start presuming a causal hypothesis (in which 
beliefs determine a conformist‟s behaviour) that will be explored fully with the 
analysis of T2 in the next subsection. So, for now I will simply present the 
coefficients of probit regressions: (i) with 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 as the dependent variable 
and 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  as the predictor, for Part I of each treatment; (ii) with 𝑖𝑛 as the 
dependent variable and 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  as the predictor for Part II of each treatment. 
 
  share in 
Trea~t Obs. 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  constant 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  constant 
      
T0 53 .0273249*** -1.007842*** .0290061*** -.984093*** 
  (.008943) (.3702524) (.0069194) (.3742122) 
T1 46 .0292078*** -1.060547** .0293176*** -1.542668*** 
  (.0099164) (.4369656) (.0094252) (.5710146) 
Table III-4 - T0 and T1 Probit regression coefficients; in brackets are robust 
standard errors (** and *** indicate 𝑝 < 0.05 and 𝑝 < 0.01, respectively, for 
the relevant Z Statistic); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  indicate stated beliefs 
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Clearly, a positive coefficient means that an increase in the explanatory 
variable will lead to an increase in the predicted probability of the rate of 
cooperative behaviour; hence, Table III-4 shows that (in Part I of each 
treatment) an increase in 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  leads to an increase in the predicted 
probability of 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒, whereas (in Part II of each treatment) an increase in 
𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  leads to an increase in the predicted probability of 𝑖𝑛. Again, notice 
that such results may admit a reverse causality interpretation (in line with a 
false consensus effect hypothesis); for this reason, the analysis of T2 will 
shed more light on our conformity motivation. 
On a different note – given that T2 does not present an incentivizing 
scheme for the elicitation of beliefs – it is important to check whether the rate 
of cooperative behaviour or the beliefs about the others‟ behaviour vary when 
beliefs are incentivized. I shall consider beliefs first: for Part I, the null 
hypothesis is that the mean for 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  is the same for T0 and T1; for Part 
II, the null hypothesis is that the mean for 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  is the same for T0 and T1. 
Thus, as for Part I, the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test suggests that 
there is not a statistically significant difference between the underlying 
distributions of 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  for T0 and T1 (𝑧 = −1.296, 𝑝 = 0.1950). As regards 
Part II, the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test suggests that there is 
mild evidence against the null hypothesis (𝑧 = −1.827, 𝑝 = 0.0677): in light of 
this result, the analysis of the decision to cooperate (i.e.: a test of whether 
offering to pay for beliefs affected behaviour or not) becomes critical. In brief: 
for Part I, the null hypothesis is that the mean for 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 is the same for T0 
and T1; for Part II, the null hypothesis is that the mean for 𝑖𝑛 is the same for 
T0 and T1. Thus, as for Part I, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test suggests that 
there is not a statistically significant difference between the underlying 
distributions of 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 for T0 and T1 (𝑧 = −0.769, 𝑝 = 0.4421): this is not 
surprising, given the above analysis of beliefs, and the established 
correlation between beliefs and behaviour. More interestingly, as regards 
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Part II, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test suggests that there is no evidence 
against the null hypothesis (𝑧 = 0.335, 𝑝 = 0.7377). Hence, one can conclude 
that the tests almost fully support H2 as stated in section III.3.c. above, that 
is, offering or not-offering to pay for beliefs is very unlikely to affect behaviour 
or beliefs (incentivizing beliefs may, at most, induce players to overestimate 
the fraction of the other participants that will choose to opt in, in Part II). 
Before proceeding to the analysis of T2, it should be highlighted that 
subjects‟ beliefs were very unequally distributed across the range  0,  0.5  ∪
 0.5,  1  , with a stated belief below 50% being most frequent in Part I of both 
T0 and T1 (and with a stated belief above 50% being most frequent in Part II 
of both T0 and T1):101 more specifically, in Part I of T0 about 68% of subjects 
stated a belief such that 𝛾𝑖 𝑐 < 0.5 whereas in Part II of T0 about 45% of 
subjects stated a belief such that 𝛾𝑖 𝑎 < 0.5; similarly, in Part I of T1 about 
59% of subjects stated a belief such that 𝛾𝑖 𝑐 < 0.5 whereas in Part II of T1 
about 33% of subjects stated a belief such that 𝛾𝑖 𝑎 < 0.5. Given that, one 
should interpret the above findings bearing in mind that (the slope of) any 
relationship between behaviour and beliefs may vary when analyzing 
subjects who stated a belief below 50% (i.e.: subjects with an expectation of 
predominant defection) and those who stated a belief above 50% (i.e.: 
subjects with an expectation of predominant cooperation): I shall return to 
this issue in the next subsection. 
                                  
101
 Recall that it was not possible for subjects to enter a stated belief of 50% (see footnote 97 
above). 
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III.4.b. Analysis of treatment T2 
I will now proceed to the analysis of the treatment with belief manipulation. 
Table III-5 summarizes the data for the decision to cooperate and the stated 
belief (for each part) with reference to T2. 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. m M 
        
share   110 .5818182 .4955179 0 1 
𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒   110 44.43636 24.91104 0 99 
in   110 .6818182 .4679022 0 1 
𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛    110 59.3  27.35078 0 100 
Table III-5 - T2 summary statistics (m and M indicate the minimum and 
maximum values, respectively); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  indicate stated beliefs 
 
Again, one can perform formal tests of the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between behaviour and expectations regarding the behaviour of 
other participants in the same role: by using the data for T2, one gets a 
positive Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.4060 (𝑝 = 0.0000) for Part I, 
and a positive Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.5176 (𝑝 = 0.0000) for 
Part II. In light of these results, one can conclude that the tests fully support 
H1 as stated in section III.3.c. above, that is, there is strong evidence of a 
positive correlation between behaviour and expectations regarding the 
behaviour of other participants in the same role, across all treatments. Yet, 
as discussed in section III.3.a. above, such a strong correlation might be due 
to consensus effects (which imply an inverse causal relationship): further 
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tests are therefore needed to establish whether beliefs affect behaviour, a 
point which would support the conformity hypothesis. 
It should now be recalled that the defining element of treatment T2 
involves introducing an exogenous variation in beliefs: to this end, T2 was 
implemented with a sampling algorithm such that subjects received 
information about an average belief of low or high cooperation; as explained 
before, for a given subject 𝑖, the pieces of information transmitted in Part I 
and II formed one of the following combinations: 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.25, or 
𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.75, or 𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~0.25 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.75, or  
𝛾 𝑖 𝑐 ~0.75 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 𝑖 𝑎 ~0.25. (More specifically, after collecting the beliefs 
stated by participants, the programme computed and transmitted the beliefs 
as summarized in Table III-8 and Table III-9: see Appendix III.) In this 
respect, as discussed above, it should be recalled that (in Part II of T2) some 
Participant A‟s choice might be affected by the fact that that very subject got 
some information in Part I. For this reason – and also because of the small 
difference in payoff between  𝑏,⋅  and  𝑎, 𝑑 , which encourages Participants 
A to choose 𝑎 – as in other studies (e.g.: Ellingsen et al. [2010]) the focus of 
this treatment will be on Trustees‟ rather than on Trustors‟ behaviour. 
Now, as noted during the analysis of treatments T0-T1, also in T2 
subjects‟ stated beliefs were very unequally distributed across the range 
 0,  0.5  ∪  0.5,  1  , with a stated belief below 50% being most frequent in Part I 
and with a stated belief above 50% being most frequent in Part II: more 
specifically, in Part I of T2 almost 60% of subjects stated a belief such that 
𝛾𝑖 𝑐 < 0.5 whereas in Part II of T2 about 36% of subjects stated a belief 
such that 𝛾𝑖 𝑎 < 0.5. Conversely, as just mentioned, the information 
transmitted was a percentage in the vicinity of 0.25 or in the vicinity of 0.75, 
and it was assigned randomly to each subject regardless of the belief she 
stated at step (ii): in particular, the ratio of subjects assigned a transmitted 
belief of low cooperation (that is, 𝛾 𝑖 ⋅ < 0.5, i.e.: 𝛾 𝑖 ⋅ ~0.25) to those 
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assigned a transmitted belief of high cooperation (that is, 𝛾 𝑖 ⋅ > 0.5, i.e.: 
𝛾 𝑖 ⋅ ~0.75) was of about 1:1, in each part. Given that – and also in light of 
possible interaction effects between low/high stated beliefs and low/high 
transmitted beliefs – I shall now proceed to analyze first subjects who stated 
a belief below 50%, and then those who stated a belief above 50%: in this 
way one can reasonably assume that each group being treated is indeed 
homogeneous. 
Hence, I will start by running a probit regression for each group of 
stated beliefs (i.e.: below/above 50%) using the data from treatment T2, in 
order to check whether a model with stated belief as the only explanatory 
variable is significant.102 That is, I will simply present the coefficients of probit 
regressions: (i) with 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 as the dependent variable and 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  as the 
predictor, for Part I of each group of stated beliefs (and for the whole 
sample); (ii) with 𝑖𝑛 as the dependent variable and 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  as the predictor for 
Part II of each group of stated beliefs (and for the whole sample). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
102
 I did not perform a similar regression using the data from treatments T0-T1, because the 
number of observations of each group of stated beliefs (i.e.: below/above 50%) for each of 
those treatments was too small to produce meaningful estimations. 
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 share in 
Stated 
beliefs 
Obs. 
Part I 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  constant 
Obs. 
Part II 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  constant 
       
0 ≤ 𝛾𝑖 ⋅ < 0.5 65 .0298773* -.9243365** 40 .0253571 -1.024315** 
  (.0153424) (.4434949)  (.0164127) (.4905198) 
       
0.5 < 𝛾𝑖 ⋅ ≤ 1 45 .0315747 -1.417182 70 .034035** -1.483769 
  (.0208432) (1.422782)  (.016576) (1.24247) 
       
all 110 .0230871*** -.7770586*** 110 .0294296*** -1.142494*** 
  (.0056345) (.2652993)  (.0052826) (.3148897) 
Table III-6 - T2 Probit regression coefficients; in brackets are robust standard 
errors (*, ** and *** indicate 𝑝 < 0.10, 𝑝 < 0.05 and 𝑝 < 0.01, respectively, 
for the relevant Z Statistic); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  indicate stated beliefs 
 
Table III-6 shows that (in Part I of T2) an increase in 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  leads to an 
increase in the predicted probability of 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒, whereas (in Part II of T2) an 
increase in 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛  leads to an increase in the predicted probability of 𝑖𝑛. 
However, it should be noted that – while the coefficients for the stated beliefs 
are strongly significant when considering the whole sample (as shown in the 
last row of the table) – the significance of the coefficients considerably 
decreases (with many cases of insignificance being present) when analyzing 
each group of stated beliefs in turn (i.e.: below/above 50%). Although that 
may be due to a variety of factors, it is reasonable to suspect that adding 
another explanatory variable may increase the significance of the model, at 
least for one of the groups of stated beliefs if interaction effects between 
low/high stated beliefs and low/high transmitted beliefs are present.  
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Thus, I shall turn to run a probit regression for each group of stated 
beliefs (i.e.: below/above 50%) so as to check whether a model with both 
stated belief and transmitted belief as explanatory variables is significant. (As 
explained before I shall focus on Part I, though I will return to Part II later on.) 
The following table presents the coefficients of probit regressions: (i) with 
𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 as the dependent variable and with 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 , 𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  as predictors, 
for Part I of each group of stated beliefs (and for the whole sample). 
 
 share 
Stated beliefs 
Obs. 
Part I 
𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  constant 
     
0 ≤ 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 < 0.5 65 .0298451* .0005991 -.9550853* 
  (.0153815) (.0066462) (.5712344) 
     
0.5 < 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ≤ 1 45 .0496499* .0190708** -3.494586* 
  (.0257273) (.0088884) (1.904342) 
     
all 110 .0240949*** .005425 -1.092166*** 
  (.005691) (.0052484) (.4135265) 
Table III-7 - T2 Part I Probit regression coefficients; in brackets are robust 
standard errors (*, ** and *** indicate 𝑝 < 0.10, 𝑝 < 0.05 and 𝑝 < 0.01, 
respectively, for the relevant Z Statistic); 𝛾𝑖 ⋅  indicate stated beliefs, 𝛾 𝑖 ⋅  
indicate transmitted beliefs 
 
Interestingly, Table III-7 shows that – while the coefficient for the transmitted 
belief 𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  is not significant when considering the whole sample (as 
shown in the last row of the table) – an increase in the transmitted belief has 
a significant, positive effect on the group of subjects who stated a belief 
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above 50%: hence, for that group of subjects, an increase in the transmitted 
belief 𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  leads to an increase in the predicted probability of 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒. 
The above results would seem to support the suspicion that interaction 
effects between stated beliefs and transmitted beliefs are present: as a 
matter of fact, that is easily confirmed (using the data from the whole sample, 
i.e.: 110 observations) by regressing the decision to cooperate on: the stated 
belief (𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ), a dummy for low/high transmitted belief (𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ), and 
an interaction term between stated belief and low/high transmitted belief; not 
surprisingly, performing such a regression shows that the interaction is 
significant.103 For Part I, the probit regression in question gives:  
Φ −.5867 + .016 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 − .8305 ∗ 𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 + .0290 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  ,
    . 3613  . 0066     . 5578  . 0130 
  
with robust standard errors being shown in brackets below each coefficient. 
The regression shows that, while the dummy for low/high transmitted belief is 
not significant (𝑝 = 0.137), the interaction term between stated belief and 
low/high transmitted belief is significant (𝑝 = 0.026), thereby confirming that 
the transmitted information has an effect on Trustees‟ behaviour, depending 
on the level of their stated beliefs.104 Now, it is well known that – when using 
                                  
103
 By using the actual transmitted belief (𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ) in place of the dummy for low/high 
transmitted belief (𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ) one obtains similar results, confirming a significant 
interaction between stated beliefs and transmitted beliefs. 
104
 For Part II, running a similar regression, one obtains relatively similar results. The probit 
regression in this case gives: 
Φ −1.8211 + .0398 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛 + 1.2573 ∗ 𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 − .0193 ∗ 𝛾𝑖 𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑖𝑛  ,
    . 5145  . 0083             . 6725  . 011 
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a non-linear model – one cannot infer that the probability (of cooperating) 
increases or decreases from the sign of the coefficients, if the model has an 
interaction term. Hence, to give an idea of the extent of the impact of the 
transmitted beliefs, I shall compute the predicted probability that Participant B 
cooperates (i.e.: 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 = 1), when the stated belief is held at its mean value 
(i.e.: 44.44) and the transmitted belief is either low or high (i.e.: ~0.25 or 
~0.75, respectively): in brief, the predicted probability of cooperating is 0.55 
for those who get a low transmitted belief and 0.72 for those who get a high 
transmitted belief. (Notice that the impact of the transmitted beliefs is 
mitigated by the fact that subjects who stated a low belief are most frequent 
in the sample.) 
In light of these findings, one can conclude that the tests provide 
support for H3 as stated in section III.3.c. above or, more precisely, the tests 
show that the transmitted information about the others‟ belief influence one‟s 
behaviour, depending on one‟s stated beliefs. It should now be recalled that, 
in the case of conformity, the causal relationship runs from beliefs to 
behaviour – whereas in the case of consensus one‟s action influences one‟s 
                                                                                              
with robust standard errors being shown in brackets below each coefficient. Unlike Part I, 
here the regression shows that both the dummy for low/high transmitted belief and the 
interaction term are mild significant (with 𝑝 being 0.062 and 0.079, respectively), thereby 
confirming that the transmitted information may have an effect also on Trustors‟ behaviour, 
depending on the level of their stated beliefs. Now, as conjectured before, this difference in 
results (between Part I and Part II) could be due to interaction effects between Part I and 
Part II of T2: in effect, in Part II of T2 some Participant A‟s choice might be affected by the 
fact that that very subject got some information in Part I; running the above regression (for 
Part II) with the addition of a dummy for low/high transmitted belief in Part I (i.e.: 𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ) 
confirms that 𝑑𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒 ) is indeed significant in Part II. 
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beliefs about some others‟ actions – it is therefore clear that only conformity 
is consistent with a subject using (also) the transmitted information to decide 
on the action to take; hence, there is evidence of conformity being present in 
our data.  
 
III.5. Concluding remarks 
This essay has presented a test for conformist motivations in mixed-motive 
games. The data show that the conformity motivation is indeed present: in T2 
an effect of (exogenously varying) beliefs on behaviour suggests that 
conformity is at least part of what has driven the correlation between beliefs 
and behaviour in T0-T1 (and, possibly, in previous Trust Game experiments). 
Interestingly, the results show that an increase in the transmitted belief has a 
significant, positive effect on the group of subjects who stated a higher belief 
(i.e.: subjects with an expectation of predominant cooperation), but not on 
those who stated a lower belief (i.e.: subjects with an expectation of 
predominant defection). 
Now, it should be recalled that in the theory of social norms that I have 
previously formalized, a conformist player in a social dilemma would do her 
part of what is presumed to be the norm-complying strategy profile, provided 
that a certain set of conditions holds, where such conditions involve both 
empirical and normative expectations of conformity to the norm. Just for 
argument‟s sake, here is a very simplified version of such conditions (see 
also Bicchieri [2006], Ch. 1): (i) subjects must be aware of the existence of a 
norm; (ii) they must believe that the others will conform to the norm 
(“empirical expectations condition”); (iii) they must believe that the others 
expect them to conform to the norm (“normative expectations condition”). 
Given that, it should be noted that transmitting information regarding the 
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others‟ beliefs about some others‟ behaviour – to a potentially conformist 
player – constitutes an exogenous variation in empirical expectations of 
conformity to a norm of cooperation; hence, it should be stressed once again 
that in this experimental study I have focused on the empirical expectation 
side (i.e.: a player‟s belief about the others conforming to a given rule of 
behaviour), while disregarding the normative expectation side (i.e.: a player‟s 
belief about the others expecting her to conform to a given rule of behaviour). 
Then, given that the transmitted information had a significant impact 
only on players who stated a higher belief, the data seem to suggest that only 
those players were conformist. What does it mean? That may suggest that 
those who stated a higher belief are exactly those who had a normative 
expectation such that they believed that the others would expect them to 
cooperate. Hence, while an exogenous variation in empirical expectations of 
conformity to a norm (i.e.: the transmitted information) may have an effect on 
the group of subjects for whom the normative expectations condition is 
fulfilled, it may not have an effect on the group of subjects for whom the 
normative expectations condition is not fulfilled (where the latter group may 
possibly comprise those subjects who stated a lower belief). To conclude, 
future research should delve into the empirical/normative expectation 
distinction which is crucial to conformity to social norms. 
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III.6. Appendix III 
III.6.a. Additional data 
𝛾 𝑖 𝑠𝑕𝑎𝑟𝑒  high belief Total     
[Part I]          no      yes       
 
22       5        0       5  
23           3        0        3  
24           7        0        7  
25          21     0        21  
26          12       0       12  
27           5        0         5  
72           0        1         1  
73           0        8         8  
74           0       26       26  
75           0       19       19  
76           0        1        1  
78           0        2        2  
Total       53       57     110 
Table III-8 - Beliefs transmitted in Part I of T2 (the last column shows the 
number of subjects being shown each belief) 
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𝛾 𝑖 𝑖𝑛   high belief Total     
[Part II]          no  yes       
 
0           1        0       1
105
  
20           2         0        2  
21           3        0        3  
23           7        0        7  
24          10       0       10  
25          13       0       13  
26           7         0        7  
27           6         0        6  
28           2         0        2  
29           5         0        5  
39           1         0        1  
72           0         1        1  
73           0        5        5  
74           0        12       12  
75          0       24       24  
76           0        7        7  
77           0        4        4  
Total          57       53      110 
Table III-9 - Beliefs transmitted in Part II of T2 (the last column shows the 
number of subjects being shown each belief) 
 
                                  
105
 One subject received a belief of 0, because no other belief lower than 50 had been stated 
by participants in that session. 
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III.6.b. Experimental instructions and screenshots 
Paper instructions and transcripts of zTree screenshots are shown below. 
 
General instructions for participants 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. 
Please note that it is prohibited to communicate with other participants during 
the experiment. If you have a question once the experiment has begun, please 
raise your hand and an assistant will come to your desk to answer it. Violation of 
this rule leads to immediate exclusion from the study and from all payments. 
You will never learn the identity of the other participants, neither before nor after 
the study; and not one of the other participants will learn anything about your 
identity. Also, no other participant will learn what you earn during the 
experiment: upon completion of the session, the amount of money you will have 
earned will be paid out individually and privately. Hence, no other participant 
will know your choices and how much money you earn in this experiment. 
You will receive £3 for participating in this session; additionally you also receive 
money depending on the decisions made (as described in the next paragraphs). 
The experiment consists of two parts (“Part I” and “Part II”), each involving one 
simple decision task; your payment at the end of the session will be calculated 
as follows. 
 
Your payment 
= £3 (show-up fee) + any amount earned in Part I + any amount earned in Part II 
 
 
In what follows we describe the procedure for Part I. 
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Part I 
There are two types of participants, participants “A” and participants “B”. 
You will be assigned a type and paired with one other participant who was 
assigned another type than you. 
 
This part consists of two steps, which you will perform with the particular 
participant you are paired with. 
 
Step 1: Participant A must choose between the following two options. 
The first option (“OUT”) gives a payout of £1 to both participants. 
The second option (“IN”) is to instead transfer both pounds (i.e. £2 in 
total) to participant B and leave further decisions to him/her. If 
participant A transfers the 2 pounds to participant B, they will be 
tripled and participant B will receive 3 x 2 = 6 pounds. 
 
Step 2: Only if participant A chooses the second option (“IN”), participant B 
will then decide if he/she transfers £3 back to participant A and 
keeps £3 for himself/herself OR if participant B keeps all the £6 for 
himself/herself. 
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Procedure for the two steps 
Step one: Decision of participant A 
It is up to participant A to choose one of the 2 options (OUT or IN): EITHER both 
participants receive £1 each OR the money and further decisions are transferred 
to participant B. 
If participant A chooses the option OUT, both of you will receive £1. In this case 
participant B cannot change the payout allocation and the first part ends. 
As a result 
At the end of step one, there are two possible situations. 
 If participant A has transferred the £2 to participant B (option IN), 
participant B has £6 and participant A has nothing. 
 If participant A has chosen the option OUT, both of you have £1. 
 
Step two: Decision of participant B 
If participant A has transferred the money to participant B (option IN), then B 
receives £6 and it is now up to participant B to decide about the distribution of 
the £6 between the two participants. Participant B can EITHER: 
- transfer £3 back to participant A and keep £3 for himself/herself 
OR 
- keep all the £6 for himself/herself and leave nothing to participant A. 
After participant B’s decision this part is completed and the earnings for both 
participants will be determined according to B’s decision. 
The above information is summarised in the following table: 
 A’s income B’s income 
A chose OUT £1 £1 
A chose IN  B keeps all £0 £6 
   B transfers half £3 £3 
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Specific procedure and on-screen instructions for Part I 
 
You are assigned the role of participant B 
 
Note that you will complete the above-described two steps only once. 
 
Step 1: Participant A decides by entering his/her choice on the screen shown 
below. 
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Step 2: We will ask you (participant B) how you would like to divide the £6 
between participant A and yourself. Note that your answer will have an effect 
only if participant A does choose to transfer the money to you (option IN). 
Participant A will not know your decision when he/she submits his/her own 
decision. 
As explained above, you decide on whether to transfer half the money to 
participant A or keep all the £6 for yourself. 
You will enter your choice on the following screen: 
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Control questions 
Please answer the following control questions. Please contact the study 
organizer if you have any questions. 
 
1. Participant A has chosen IN. You then choose to transfer half the money 
back to participant A. 
What is the income of participant A? ……………. 
What is the income of participant B (yourself)?……………. 
 
2. Participant A has chosen IN. You then choose to keep all the money for 
yourself. 
What is the income of participant A? ……………. 
What is the income of participant B (yourself)?……………. 
 
3. Participant A has chosen OUT. 
What is the income of participant A? ……………. 
What is the income of participant B (yourself)?……………. 
 
Please feel free to ask questions at any point if you feel you need some 
clarification. Please do so by raising your hand. 
We will start with Part I once the instructions are clear to everyone. Are there any 
questions? 
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Part II 
 
We are now ready to undergo the last part of the study. This part has exactly the 
same two-step procedure as in Part I. 
The payouts are the same as before and are summarised in the following table: 
 
 A’s income B’s income 
A chose OUT £1 £1 
A chose IN  B keeps all £0 £6 
   B transfers half £3 £3 
 
The only difference is that you are assigned a different type in this part than in 
the previous part. 
 
You are now assigned the role of participant A. 
Again, you will be paired with one other participant. This other participant will be 
a different person than the one you were paired with in Part I.  
 
Please refer to your paper handout or ask an assistant if you need reminding of 
the procedure. 
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[Transcript of on-screen messages] 
Treatments T0-T1 
 
Screen 1 (Part I) 
 
You are assigned the role of participant B 
 
 
Prior to entering your decision as participant B, we would like to know what you 
think of the other participants who have been assigned the same type as you 
(i.e. participants B).  
In other words, we ask you to guess how many of today’s participants B 
(excluding yourself) will choose to transfer half the money back, and how many 
of today’s participants B will keep all the money for themselves. 
 
Please enter your guess by positioning the below slider to the desired 
percentage. 
[The below line is only for treatment T1.] 
Note: You can earn some additional income if your guess is correct. If your guess 
differs by no more than 5 percentage points from the realized value, at the end 
of the study you will receive an additional payment of £2. Otherwise, you do not 
receive an additional income. 
 
 
Screen 2 (Part I) 
 
Enter 2nd mover decision. 
 
 
Screen 3 (Part II) 
 
Insert instructions for Part II here. 
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Screen 4 (Part II) 
 
You are assigned the role of participant A 
 
Prior to entering your decision as participant A, we would like to know what you 
think of the other participants who have been assigned the same type as you 
(i.e. participants A).  
In other words, we ask you to guess how many of today’s participants A 
(excluding yourself) will choose IN, and how many of today’s participants A will 
choose OUT. 
 
Please enter your guess by positioning the below slider to the desired 
percentage. 
[The below line is only for treatment T1.] 
Note: You can earn some additional income if your guess is correct. If your guess 
differs by no more than 5 percentage points from the realized value, at the end 
of the study you will receive an additional payment of £2. Otherwise, you do not 
receive an additional income. 
 
 
Screen 5 (Part II) 
 
Enter 1st mover decision. 
 
 
Screen 6 
 
Outcome. 
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Treatment T2 
 
Screen 1 (Part I) 
You are assigned the role of participant B 
 
Prior to entering your decision as participant B, we would like to know what you 
think of the other participants who have been assigned the same type as you 
(i.e. participants B). 
In other words, we ask you to guess how many of today’s participants B 
(excluding yourself) will choose to transfer half the money back, and how many 
of today’s participants B will keep all the money for themselves. 
 
************first lower part of screen 1***** 
Please enter your guess by positioning the below slider to the desired 
percentage. 
 
************second lower part of screen 1 [to appear after subjects have entered 
their guesses]***** 
A sample of other participants B in this session expects on average that <x>% will 
transfer half the money, whereas <100-x>% will keep all the money. 
TRANSFER HALF: x% 
KEEP: (100-x)% 
 
 
Screen 2 (Part I) 
 
Enter 2nd mover decision. 
 
 
Screen 3 (Part II) 
 
Insert instructions for part II here. 
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Screen 4 (Part II) 
 
You are assigned the role of participant A 
 
Prior to entering your decision as participant A, we would like to know what you 
think of the other participants who have been assigned the same type as you 
(i.e. participants A).  
 
In other words, we ask you to guess how many of today’s participants A 
(excluding yourself) will choose IN, and how many of today’s participants A will 
choose OUT. 
 
************first lower part of screen 4***** 
Please enter your guess by positioning the below slider to the desired 
percentage. 
 
************second lower part of screen 4[to appear after subjects have entered 
their guesses]***** 
A sample of other participants A in this session expects on average that <x>% will 
OPT IN, whereas <100-x>% will OPT OUT. 
IN: x% 
OUT: (100-x)% 
 
 
Screen 5 (Part II) 
 
Enter 1st mover decision. 
 
 
Screen 6 
 
Outcome. 
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Conclusions 
The present thesis contributes to our understanding of some of the informal 
norms regulating human behaviour, namely conventions and social norms. It 
should be stressed that, although the present definitions of conventions and 
social norms differ from one another, in both cases they imply belief-based 
solutions to problems of strategic interdependence. Given the role played by 
such norms in concerting expectations, it is evident that here – when a 
convention or a social norm is in operation – it is the case that players are 
“reasoning together”. Now, unlike other models of conventions or social 
norms, the theories presented here aim at capturing the way people reason 
together by means of neutral frameworks, which can account for a wide 
range of belief-based solutions: more explicitly, in the case of coordination 
games, a salience relation is devised in such a way that need not reflect 
payoff or risk dominance, but may well be based on aesthetics, precedent, 
geometry, and so on; similarly, in the case of mixed-motive games, a social 
norm need not necessarily be egalitarian or Pareto-efficient (in effect, all is 
needed for a social norm to be followed is that players have conditionally 
conformist preferences, hold correct beliefs, and are sensitive enough to the 
social cost of deviating). Indeed, only by making use of a neutral framework 
the analyst can allow for these equilibrium selection devices to adequately 
reflect the mechanisms of a very wide range of economically-relevant rule-
based phenomena, such as fashions, bargains and contracts.    
 This thesis has further developed the idea that informal norms vary 
because of changes in objective circumstances as well as because of 
subjective changes in perceptions or expectations. In this connection, the 
experiment has provided evidence of conformist motivations being present in 
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mixed-motive games, showing that exogenously varying expectations has an 
impact on behaviour. In this respect – given that here perceptions and 
expectations play such a crucial role – it is important to stress that in order for 
a game-theoretic account of norms to provide meaningful insights, one 
necessarily needs to combine deduction with empirical observation. In effect, 
only thanks to the empirical approach one may be able to observe and 
formalize which strategic principles players are likely to use: as observed by 
Camerer [2003], «[i]t is unlikely that a purely mathematical theory of rational 
play will ever fully identify which of many equilibria are likely to emerge 
because history, shared background, and the way strategies are described or 
made psychologically prominent surely matter. As a result, experiments and 
observation of the sort that naturalists do in biology can potentially do what 
mathematical analysis cannot – predict what will happen» (Camerer [2003], 
p. 337). 
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